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Abstract 
This dissertation is an elaboration and defense of probabilism, the view that belief 
comes in various degrees of strength, and that the probability calculus provides 
coherence norms for these degrees of belief. Probabilism faces several well-known 
objections. For example, critics object that probabilism’s numerical representation of 
degrees of belief is too precise, and that its coherence norms are too demanding for real 
human agents to follow. While probabilists have developed several plausible responses 
to these objections, the compatibility among these responses is unclear. On this basis, I 
argue that probabilists must articulate unified methodological and normative 
foundations for their view, and I sketch the foundations of a probabilist modeling 
framework, the Comparative Confidence Framework (CCF). CCF characterizes 
probabilism primarily as an account of ideal degree of belief coherence. CCF provides a 
set of fundamentally qualitative and comparative—rather than quantitative—
evaluative ideals for degree of belief coherence. By providing qualitative, comparative, 
evaluative coherence norms for degrees of belief, CCF avoids the aforementioned 
objections: that probabilism’s formal representation of degrees of belief is too precise, 
and that its norms are too demanding. CCF is a first step in the development of unified 
foundations for a wider subjectivist Bayesian theory of doxastic and pragmatic 
rationality. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Précis of the Project 
This dissertation is about probabilism. In particular, as the title indicates, it’s about 
probabilism’s methodological and normative foundations. Put very broadly, probabilism 
is a philosophical application of the probability calculus—the mathematical theory of 
probability—to characterize norms for apportioning our confidence in the truth of 
claims. Philosophical applications of probability have become very popular recently. 
Philosophers have been using probabilistic tools in the philosophy of science and 
decision theory for most of the last century. But, recently, metaphysicians, philosophers 
of language, ethicists, and “mainstream” epistemologists have also begun to employ 
probabilistic tools with increasing regularity.1 So, reflection on the philosophical 
foundations underlying this tool is clearly in order. 
Probabilism is one of the core components of subjective Bayesianism,2 a highly 
fruitful and influential research program in epistemology, philosophy of science, 
                                                          
1See Titelbaum (2013, p. 3) for a more detailed list of some recent philosophical 
applications of probability. 
2I write of “subjective Bayesianism” to refer to the version of Bayesianism that uses 
probabilities primarily to represent—or normatively model—degrees of belief, which 
are subjective mental states. Many Bayesians—objective Bayesians—employ the 
probability calculus primarily—sometimes exclusively—to represent or model other 
objective quantities, like confirmational, evidential, and logical support relations, 
objective chances, and relative frequencies. Thus, objective Bayesians hold that these 
quantities conform to the probability axioms in accord with a principle akin to (2) below. 
Many subjective Bayesians use probabilities to represent the aforementioned objective 
quantities too, but the use of probabilities to represent degrees of belief is distinctive of 
subjective Bayesianism. 
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decision theory, and statistics. Subjective Bayesianism’s successes in illuminating and 
solving problems in these areas are well documented.3 However, subjective Bayesianism 
is not a strongly unified movement. Subjective Bayesians often disagree about how 
exactly to characterize their view.4  I will follow Easwaran (2011, p. 312) in characterizing 
subjective Bayesianism in terms of the following three commitments: 
(1) there is kind of a gradational belief-like mental state, called “degree of belief”; 
(2) at any given time, one’s degrees of belief ought to be faithfully representable 
with a probability function; and 
(3) one’s degrees of belief ought to change over time in light of new evidence 
according to the principle known as “conditionalization.”5 
Subjective Bayesians typically also accept some combination of several other 
probabilistic principles for degrees of belief, including the regularity principle, the 
principal principle, the principle of indifference, the reflection principle, and other 
alternatives to these principles.6 
                                                          
3See, e.g., Earman (1992, Chs. 3 & 4), Howson & Urbach (2006), Hájek & Hartman (2010). 
4Some Bayesians hold that what is distinctive of Bayesianism is the centrality of Bayes 
theorem. Others think that it is the degree of belief interpretation of probability. See 
Weisberg (2011) for an account of the differences among Bayesians. 
5According to conditionalization, assuming the representation of an agent’s degrees of 
belief with a real-valued function, 𝑐𝑟(⋅): ℒ → ℜ, where ℒ is a logical language, if the 
agent learns some claim, 𝐴 ∈ ℒ, then the agent’s degrees of belief, represented by 𝑐𝑟(⋅
) should update in light of this new information. If the agent’s old degrees of belief were 
aptly represented by 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑑(⋅), then the agent’s degrees of belief in light of learning 𝐴 
should be aptly represented by 𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(⋅) = 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑑(⋅ |𝐴). Furthermore, if 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑑(⋅) is 
probabilistically coherent and 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝐴)  ≠ 0, then 𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(⋅)  is coherent too, and 
𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝐴) = 1. See Easwaran (2011, p. 314). 
6See Lewis (1980) for his original statement of the principal principle. See van Fraassen 
(1984) for the original statement of the reflection principle. See Keynes (1921) for the 
principle of indifference, and see Jaynes (2003) for its modern reincarnation, the 
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Probabilism can be characterized as a commitment to the first two core tenets of 
subjective Bayesianism, that is, as the view that we have degrees of belief, and at any 
given time they ought to be faithfully representable as probabilities. Thus, probabilism 
constitutes the synchronic core of subjective Bayesianism, while conditionalization can 
be said to be its core diachronic principle.7  
“Probabilism” is often used to refer both to a commitment to tenets (1) and (2), and 
to the latter principle. Hereafter, I will reserve “probabilism” to refer to the view 
constituted by the commitment to (1) and (2), and I will refer to (2) considered 
independently as “the probabilist norm.”   
To some readers familiar with probabilism and the notion of degree of belief, my 
statement of (1) and (2) above in terms of the representation of degrees of belief with 
numerical functions might look a little funny. For many probabilists take it as a foregone 
conclusion that degrees of belief are representable with numerical functions. Indeed, 
many probabilists seem to hold that degrees of belief somehow are numerical functions. 
But that’s not how I think of degrees of belief. For my purposes in this dissertation, 
degree of belief is a kind of doxastic attitude in its own right, akin to the traditional 
epistemological notion of categorical belief. For my purposes at this point, I ask the 
reader to think of degree of belief as an attitude that the world is a particular way, an 
attitude which can be weaker or stronger rather than all-or-nothing. At this point, I make 
                                                          
principle of maximum entropy. For a thorough list of statements of the principle of 
regularity as well as critical discussion, see Hájek (MSb) and Hájek (2013). 
7I should note that conditionalization is more controversial than probabilism. For a 
thorough discussion of alternate update rules, see Titelbaum (2013). 
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no assumptions about the relationships among degrees of belief and any other putative 
kinds of doxastic state: for example, I do not assume that categorical beliefs can be 
reduced to degrees of belief or vice versa. I will say more about these connections in 
later chapters, especially Chapters 2 and 4. Probabilism holds that our degrees of belief 
ought to be faithfully representable with probability functions. 
Probabilism is an attractive view for several reasons. First, the notion of degree of 
belief often comes in handy for describing our doxastic states in particular cases. For 
example, our commitments to certain claims often seem to grow weaker or stronger in 
light of changes in evidence. Degrees of belief allow us to characterize these changes 
more precisely than the traditional notion of categorical belief alone. Second, 
probabilities seem to be apt for characterizing degrees of belief and their logic. The 
probability calculus can be viewed as a gradational extension of classical deductive logic, 
and it characterizes a kind of coherence akin to deductive consistency. Since many 
epistemologists accept deductive consistency as a kind of norm for categorical belief, 
the probabilist norm is an attractive analogue for degrees of belief.8 Furthermore, as 
Titelbaum (2013, pp. 3-4) notes, probabilities are capable of capturing complex and 
varied evidential relationships. So, probabilities are very useful for representing how 
degrees of belief ought to accord with evidence. Finally, as a component of subjective 
Bayesianism, probabilism suggests illuminating positions on important problems in 
                                                          
8I do not mean here to endorse deductive consistency as a norm for categorical belief. 
Nor do I intend to suggest that the plausibility of the probabilist norm stands and falls 
with the plausibility of a consistency norm for categorical belief. See, e.g., Christensen 
(2004) and Easwaran & Fitelson (2015) for relevant discussion. 
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epistemology like the lottery and preface paradoxes, and the problem of (peer) 
disagreement. 
Given probabilism’s attractive features and track record, it is no surprise that 
probabilists are keen to apply their theory to every problem they can get their 
theoretical hands on. Indeed, many of the papers in the probabilist literature take a 
standard format: the author immediately characterizes probabilism with some variants 
of (1) and (2) followed shortly by an application of the theory to some particular problem 
by way of lots of formalism without much explicit interpretation of this formalism. This 
format makes a lot of sense: probabilism is a simple, powerful view, ripe for applications; 
it is fairly easy to grasp without a lot of explicit interpretation of the formalism. 
While probabilism’s simplicity, power, and intuitiveness are undoubtedly 
theoretical virtues, they have the side effect that the view is rarely articulated in 
sufficient detail.9 Probabilists rarely take much time to explain what degrees of belief 
really are. They rarely present their probabilistic formalism in detail. And they don’t spill 
much ink explaining how probabilism’s formalism should be applied to particular cases, 
or how these applications should be interpreted to yield normative verdicts about 
degrees of belief. Fortunately, these words from Savage (1972, p. 1) still seem to hold 
true: “…here, as elsewhere, catastrophe is avoided, primarily because in practical 
situations common sense saves all but the most pedantic of us from flagrant error.” 
                                                          
9 Titelbaum (2013) is a notable exception. Indeed, much of this project is inspired by—
and intended as response to—the early chapters of that book. 
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While the tenets of probabilism are not often articulated very fully or explicitly, the view 
is developed and revealed in its applications. 
Despite its various attractive features and successful applications, probabilism is not 
without critics. It is subject to several important, well-known objections. Critics—often 
probabilists themselves—have objected to probabilism’s precise numerical 
representation of degrees of belief. They have also objected to the excessive 
demandingness of the probabilist norm’s requirement that our degrees of belief should 
be representable probabilistically. The probabilist norm seems to require us to be 
opinionated, with judgments about every logical combination of claims in our ken, and 
logically omniscient, certain of all logical truths. These requirements are far beyond our 
mnemonic and computational capacities. 
Probabilists have developed several broad strategies for responding to these 
objections. For example, they’ve explained that the view’s numerical precision is a kind 
of methodological idealization, a simplification for the sake of representational and 
computational simplicity and tractability. They’ve also explained that the view is a 
normative idealization as well: it is not meant to describe the way actual agents typically 
apportion their degrees of belief; rather, it is meant to characterize the notion of ideal 
degree of belief or some other such normative notion. These are just a couple of the 
probabilist strategies for avoiding objections. 
In general, probabilists seem to be pretty well satisfied with these responses to the 
standard objections. When any of the standard objections threaten an application of the 
theory, probabilists acknowledge the appearance of the problem, deploy the 
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appropriate response strategy, explain how the objection arises out of a naïve or 
unsophisticated interpretation or application of the view, and then they get on with 
their business.  
The resulting dialectic is self-perpetuating. Probabilism’s typical under-articulation 
leaves it open to the standard objections. Probabilists deploy their fleet of standard 
responses to these objections, but they do so piecemeal. The standard responses are 
individually plausible ways of deflecting or dissolving particular objections and filling in 
some of the details of the view. But it’s not entirely clear that these responses can be 
employed coherently in unison to fill out probabilism’s details in a plausible way. So 
when a probabilist deploys one of the standard responses to deflect one of the standard 
objections, it usually leaves room for the other standard objections to creep back in. It’s 
kind of like trying to smooth out a bump in a rug.  If you manage to smooth things out 
in one area, the problem crops up somewhere else. It’s not clear that the probabilists 
can get the rug to lie flat. 
I contend that probabilists must provide a unified articulation of probabilism’s 
foundations in order to avoid the standard objections. To articulate their view’s 
methodological foundations, probabilists must carefully articulate their formal system, 
its interpretation, and its domain of application.10 Probabilists must specify whether 
their formalism is set-theoretic or logical, qualitative or quantitative, precise or 
                                                          
10The following aspects of probabilism’s methodological foundations correspond to the 
elements of a well-articulated formal modeling framework characterized by Titelbaum 
(2013, p. 31). 
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imprecise, etc. While it is a pain to articulate these features of the view, these choices 
make a big difference in what probabilism amounts to. Once probabilists have specified 
their formalism, they must provide its standard interpretation. This means 
characterizing degrees of belief, which it is meant to represent, explaining how degrees 
of belief are represented in the formalism, and explaining how features of the 
representation can be applied to degrees of belief by explaining how the formalism 
characterizes some normative notion like good, right, or rational degree of belief, and 
by explaining how the formalism can be used to generate normative verdicts about 
degrees of belief in particular cases. Probabilists must also delimit their view’s domain 
of application by specifying when it can and cannot be aptly applied. They must clarify 
whether their formalism is to be applied to represent agents’ entire doxastic state or 
just local parts. And it would be helpful if they could characterize contexts in which 
probabilism may not be apt for representing degrees of belief. 
An important part of specifying the interpretation of probabilism’s formalism is 
specifying the normative foundations of the view. As I note above, probabilists must 
characterize the normative notion their formalism is supposed to capture. They must 
also carefully formulate the probabilist norm. They must specify its logical structure 
(whether it is wide or narrow scope, strict or slack, positive or negative polarity), and 
they must characterize its normative force (evaluative, deontic, or hypological). 
Furthermore, they should characterize the source of this normativity. This may mean 
more than simply appealing to one of the standard arguments for probabilism, like the 
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Dutch book argument or the epistemic utility arguments. These arguments should not 
only justify the probabilist norm, but also help to characterize it and its normative force. 
My purpose in this dissertation is to show why probabilists need to better articulate 
the foundations of their view, to characterize what exactly it means to do this, and to 
provide an account of the core aspects of these foundations. As Savage (1972, p. 1) 
suggests, theory-building is unlike house-building insofar as foundations don’t come 
first. However, I contend that probabilism has reached a level of theoretical maturity 
where its foundations can no longer be ignored. This dissertation is an attempt to 
demonstrate the need for an articulation of the foundations of probabilism and to 
defend one way to do so.  
1.2 Chapter Outlines 
This dissertation has four substantive chapters. Chapter 2 is devoted to presenting 
probabilism in detail. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to present probabilism, the 
subject of this dissertation; and to demonstrate various ways in which probabilism still 
needs some filling in. I describe the most prominent proposals for fleshing out the view, 
and point out some unconsidered and undeveloped approaches. First I present common 
probabilist characterizations of degree of belief. Probabilists are committed to the 
existence of this doxastic state, and to its representability with real-valued probability 
functions. But they usually don’t explain in enough detail what it means for agents to 
have degrees of belief, what the objects of degrees of belief are supposed to be, what 
it means for beliefs to come in degrees, how degrees of belief relate to other doxastic 
states, or why real-valued functions, probability functions in particular, are apt for 
10 
 
representing degrees of belief. Next I consider the probabilist norm, according to which 
degrees of belief should obey—or conform to—the probability calculus. I present both 
set-theoretic and logical versions of the probability axioms, and I consider  prominent 
views about what it means for degrees of belief to obey—or be representable as 
conforming to—these axioms. Finally, I present the three main classes of arguments that 
have been proposed to justify the probabilist norm: Dutch book arguments, 
representation theorem arguments, and epistemic utility arguments. I explain how each 
of these justifications also serves as partial characterization of probabilism, and I explain 
how each of them yields a slightly different characterization of degrees of belief. 
Chapter 3 characterizes the main elements of the dialectic between probabilists and 
their critics. I focus on three main sources of criticism: probabilism’s numerical 
representation of degrees of belief; its requirement that agents should be 
opinionated—that they should have degrees of belief about everything; and 
probabilism’s logical omniscience requirement—that agents should be certain of all 
logical truths. I present objections to these aspects of probabilism, and describe 
probabilist responses to these objections. I show how this dialectic raises deep 
questions about the foundations of probabilism. I draw out of this dialectic several 
general strategies that probabilists use to respond to objections, and I show how these 
strategies amount to commitments to views about probabilism’s normative and 
methodological foundations. I show how some of these strategies seem to constitute 
conflicting commitments about the nature of probabilism’s foundations. Finally, I argue 
that probabilists need to articulate these foundations in a unified, systematic way in 
11 
 
order to adequately address their critics’ objections and demonstrate the co-tenability 
of their responses. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I sketch a unified account of probabilism’s foundations. In 
Chapter 4 I focus on methodological foundations. First I briefly explain the virtues and 
vices of appealing to formal methods in general, and specifically those that come with 
appealing to probabilities to represent degrees of belief. I refer to this discussion 
throughout the remainder of the chapter in order to better explain the goals of applying 
probabilism’s formalism and to show how to avoid certain pitfalls. Then I defend three 
main methodological positions. I defend a logical—rather than set-theoretic—
formalism, on the basis that this approach is necessary for the appropriate modeling of 
non-ideal agents. I defend a fundamentally qualitative and comparative formalism, 
which allows us to better understand and avoid objections to probabilism’s 
mathematical/numerical precision, and which allows us to state more intuitive and 
perspicuous connections between this formalism and norms for degrees of belief. I also 
defend a global—rather than merely local—approach to probabilist modeling, according 
to which probabilist modeling not only generates normative verdicts about particular 
cases, but also characterizes general connections between the probability calculus and 
norms for degrees of belief.   
Chapter 5 is devoted to probabilism’s normative foundations. I defend several 
normative positions. First, I lay out the apparatus of bridge principles—principles that 
connect the probabilist formalism with degree of belief norms—and I distinguish several 
different parameters that can be varied in the formulation of these principles. I defend 
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a kind of normative pluralism, according to which there are a various different 
normative connections between the probability calculus and degrees of belief. But then 
I focus on elaborating a set of evaluative—rather than deontic or hypological—
probabilistic coherence norms. Finally, I justify these bridge principles on the basis that 
while none of the standard arguments for the probabilist norm suffice on their own, 
together these arguments, along with subjective Bayesianism’s many successes, provide 
strong support for normative connections between the probability calculus and degrees 
of belief. 
1.3 Terminological & Notational Conventions 
To allay future confusion, I want to announce (and in some cases reiterate) some 
terminological and notional conventions I will employ in the remainder of the 
dissertation.  It’s a little awkward to present these conventions out of context, and I will 
remind the reader of these conventions at various points in later chapters. However, the 
literature on probabilism is so full of conflicting uses of technical terms and formalism 
that I think that I should sort out some of these issues up front. 
1.3.1 Probabilism & the Probabilist Norm 
The subject of this dissertation is probabilism. By “probabilism” I mean the view 
that posits the existence of degrees of belief and invokes probability theory as a kind of 
logic and a source of norms for these degrees of belief. Some probabilists also use 
“probabilism” to refer to the norm or principle that degrees of belief ought to conform 
to the axioms and theorems of the probability calculus. To avoid confusing the view with 
the norm, I will refer to the norm as “the probabilist norm.” 
13 
 
1.3.2 Doxastic Attitudes 
In this dissertation I talk a lot about doxastic attitudes, mental states about the way 
the world is (as opposed to how we desire, intend, or imagine the world to be). In 
particular, I talk a lot about three main kinds of doxastic attitudes: degree of belief, 
categorical belief, and comparative confidence. These doxastic attitudes are all known 
by many different names in the literature, and there are many different views about 
how these attitudes relate to each other. Below I briefly explain the terms I will use to 
refer to these attitudes. 
I focus primarily on degree of belief. For, as I just noted, one of the core tenets of 
probabilism is the claim that there is a gradational belief-like mental state called “degree 
of belief.” Probabilists use various terms to refer to degrees of belief in addition to the 
term “degree of belief.” They use such terms as “credence,” “degree of credence,” 
“degree of confidence,” “level of confidence,” and “partial belief.” While some 
probabilists might acknowledge subtle distinctions among the notions these terms pick 
out, I do not. I take all of these terms to pick out a kind of gradational doxastic state akin 
to the traditional notion of categorical belief. To avoid confusion, I will try to avoid 
variation and stick to using “degree of belief” to refer to this mental state.  However, in 
some cases, it is more natural to talk about degrees of belief in terms of confidence or 
degrees of confidence. So, I diverge from “degree of belief”-talk from time to time. I may 
also slip up from time to time, and slip into using “credence”-talk, etc. Sorry in advance. 
In addition to degree of belief, I will also discuss categorical belief and comparative 
confidence. Categorical belief is a categorical, all-or-nothing attitude about the way the 
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world is. Comparative confidence is a comparative judgment of the relative strength of 
an agent’s confidence in two claims.  Like degree of belief, these attitudes are also often 
referred to by several names in the literature. Categorical belief is often called “belief,” 
“full belief,” “binary belief,” “flat-out belief,” “all-or-nothing belief,” and more. While 
comparative confidence is not discussed as often as categorical belief or degree of 
belief, it is also known by multiple names. It is sometimes referred to as “comparative 
probability” or “qualitative probability.”  
Though I have introduced different terms for degree of belief, categorical belief, 
and comparative confidence, I do not assume that these are genuinely distinct kinds of 
doxastic attitudes. As I note above, there are many different views about how these 
attitudes relate to each other. For example, many probabilists hold that categorical 
beliefs are simply a species of degree of belief. Others hold that both categorical belief 
and degree of belief can be reduced to comparative confidence judgments. In the end, 
I will hold that degree of belief and comparative confidence are really the same kind of 
gradational doxastic attitude.11 However, at this point, I want to be able to talk about 
these attitudes as though they are distinct, whether or not they actually are. 
1.3.3 Formal Representations of Doxastic Attitudes 
In addition to talking a lot about the aforementioned doxastic attitudes themselves, 
I will also talk a lot about their formal representations. In particular, I’ll talk a lot about 
the formal representation of degrees of belief with real-valued functions. So, while I will 
                                                          
11 I will not take a stand on the relationship between categorical belief and degree of 
belief. 
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treat the terms “degree of belief” and “credence” as co-referential in what follows, I will 
use “credence function” rather than “degree of belief function” to refer to the 
mathematical functions probabilists use to represent degrees of belief. This is because I 
want to be very clear that degrees of belief are distinct from the functions that represent 
them. Degrees of belief are mental states that are not necessarily numerical; credence 
functions are functions from expressions of a formal language (sentences or sets) to real 
numbers between 0 and 1. I hope that adopting this terminological strategy will help 
both me and my reader to avoid conflating degrees of belief and credence functions. 
Likewise, I want to avoid conflating the other doxastic states, categorical belief and 
comparative confidence, with their formal representations. I will not discuss the formal 
representations of categorical belief in this dissertation, so I will set aside that issue. 
However, I will discuss the formal representation of comparative confidence judgments 
with what I call “comparative confidence relations.” The comparative confidence 
relations (≽, ≻, ≈, and ∼) are relations in a formal language. They are designed to 
represent agents’ confidence comparisons, but they may not necessarily do so perfectly. 
There may be aspects of confidence comparisons that are not faithfully represented by 
comparative confidence relations, and there may be features of the comparative 
confidence relations that comparative confidence judgments lack. Thus, I want to avoid 
conflating comparative confidence judgments with the comparative confidence 
relations that represent them. 
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1.3.4 Logical & Mathematical Formalism 
I assume a familiarity with some logic and mathematics. I will not attempt to survey 
those assumptions here. However, I do want to present the logical and mathematical 
notation I will employ, which is summarized in the following table. 
Table 1: Logical & Mathematical Symbols 
Symbol Interpretation 
𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, … , 𝐴1, 𝐵1, … Metalinguistic variables for sentences of a formal language 
¬ Negation 
∧ Conjunction 
∨ Disjunction 
→ Material conditional 
↔ Material biconditional 
A, B, C, … Sets 
A − B 
A̅ 
Set-theoretic difference (the set of members of A not in B) 
Set-theoretic complement of A (in the context of a set of all 
elements of interest, ,   A̅ =  A) 
∩ Intersection 
∪ Union 
∈ Set membership 
⊂ Subset relation 
⊆ Proper subset relation 
𝑐𝑟(⋅) Unconditional credence function 
𝑐𝑟(⋅ | ⋅) Conditional credence function 
𝑝𝑟(⋅) Unconditional probability function 
𝑝𝑟(⋅ | ⋅) Conditional probability function 
≻ Strict comparative probability relation  
≽ Weak comparative probability relation 
≈ Comparative probability indifference relation 
∼ Comparative confidence indeterminacy relation 
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2 Probabilism 
Here’s a pretty typical two-tenet characterization of probabilism: 
1. beliefs come in degrees, and 
2. degrees of belief ought to conform to the probability calculus.12 
According to this characterization, probabilism is a commitment to the existence of a 
particular kind of doxastic state, degree of belief, and to a norm for degrees of belief. 
Obviously, this characterization is incomplete. It leaves a lot of room for 
interpretation and further characterization. The first tenet tells us that we have degrees 
of belief. But it doesn’t tell us what degrees of belief are, what their objects are, what it 
means for them to come in degrees, how they relate to other doxastic states (if there 
are any), how they should be represented formally, or why we should think there are 
degrees of belief in the first place. And the probabilist norm tells us that the axioms of 
the probability calculus are normative constraints on the apportionment of degrees of 
belief. But it doesn’t tell us how the probability axioms, which specify a kind of real-
valued function, serve as norms for a kind of doxastic state. Probabilists must explain 
how degrees of belief can be represented with real-valued functions and how the 
axioms and theorems of the probability calculus can be applied to degrees of belief as 
norms.13 For while the probabilist norm sounds innocuous to the initiated, it can sound 
like a category mistake to those who are not steeped in Bayesian lore. 
                                                          
12For similar statements of probabilism see, for example, Eriksson & Hájek (2007, p. 
183), Hájek (2008, pp. 793-794), Kaplan (2010, p. 42), Joyce (1998, pp. 575-576; 2009, 
pp. 263-264), Zynda (2000, p. 45), and Pettigrew (2011). 
13This second task is often ignored by probabilists.  Titelbaum (2013) stresses this point. 
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Thus, this common characterization of probabilism leaves many questions 
unanswered. That’s not too surprising, since it’s stated in just one sentence. But the 
problem, as I note in the introduction, is that probabilists rarely answer these questions 
very explicitly. They tend to focus instead on applications of the view. And while 
probabilists do give various arguments designed to justify the probabilist norm, and 
these arguments do begin to fill in the details of the view, they do not do so very 
explicitly or completely. Since probabilism is the subject of this dissertation, my purpose 
in this chapter is to present the probabilist thesis in detail. But, since probabilism is rarely 
presented in much detail, my approach will be to consider each of probabilism’s two 
core tenets, pointing out the ways in which the view is under-articulated, and presenting 
some of the usual options for filling it out and justifying it. 
§2.1 is devoted to characterizing degrees of belief. §2.2 is a survey of the main 
reasons that probabilists posit degrees of belief. §2.3 is an explanation of the probabilist 
norm, including a presentation of the probability calculus and its typical presentation as 
a source of norms for degrees of belief. §2.4 is a survey of the main arguments 
probabilists give to justify the probabilist norm, including Dutch book arguments, 
representation theorem arguments, epistemic utility arguments, and what I call 
“normative triangulation” arguments. 
2.1 What Are Degrees of Belief? 
Probabilism’s first tenet posits the existence of a gradational doxastic state called 
“degree of belief.” But, as I note above, it doesn’t tell us what it means to have this 
particular kind of doxastic attitude, what its objects are, what it means for it to come in 
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degrees, how it relates to other kinds of doxastic states that are commonly posited in 
epistemology, or how exactly it should be represented formally. In this section, I’ll 
pursue these questions in order, announcing the different options that probabilists have 
for answering them. 
Before I continue, I want to expand on some comments I made in the introduction 
intended to allay confusion about my conception of degree of belief. As I note in §1.3, 
degree of belief is a concept that goes by many names: “degree of belief,” “credence,” 
“degree of credence,” “partial belief,” “degree of confidence,” “level of confidence,” 
and more. Different authors employ different terms for various reasons, and some 
acknowledge subtle distinctions among these terms and among the concepts to which 
they refer.14 In this dissertation, I will treat these terms as co-referential. 
To some probabilists, it may sound odd to talk about degrees of belief as mental 
states that can be considered independently of the probability calculus, and to raise the 
question, as I do above, of how degrees of belief relate to probabilities. This is because 
the notion of degree of belief emerged out of the subjective interpretation of probability 
(Titelbaum 2013, p. 16). On this conception, it doesn’t make much sense to ask whether 
degrees of belief should be represented formally as probabilities, or whether the 
probability axioms are appropriate norms for degrees of belief. 
As I explained in the introduction, this is not how I think of degree of belief. I think 
that we can consider the notion of degree of belief independently, without reference to 
                                                          
14See, for example, Sturgeon (2010), who prefers to trade in terms of confidence, and 
who reserves “credence” to refer to sharp numerical subjective probabilities. 
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probability.15 I think of degree of belief as a legitimate doxastic attitude in its own right, 
akin to the traditional epistemological notion of belief. I think that real human agents 
have degrees of belief, just as we are typically thought to have beliefs. I do not reserve 
“degree of belief” to refer to the doxastic attitudes of ideally rational agents. I do not 
think of degrees of belief as necessarily explicitly numerical, precise, or complete. I see 
my view of degree of belief as continuous with traditional epistemological theorizing 
about belief. I think it is meaningful to ask why and how degrees of belief should be 
represented formally. And I think it is meaningful to ask whether probability functions 
are apt for this purpose, and whether probabilistic coherence is an appropriate norm 
for degrees of belief. So, I ask the reader to set aside the conception of degree of belief 
as the subjective interpretation of probability, and, in what follows, I invite the reader 
to consider afresh what exactly degrees of belief are, whether and how they should be 
represented formally, and which norms are appropriate for them. 
2.1.1 What Does It Mean to Have Degrees of Belief? 
Part of understanding what degrees of belief are is understanding what it means to 
have them. Degrees of belief are a kind of doxastic state or attitude.16 The notion 
doxastic attitude seems to be a precisification of the folk psychological notion of belief, 
which is, roughly, a mental attitude about the way the world is. Doxastic attitudes are 
distinguished from so-called “conative,” desire-like attitudes by their “mind-to-world” 
                                                          
15Here I echo Titelbaum (2013). 
16I do not distinguish between doxastic states and doxastic attitudes. Some use “doxastic 
state” to refer to all of one’s doxastic attitudes at a time. I call that one’s “total doxastic 
state.” 
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rather than “world-to-mind” direction of fit.17 That is, doxastic attitudes are oriented at 
fitting the way the world is, whereas conative attitudes are oriented at changing the 
world to fit themselves. Epistemologists and philosophers of mind have developed 
several theories of what it means to have doxastic attitudes—to have beliefs qua mental 
states. These theories include eliminativism, instrumentalism, functionalism, 
representationalism, dispositionalism, interpretationalism, and primitivism. Probabilists 
can adapt these theories to degree of belief, giving them several options for accounts of 
what it means to have degrees of belief. In this subsection, I will survey these options 
and note connections with common probabilist characterizations of degree of belief.18 
Eliminativism about doxastic states is the view that there are no doxastic states, and 
that, accordingly, the notion doxastic state should be abandoned. Thus, eliminativists 
must deny the existence of degrees of belief. Since probabilism’s first tenet is a 
commitment to the existence of degrees of belief, and since probabilism is predicated 
on the theoretical utility of degree of belief, eliminativism is incompatible with 
probabilism. 
                                                          
17 According to Humberstone (1992), the distinction between mind-to-world and world-
to-mind direction of fit is due to Anscombe (1957). The direction of fit terminology was 
popularized by Smith (1987, 1988, 1994). While this terminology is evocative and, thus, 
helpful in distinguishing doxastic and conative attitudes, its use has been criticized (see 
Sobel & Copp 2001). I employ this terminology here and later in the dissertation to 
provide a rough characterization of doxastic attitudes. I do not fully endorse the 
“direction of fit” theory of attitudes. 
18The characterizations of the accounts of the nature of degree of belief surveyed below 
draw heavily on Eriksson & Hájek (2007) and Schwitzgebel (2011). 
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While probabilism is incompatible with eliminativism, it is compatible with at least 
some forms of instrumentalism. Soft instrumentalism about doxastic states is the view 
that there are doxastic states, but that they are not robustly real. As Schwitzgebel (2011, 
§1.5) notes, a soft instrumentalist about doxastic states might compare them to entities 
like the equator, centers of gravity, or the average American. There is no thin red line 
painted around the earth, but it is nonetheless meaningful to explain the location of 
Quito, Ecuador by appeal to the equator. The equator is less real than Quito, but more 
than a mere fiction. Likewise there may not be any concrete phenomena that can be 
called “degrees of belief,” but degrees of belief might nonetheless exist and degree of 
belief might be theoretically useful. Hard instrumentalism about doxastic states is the 
view that—strictly speaking—there are no doxastic states, but that it can be 
theoretically useful to talk as if there are. For the same reason that probabilism is 
incompatible with eliminativism, it seems to be incompatible with hard 
instrumentalism. I think, however, that probabilism’s first tenet could be modified to 
make it compatible with hard instrumentalism: rather than positing the existence of 
degrees of belief, it might merely state that it is useful to talk as if there are degrees of 
belief. Depending on the details, each of the views presented below can be given an 
instrumentalist interpretation. Dispositionalism and interpretationalism are especially 
amenable to instrumentalist interpretations.19 
                                                          
19Indeed, you might even think that these views require at least a soft form of 
instrumentalism. 
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Functionalism about doxastic attitudes is the view that what makes something a 
doxastic attitude of a certain kind are its actual, potential, or typical causal relationships, 
especially causal relationships with other mental states, sensory stimulation, and 
observable behavior (Schwitzgebel, 2011, §1.4). Functionalism can be further 
characterized in many different ways depending on which causal roles we treat as 
distinctive of the kind of doxastic state in question. Some examples of these 
characteristic causal roles are relations to the tendency to assert, the tendency to be 
formed in response to perceptual experiences, the tendency to infer the logical 
consequences of the content of one’s doxastic states, and the tendency to produce 
actions when combined with certain desires and intentions (Schwitzgebel, 2011, §1.4). 
The other accounts of the nature of doxastic states surveyed below can all be viewed as 
versions of functionalism. 
Eriksson & Hájek (2007, p. 196) characterize Ramsey (1964) as the first functionalist 
probabilist. Ramsey held that degrees of belief are the things, which when combined 
with desires—or more precisely utilities—serve as the bases of our actions. Ramsey’s 
view also has affinities with interpretationalism, as I will discuss below. 
Representationalism is the view that having a doxastic attitude toward a doxastic 
object is just a matter of having a particular mental representation that captures the 
content of the doxastic object (Schwitzgebel, 2011, §1.1).20 These representations play 
                                                          
20Representationalism in this sense is not to be confused with characterizations of 
degrees of belief in terms of representation theorem arguments for probabilism, which 
have close ties to interpretationalism. 
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a causal role in mental operations (like inferences and decisions) and the production of 
behavior (like language use and all manner of other actions). Representationalists offer 
different proposals about exactly what these mental representations are and how they 
must be stored in the mind in order to count as doxastic—rather than, for example, 
conative or imaginative—representations. Fodor (1975), for example, suggests that they 
are sentences in a species-wide internal “language of thought.” These representations 
count as doxastic attitudes when they are stored in one’s “belief box.”  
It’s not entirely clear how the representationalist probabilist would account for the 
gradational structure of degrees of belief. They might hold that mental representations 
bear markers or valences of some kind that indicate strength of confidence. Or they 
might hold that the “belief box” is structured, with stronger degrees of belief residing in 
one region, and weaker degrees of belief residing in another. They might even think of 
degrees of belief as mental representations that are explicitly probabilistic. For example, 
on this view, a strong degree of belief that Elvis was a member of the Beatles might be 
constituted by a sentence in the language of thought equivalent to “it is highly probable 
that Elvis was one of the Beatles.”21 The representationalist probabilist would have to 
                                                          
21For arguments against placing the gradational structure of degrees of belief into the 
content of doxastic objects, see Christensen (2004, pp. 18-20) and Eriksson & Hájek 
(2007, pp. 206-207). These arguments do not concern representationalist theories of 
doxastic states in particular. Rather, they criticize the general strategy of treating 
degrees of belief as categorical beliefs with probabilistic content. 
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modify the standard representationalist accounts of belief in order to fully specify their22 
view. 
Dispositionalism is the view that having a particular doxastic attitude is a matter of 
having particular mental or behavioral dispositions (Schwitzgebel, 2011, §1.2). 
Dispositionalism comes in a few different forms. It is often spelled out as the view that 
being in a particular doxastic state is just a matter of the pattern of one’s actual and 
potential behavior. On this kind of view, to have a particular degree of belief might be 
cashed out as the tendency to say certain things, exhibit surprise in particular 
circumstances, perform certain actions, and so on. Traditional behaviorism is a 
degenerate form of dispositionalism, according to which having a particular doxastic 
attitude is just a matter of one’s actual observable behavior. But not all forms of 
dispositionalism are purely behavioristic. More liberal forms of dispositionalism also 
explain doxastic states in terms of dispositions toward having other mental states—
possibly even other doxastic states. On this sort of view, one might count as having a 
particular degree of belief if one is disposed to speak certain ways, act certain ways, or 
even to hold certain other degrees of belief. Dispositionalism seems to be well-equipped 
to account for the gradational structure of degrees of belief, for dispositions are also 
matters of degree. An agent with a strong degree of belief that 𝐴 will have a strong 
disposition to utter “𝐴” and to have strong degrees of belief in 𝐴’s logical consequences, 
                                                          
22 I use “their” as the generic possessive pronoun here rather than “his,” “her,” 
“his/her,” or “his or her” for the sake of gender inclusiveness on the basis that many 
people do not identify with either of those genders. I follow this principle throughout 
the dissertation.  
26 
 
a weak disposition to express surprise at 𝐴, and so on. One with a weak degree of belief 
that 𝐴 will have a weak disposition to utter “𝐴,” a strong disposition to exhibit surprise 
at 𝐴, and so on.23 
The well-known betting interpretation of degrees of belief has strong affinities with 
dispositionalism. De Finetti (1974) famously advocated a behaviorist operational 
definition of “degree of belief” in terms of actual betting behavior. On his view, one’s 
degree of belief in a claim, 𝐴, is the ratio 
$x
$y
 that one deems fair for buying or selling a 
bet of $x on 𝐴 for a $y stake. De Finetti’s operationalism quickly went out of style, but 
the characterization of degrees of belief in terms of betting has been popular among 
probabilists in various iterations for a long time. The idea is that all of our decisions are 
gambles on outcomes, so rational action requires rational bets based on our belief-
strengths and our desire-strengths (our utilities). Our best current accounts of decision 
theory follow this line of thought.  
Like some forms of dispositionalism, interpretationalism also accounts for the 
nature of doxastic states in terms of behavior. However, interpretationalism also 
includes an additional appeal to a theoretical interpretive framework (Schwitzgebel, 
2011, §1.3). Whereas a behaviorist would hold that doxastic attitudes just are a subset 
of one’s actual behaviors or behavioral dispositions, the interpretationalist holds that 
one’s doxastic attitudes are theoretical entities posited to explain one’s behavior. On 
this view, what it means to be in a doxastic state is to exhibit particular behaviors (or 
                                                          
23The dispositionalist probabilist will, of course, have to account for how having low 
degree of belief that 𝐴 differs from having no such degree of belief. 
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behavioral dispositions) that can be predicted and explained by attributing the doxastic 
attitude in question, along with other doxastic, conative, and—perhaps—affective 
states. So, an interpretationalist probabilist would say that degrees of belief are 
theoretical entities posited to explain behavior. For example, one’s strong degree of 
belief that it will rain today is a doxastic state posited to explain one’s wearing a rain 
coat and carrying an umbrella. 
Interpretationalism has also long been popular among probabilists. Traces of the 
view can be found in Ramsey (1964), and it can be found more explicitly in Lewis (1974) 
and Maher (1993). Like dispositionalism, interpretationalism is often associated with 
representation theorem arguments for probabilism, which I’ll discuss in §2.4.2. 
Depending on which of these views probabilists hold, they might be characterized 
as instrumentalists or realists about degrees of belief.24 Since probabilism’s first tenet is 
a commitment to the existence of degrees of belief, probabilists’ choice among these 
accounts partially determines what kind of existential commitment this is. 
Representationalism seems to require a realism about degrees of belief. But 
dispositionalism and interpretationalism seem to be amenable to soft instrumentalist 
interpretations, according to which degrees of belief are real. The nature of this 
existential commitment will have important consequences for the plausibility of various 
aspects of probabilism, including its formal representation scheme, and the probabilist 
norm itself. 
                                                          
24Since probabilism’s first tenet asserts the existence of degrees of belief, it wouldn’t 
make sense for probabilists to be eliminativists about degree of belief. 
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Viewed as analyses or explications of degree of belief, functionalism, 
representationalism, dispositionalism, and interpretationalism all face serious 
objections.25 Primitivism is an alternative approach to characterizing degrees of belief. 
Primitivism about degrees of belief is the view that degree of belief is a primitive 
concept—a concept that cannot be faithfully reduced to, or analyzed or explicated in 
terms of other concepts.26 While primitivism about degrees of belief denies that degree 
of belief can be analyzed or explicated, it does not deny that it can be characterized. On 
this view, we can say many interesting and fruitful things about degrees of belief, 
without analyzing degree of belief. Indeed, the arguments for probabilism can be viewed 
as providing such characterizations. As Eriksson & Hájek (2007, p. 209) note, some of 
the arguments for probabilism (to be discussed in §2.4) seem to assume primitivism 
about degrees of belief. The difficulties of analyzing degree of belief, in turn, serve as 
evidence that it is a natural primitive. So do the fruits of subjective Bayesianism. 
Prima facie, there’s nothing in the tenets of probabilism that explicitly favors any of 
these views. However, probabilism’s plausibility depends on which view of the nature 
of degrees of belief probabilists adopt. Each view has theoretical merits and demerits of 
its own. But, additionally, each view has implications for the plausibility of other aspects 
                                                          
25See Eriksson & Hájek (2007) for a thorough account of these problems. 
26I distinguish between conceptual analysis and explication as follows. The analysis of a 
concept is the articulation of necessary and sufficient conditions for satisfying that 
concept. Some concepts, however are vague or ambiguous, making them impossible to 
analyze in this sense. Such cases call for explication, the articulation of a partially 
stipulated set of necessary and sufficient conditions that specify a precise concept useful 
for some theoretical purposes, though not apt for capturing the full meaning of an 
everyday concept. 
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of probabilism, such as its formal representation scheme and its justification for the 
probabilist norm. I will say more about these connections in §2.4, when I present the 
various arguments for the probabilist norm. 
2.1.2 What Are the Objects of Degrees of Belief? 
Just as probabilists can choose from several theories of what it means to have 
doxastic attitudes, they can also choose from among several theories of the objects of 
these attitudes. The list of candidates is long: propositions (centered or uncentered), 
propositions under descriptions, epistemic possibilities, doxastic possibilities, natural 
language sentences, sentences in a language of thought, and more. Probabilism’s core 
tenets don’t clearly nominate or exclude any of these views. Each approach has its own 
merits and demerits. I will not attempt to survey all of these options here. I will focus on 
the views most popular among probabilists: propositions, and epistemic and doxastic 
possibilities. I will also present an approach, due to Titelbaum (2013), which allows us 
to model the objects of degrees of belief without taking a firm stand about what exactly 
they are. The underlying conception of doxastic objects is important for assessing 
probabilism’s formal representation scheme and some of its apparent normative 
requirements, such as the logical omniscience requirement. 
Propositions are the most commonly proposed doxastic objects. Traditional 
epistemologists often claim that belief is categorical assent to the truth of a proposition. 
Likewise, probabilists often claim that degree of belief is the strength of one’s 
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confidence in the truth of a proposition.27 Most philosophers agree on a few basic 
features of propositions: they are the primary bearers of truth value, the contents 
expressed by declarative sentences (a.k.a. “claims” or “statements”) in context, the 
referents of that-clauses, and the objects of attitudes shared among agents (McGrath 
2012). But beyond this core characterization, there are several competing accounts of 
exactly what propositions are. The two most prominent views of propositions are the 
possible worlds approach and the structuralist approach. 
According to the possible worlds approach, a proposition is the set of possible 
worlds in which it is true. For example, the proposition Patrick Epley lives in Norman, 
OK, on July 13, 2014 is the set of possible worlds in which I, Patrick Epley, live in Norman, 
OK, on July 13, 2014. It is widely agreed that possible worlds are maximally consistent 
ways the world could be. But, as usual, there are disagreements over the details.28 
Structuralism holds that propositions are structures composed out of individuals, 
properties, and relations.29 On this approach, Patrick Epley lives in Norman, OK on July 
                                                          
27Some even think of degrees of belief as numerical truth-value estimates, where true 
is 1 and false is 0. See Joyce (1998, p. 587) who attributes this view to Jeffrey (1986). 
Joyce (2005, p. 155) takes the somewhat weaker view that degrees of belief help us 
estimate truth values of propositions. 
28Lewis (1986) holds that they are concrete entities as real as the actual world. Others 
hold that they are abstract objects of various kinds (for example, Adams (1974), Fine 
(1977) and Plantinga (1974, 1976)). Still others think that they are combinations of so-
called metaphysical simples (for example, Armstrong (1989)). See Menzel (2013) for an 
overview. 
29See King (2012) for an overview. 
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13, 2014 is understood as a structure composed of me, Norman, OK, July 13, 2014, and 
the inhabitance relation. 
Despite their popularity, propositional accounts of doxastic objects have a few well-
documented problems. Most of these problems stem from propositions’ coarseness of 
grain; propositional accounts of doxastic objects don’t allow us to make fine enough 
distinctions between doxastic objects. For example, they don’t make proper sense of 
doxastic attitudes towards logical truths and other necessary truths, attitudes about 
objects that are known under multiple descriptions, and self-locating attitudes.  
Construed as sets of possible worlds, propositions are ill-suited to being the objects 
of doxastic states about logical truths and other necessary truths because all necessary 
truths express the same proposition, namely the set of all possible worlds. Thus, on this 
view, doxastic attitudes toward necessary truths are indistinguishable. But this conflicts 
with the common intuition that, for example, a belief that 2 + 2 = 4 is importantly 
different from a belief that 29 × 232 = 6,728. Construed structurally, however, 
propositions appear to be better suited to being doxastic objects. Whatever the 
constituents of the propositions expressed by “2 + 2 = 4” and “29 × 232 = 6,728” 
are, they are plausibly different. But this raises the question of what exactly these 
constituents are. 
Neither the possible worlds approach nor the structural approach makes 
propositions especially well-suited to being the objects of doxastic attitudes about 
individuals known under multiple descriptions. That is, they both seem to fall afoul of 
Frege’s puzzle (Frege 1997). For, on both accounts, attitudes toward Hesperus is 
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Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus are attitudes toward the same proposition. On 
the possible worlds account, this proposition is the set of possible worlds in which the 
planet Venus is self-identical. On the structural account, it is a structure that predicates 
self-identity of that planet. In both cases, an attitude toward Hesperus is Hesperus is an 
attitude toward Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
And neither account of propositions accords well with propositions being the 
objects of self-locating attitudes. For I might have a strong degree of belief that I live in 
Norman, OK, but a very weak degree of belief that Patrick Epley lives in Norman, OK, 
because I might have a weak degree of belief that I am Patrick Epley.30 The possible 
worlds account of propositions can’t make sense of my degree of belief. For “I live in 
Norman, OK” (written or spoken by me) and “Patrick Epley lives in Norman, OK” express 
the same proposition, namely the set of possible worlds in which I, Patrick Epley, live in 
Norman, OK. Likewise, the structural account of propositions also fails, for in both cases, 
the object of my divergent degrees of belief is a structure composed of me, Norman, 
and the inhabitance relation. 
These problems motivate some probabilists to posit centered propositions as the 
objects of doxastic attitudes.31 The centered propositions approach is an outgrowth of 
the possible worlds conception of propositions. Whereas a traditional, uncentered 
                                                          
30This example is adapted from Huber (2014). 
31Lewis (1979) is the locus classicus for discussion of centered propositions. Lewis 
attributes the idea to Quine (1969). See Arntzenius (2003), Bostrom (2007), Bradley 
(2012), Elga (2000), Meacham (2008), and Titelbaum (2013) for discussion of centered 
propositions as the objects of degree of belief. 
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proposition is understood as a set of possible worlds, a centered propositions is a set of 
possible worlds indexed to an individual at a time. Some think of centered propositions 
as properties of individuals. One’s belief in a centered proposition is a belief that the 
actual world centered on oneself is in the set of centered worlds that constitutes the 
centered proposition. 
In the example above, we can make sense of my divergent degrees of belief that I 
live in Norman and that Patrick Epley does by appeal to centered propositions. The 
object of my strong degree of belief that I live in Norman is the centered proposition 
constituted by the set of possible worlds centered on me now in which I live in Norman. 
The object of my weak degree of belief that Patrick Epley lives in Norman is the centered 
proposition constituted by the set of all centered worlds—regardless on which 
individual and time they are centered on—in which Patrick Epley lives in Norman. 
Because centered worlds are indexed to time-slices of individuals, centered propositions 
serve as finer-grained doxastic objects than their uncentered cousins. 
But centered propositions have problems of their own when construed as doxastic 
objects. Prima facie, they don’t help us make sense of attitudes toward logical truths, 
and they don’t help us solve Frege’s puzzle. Furthermore, centered propositions are too 
fine-grained for some purposes. Taking them as the objects of degrees of belief conflicts 
with other elements of the Bayesian approach. While doing so doesn’t much affect 
probabilism (Lewis, 1979, p. 534), it does affect Bayesian degree of belief updating 
(Huber 2014, §1.2). For the centered propositions that serve as the objects of one’s self-
locating doxastic attitudes will shift as one travels through spacetime. Since most 
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probabilists endorse other norms within the Bayesian package, including Bayesian 
degree of belief updating, this problem makes centered propositions less plausible as 
doxastic objects. 
Some philosophers have suggested that doxastic objects are sets of epistemic or 
doxastic possibilities—rather than logical or metaphysical possibilities.32 Intuitively, the 
epistemic possibilities for an agent at a time are the possibilities that are not ruled out 
by the agent’s store of knowledge at that time, and an agent’s doxastic possibilities at a 
time are the possibilities that are not ruled out by their doxastic states at that time. 
These two approaches are initially attractive because they seem to avoid Frege’s puzzle 
and issues about doxastic attitudes toward logically and metaphysically equivalent 
claims. For, if an agent doesn’t know (believe) that Hesperus is Phosphorus, then 
Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus may be different epistemic (doxastic) 
possibilities for the agent. So, the agent can have different doxastic attitudes towards 
Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus. Similarly, for all the agent knows 
(believes) it may be impossible that 2 + 2 ≠ 4, but nonetheless possible that 29 ×
232 ≠ 6,728. 
There are two main flaws with the epistemic and doxastic possibility accounts of 
doxastic objects. First, the notions of epistemic and doxastic possibility are not yet made 
precise, leaving several important questions unanswered. For example, what exactly 
does it mean for a possibility to be ruled out by your store of knowledge or your doxastic 
                                                          
32 See Hacking (1967), Bjerring (2010), Chalmers (2011, 2011a), and Easwaran (2011, 
2011a) for discussion of these approaches. 
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attitudes? And what kinds of possibilities are these that are ruled in or out by our 
knowledge or doxastic states?  
Second, epistemic and doxastic possibility approaches assume a form of logical 
omniscience. This flaw is common to all set-theoretic accounts of doxastic objects. The 
problem is that sets are purely extensional. So, two sets of possibilities are identical so 
long as they are composed of the same members. Thus, complex possibilities—set-
theoretic combinations of possibilities—are identical so long as they are composed of 
the same basic elements. Thus, for example, the sets A ∩ B and A̅ ∪ B̅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are identical, 
though they are formed by different set-theoretic operations. In short, these 
approaches cannot account for agents who are set-theoretically non-omniscient. I’ll say 
more about this issue in Chapter 4. 
In response to difficulties with each of the most popular accounts of doxastic 
objects, Titelbaum (2013, pp. 35-37) sets aside the issue of exactly what the objects of 
our doxastic attitudes really are. Instead, he proposes to model degrees of belief as if 
they are about the truth of “claims” (declarative natural language sentences) in context. 
As Titelbaum (2013, p. 35) puts it, modeling doxastic objects this way provides an 
“access point” to all plausible theories of what doxastic objects really are. For whatever 
they really are, doxastic objects underwrite our ability to invest confidence in the truth 
of claims in context. This is why we can elicit someone’s degree of belief in 𝐴 by asking 
“how confident are you that ‘𝐴’ is true in the present context?” (Titelbaum 2013, p. 37).  
Modeling degrees of belief as if they are about the truth of claims in context allows 
us to avoid the problems with the popular accounts of doxastic objects. For claims in 
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context are appropriately fine-grained because they are tied to the syntax of natural 
language sentences. Thus, this approach allows us to distinguish the doxastic objects 
modeled by “Hesperus is Hesperus” and “Hesperus is Phosphorus,” “2 + 2 = 4” and 
“29 × 232 = 6,728,” “I live in Norman” and “Patrick Epley lives in Norman,” etc. 
Indeed, claims in context may even be too fine-grained. For example, “Danica gave 
George the wrench” and “the wrench was given to George by Danica” model different 
doxastic objects on this approach. But fine grain is better than coarse grain in this 
context.33  
2.1.3 Degrees of Belief? 
What does it mean for a doxastic attitude to be gradational—to come in degrees? 
This question begets several others. To start with, what is the alternative? The obvious 
comparison is to the categorical doxastic attitudes that have long been the primary focus 
of epistemologists, namely belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment. These doxastic 
attitudes are binary: you believe a claim or not; you disbelieve it or not; you suspend 
judgment on it or not. 34 They do not come in degrees. So, degrees of belief are not 
                                                          
33 See Titelbaum (2013, pp. 35-37) for further discussion of the features and flaws of this 
approach. 
34 These categorical doxastic states also seem to be exclusive. For example, it seems that 
you can’t both believe and disbelieve that Biden is French. However, these attitudes are 
not exhaustive in that there may be claims towards which you have no attitude 
whatsoever. We should not confuse suspending judgment on a claim with having no 
attitude toward the claim. Until you read this sentence, you probably had no attitude 
about whether I ate Chilean seabass for lunch on May 1st, 1993. But now that I’ve 
broached the subject, hopefully you’ve suspended judgment.  
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categorical (binary) like these other doxastic attitudes. They come in different grades of 
strength.35 
How many grades of confidence are there? There might be just a few, akin to the 
Likert scale: strong belief, belief, equivocal confidence, disbelief, and strong disbelief.36 
Or there might be a larger finite number of levels of confidence. Or there might be 
infinitely many—countably or uncountably many—grades of confidence. As I’ve 
mentioned above, and as I’ll explain in more detail in §2.1.5, probabilists typically 
represent degrees of belief with real numbers between 0 and 1. There are uncountably 
many such numbers. So, if the probabilist representation of degrees of belief with real-
valued functions is not overly precise, this suggests that there are, in principle, 
uncountably many grades of confidence. However, as we’ll see in Chapter 3, many 
probabilists concede that their formal representation of degrees of belief is overly 
precise in various ways. Regardless of whether there are finitely or infinitely many 
grades of confidence, there seem to be many such grades that allow us—in at least some 
cases—to make fine-grained distinctions about the strength of our confidence in 
                                                          
35Some have suggested that degrees of belief are just explicitly probabilistic categorical 
beliefs, e.g., a belief that the probability of rain today is 50%. For example, Harman 
(1986) suggests that in the few cases we seem to have degrees of belief, they are 
actually just explicitly probabilistic categorical beliefs. I’ll say more about the question 
of reducing degrees of belief to categorical belief. For an excellent discussion of this 
issue, see Christensen (2004, pp. 18-20). 
36 You might even think that the traditional, categorical doxastic attitudes are different 
grades of belief in a doxastic hierarchy with only three levels of strength: belief, 
suspension, and disbelief.  
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different claims, and about changes in the strength of our confidence in particular claims 
in light of changes in our evidence. 
What gives rise to the gradational structure of confidence? Do we have different 
degrees of belief somehow in isolation, or do we have different degrees of belief only 
holistically in virtue of differences between our degrees of belief in different claims? We 
often talk about isolated degrees of belief, saying things like “I’m pretty sure that Biden 
is French” or “I’m certain that Trump won’t get the nomination.” However, it’s hard to 
imagine how degrees of belief could exist in isolation. Rather, it seems that when we 
talk about individual degrees of belief in isolation, we are implicitly placing them in a 
kind of confidence ordering. When one says “I’m pretty sure that Biden is French,” one 
implicitly places Biden is French near, but not quite at the top of the ordering. 
Assuming that the gradational structure of degrees of belief does arise out of 
confidence comparisons, we confront the further question of whether all claims are 
comparable in terms of confidence. That is, does each agent have a univocal confidence 
ordering in which they compare all claims? Or are some claims incomparable in terms 
of confidence for some of agents, resulting in multiple incommensurable confidence 
orderings? The typical probabilist representation of degrees of belief with real-valued 
functions suggests that all of an agent’s degrees of belief are comparable in a univocal 
confidence ordering. But, intuitively, it seems that some claims are incomparable—or at 
least very hard to compare with much precision. For example, could you precisely 
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compare the following two claims: the population of Tokyo will be 40 million by 2025, 
and the first card drawn from my old and likely incomplete deck will be a spade?37 
For the most part, probabilists don’t give explicit answers to these questions. 
However, in some cases, they do seem to commit themselves to having specific 
answers—for example, their formal representation of degrees of belief and their 
arguments for the probabilist norm seems to provide such commitments. I’ll call 
attention to some of these implicit commitments below. 
2.1.4 Degrees of Belief & Other Doxastic Attitudes 
Epistemologists generally acknowledge two main kinds of doxastic attitudes: 
degrees of belief and the categorical attitudes I’ve already mentioned. Some 
epistemologists also acknowledge a third kind of attitude called “comparative 
confidence.” Comparative confidence is an attitude an agent bears to pairs of claims. An 
agent’s comparative confidence in a pair of claims is a comparison of the strength of the 
agent’s confidence between claims. The agent might be strictly more confident that 𝐴 
than that 𝐵, or vice versa.  Or the agent might be equally confident in 𝐴 and 𝐵. Or their 
confidence in 𝐴 and 𝐵 might not be comparable at all. Comparative confidence can be 
construed as an alternative conception of graded doxastic attitudes, as one’s 
comparative confidence assessments form a kind of confidence ordering that can be 
thought to convey information about one’s degrees of confidence. 
                                                          
37 This example is an adaptation of one from Fishburn (1986, p. 339), which was in turn 
inspired by Keynes (1921). 
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When probabilists present the first tenet of probabilism (if they do so explicitly at 
all), they do not usually explain how degrees of belief relate to these other kinds of 
doxastic attitudes. Probabilists have three main options for specifying the connections 
between degrees of belief, the categorical attitudes, and comparative confidence: 
pluralism, reductionism, and eliminativism.38 Pluralism is the view that categorical 
belief,39 degree of belief, and comparative confidence are all legitimate, distinct doxastic 
states. None of these states reduce to each other; none of these notions should be 
eliminated from philosophical discourse. Reductionism is the view that one or two of 
the states reduce to one of the others. Eliminativism is the view that one or more of the 
notions should be removed from philosophical discourse. The eliminable notions are 
empty or useless; they do not contribute to philosophical discourse in any important 
way. 
Prima facie, probabilists can endorse any of these options so long as they hold that 
at least some doxastic states—degrees of belief—are graded. So, it looks like the only 
view unavailable to probabilists is eliminativism about degree of belief. Pluralism seems 
to be a live option. So do the various forms of reductionism. Typically, however, the 
probabilists who have countenanced the issue of the relationship between these 
                                                          
38 For a nice survey of these options, see Christensen (2004, Ch. 2). Christensen focuses 
on the connections between degree of belief and categorical belief, but his discussion 
can easily be adapted to apply to comparative confidence too. Hawthorne (2009) is, to 
my knowledge, the only discussion of the connections between all three kinds of 
attitudes. 
39 Rather than listing all of the categorical doxastic attitudes, I’ll focus on categorical 
belief hereafter. 
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notions have focused on the relationship between categorical belief and degree of 
belief, and they have favored reductionism and eliminativism of various kinds. Several 
probabilists have argued that the notion of categorical belief should be replaced with 
degree of belief in our epistemologies.40 Others have argued that categorical belief 
reduces to degree of belief.41 Few authors have invoked the notion of comparative 
confidence in this discussion.42 Thus, despite the variety of options for interpreting and 
further characterizing the first tenet of probabilism, many probabilists present it as the 
claim that beliefs come in degrees—suggesting the eliminativist or reductionist reading. 
2.1.5 Formal Representations 
On its own, the first tenet of probabilism doesn’t seem to say anything about 
whether—or how—degrees of belief should be represented formally. It merely posits a 
graded doxastic state. But the second tenet of probabilism says that degrees of belief 
ought to conform to the axioms of the probability calculus. And since, strictly speaking, 
the probability axioms apply to real-valued functions, it seems that probabilism requires 
some kind of formal representation of degrees of belief in terms of real-valued 
functions. 
                                                          
40 Jeffrey (1970) is the most well-known proponent of this position.  
41 See, for example, Sturgeon (2008), Foley (2009), and Hawthorne (2009). 
42For some notable exceptions see Koopman (1940) and Hawthorne (2009). While few 
authors have written about how comparative confidence relates to degree of belief and 
categorical belief, there is a fairly long tradition of work on comparative confidence and 
comparative probability among Bayesians. See Fine (1973), Fishburn (1986), and 
Capotorti & Vantaggi (2000) for overviews of some of this work. 
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So, probabilists usually represent an agent’s degrees of belief formally in terms of a 
pair of credence functions, an unconditional credence function, 𝑐𝑟(⋅), and a conditional 
credence function, 𝑐𝑟(⋅ | ⋅), each of which assigns a number, 𝑟 ∈ [0,1], to the 
expressions of a formal language.43 
Credence function values closer to 1 represent higher degrees of confidence; values 
closer to zero represent lower degrees of confidence; .5 represents equivocal 
confidence. ⌜𝑐𝑟(𝐴)⌝ represents the agent’s degree of belief in the claim represented 
by ⌜𝐴⌝. ⌜𝑐𝑟(𝐴|𝐵)⌝ represents the agent’s degree of belief in the claim represented by 
⌜𝐴⌝ on the assumption that the claim represented by ⌜𝐵⌝ is true. So, for example, 
⌜𝑐𝑟(𝐴)=1⌝  represents that the modeled agent is certain in the truth of 𝐴, 
⌜𝑐𝑟(𝐴|¬𝐵) = 0⌝ represents that the agent is certain that 𝐴 is false on the assumption 
that 𝐵 is false, and ⌜𝑐𝑟(𝐵) = .5⌝ represents that the agent is equally confident that 𝐵 
is true as that it is false.  
This formal representation of degrees of belief by means of such a pair of real-
valued credence functions captures the graded nature of degrees of belief. It also 
permits a connection between degrees of belief and the probability axioms. A full 
account of the probabilist scheme for formally representing degrees of belief should 
include more explicit and precise connections between degrees of belief and their 
                                                          
43 Probabilists disagree about which formal language to use to represent the objects of 
degree of belief. Some prefer the language of set-theory; others prefer languages for 
sentential or predicate logic. For my purposes in this section, the differences don’t really 
matter, so I present a formal representation in terms of the sentences of a logical 
language. I’ll say more about this issue in §2.3.1 and Chapter 4.   
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numerical representations. In particular, it should include an account of the precise 
significance of the representation of degrees of belief with real numbers, per the 
discussion in §2.1.4. Although probabilists do not usually present the details of this sort 
of account,44 I’ll present some of these detail in the next two sections. 
Also, as I mention above, probabilists are typically reductionists or eliminativists 
about the notions of categorical belief and comparative confidence. So, this formal 
representation is often meant to be an exhaustive account of the doxastic states of 
epistemological interest. However, one might propose a formal representation for the 
states of categorical belief and comparative confidence as well. But, since most 
probabilists treat credence functions as sufficient for formally representing all doxastic 
states, their treatments suggest that they take the probability axioms to be sufficient 
norms for all doxastic states. 
2.2 Why Posit Degrees of Belief? 
Probabilists posit degrees of belief for two main kinds of reasons: to better describe 
our doxastic states in order to better account for our experiences and behavior; and to 
provide a more plausible normative account of what our doxastic states should be like.45 
I’ve said quite a lot so far about what degrees of belief are, and I’ve hinted at some of 
the reasons for positing them, but now I will present these reasons more explicitly, in 
more detail.  
                                                          
44Titelbaum (2013) is a notable exception. 
45 I follow Titelbaum (MS) in distinguishing descriptive and normative reasons for 
positing degrees of belief. My discussion of the normative reasons for positing degrees 
of belief follows Titelbaum’s presentation quite closely. 
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2.2.1 Descriptive Reasons 
Probabilists cite three main descriptive reasons for positing degrees of belief. First, 
introspection and our practices of mental state attribution (including self-attribution) 
reveal that we often have different degrees of confidence in various claims.46 We may 
find ourselves pretty confident that it won’t rain, and even more confident it won’t 
snow. We also say things like “I’m more confident that Clinton will win than that Walker 
will win,” and “I’m very confident that Trump won’t get the nomination.” Sometimes we 
even quantify the strength of our confidence: “I’m 95% sure I turned off the stove.” 
These cases suggest that there is a graded doxastic state that supports pretty fine-
grained comparisons of relative strength. Probabilists posit degrees of belief to describe 
these cases, rather than try to account for them in terms of the traditional, categorical 
doxastic states of belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief.   
Second, probabilists posit degrees of belief to account for the way we respond to 
evidence.47 We generally try to match our doxastic attitudes to our evidence. But, 
probabilists note, our evidence can be weaker or stronger, and it often changes 
incrementally over time. For example, imagine that I believe my spouse is at home right 
now on the basis that this would conform to her usual schedule and she told me her 
plans to work from home when I left for the office this morning. When I see that she is 
posting pictures of our cats (who reside only at home) to social media, my confidence 
                                                          
46 See, for example, Christensen (2004, p. 13), Huber (2009, p. 1), Easwaran (2011, p. 
312), and Titelbaum (MS, Ch. 1). 
47 See, for example, Christensen (2004, p. 13), Joyce (2004, p. 133), and Titelbaum (MS, 
Ch. 1). 
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that she is home increases further. Even though I already have a categorical belief that 
my spouse is at home, my confidence that she is at home grows as the evidence mounts.  
We often experience these kinds of shifts in our confidence even when our categorical 
beliefs stay the same. On the assumption that our doxastic attitudes can match the 
evidence fairly closely, cases like this suggest, once again, that there is kind of a graded 
doxastic state, which can be weaker or stronger, and which can change incrementally 
over time to match the evidence.  
Third, probabilists posit degrees of belief to better describe and explain our 
behavior and decision-making.48 Betting behavior, in particular, is one of the 
phenomena degrees of belief are most commonly invoked to explain. My offer of 4:1 
odds for Stewball winning the next race indicates that I am less than certain that 
Stewball will win, but much more confident than not that he will.49 Accounting for my 
behavior in this case seems to require degrees of belief.   
However, explicit betting behavior is not the only behavioral source of evidence for 
degrees of belief.  There are many more commonplace examples. Imagine, on a rainy 
day, that I opt for my golf umbrella rather than my raincoat, despite the fact that I 
believe both will keep me dry and I have no other preference for one over the other. 
The best explanation for my choice in this case is that, while I believe either option will 
keep me dry, I’m more confident that the umbrella will do so than that the raincoat will. 
                                                          
48 See, for example, Christensen (2004, pp. 13-14), Joyce (2004, p. 133), and Titelbaum 
(MS, Ch. 1). 
49 This example is borrowed from Joyce (2004, p. 133). 
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Similarly, imagine that I enjoy accountancy and marine biology equally, and I believe I 
could get a job pursuing either career, but I choose to pursue a career as an accountant 
rather than as a marine biologist. One plausible explanation of my choice in this case is 
that I’m more confident that I’ll get a job as an accountant. My behavior in all such cases 
seems to demand explanation in terms of a doxastic state that is more finely grained 
than the categorical states alone. 
On their own, these cases give probabilists pretty strong reason to posit degrees of 
belief. However, many probabilists think the case for degrees of belief is further 
buttressed by the lack of plausible alternative explanations of the phenomena described 
above.  
Attempts to explain away the appearance of degrees of belief in our introspection 
and attitude reports don’t seem to have any hope of getting off the ground. So, it doesn’t 
look like we can avoid positing degrees of belief by denying or reducing the phenomena 
they’re posited to describe and explain. 
The most commonly proposed way of explaining away degrees of belief is to 
account for their appearance in terms of categorical beliefs about probabilities.50 On this 
approach, when I say “I’m very confident Trump won’t get the nomination,” I’m not 
expressing a graded doxastic state with a strong negative valence towards Trump’s 
candidacy. Instead, I’m expressing a categorical belief that it is very improbable that 
Trump will get the nomination. Similarly, on this view, my response to seeing my 
                                                          
50 This is the kind of response probabilists often encounter at conferences and in the 
classroom. Its most cited occurrence in print is due to Harman (1986). 
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spouse’s posts of cat pictures on social media is not an increase in the strength of my 
degree of belief that she is at home. Rather, this evidence causes me to change my 
categorical belief about my estimation of the probabilities that she is at home. And my 
selection of the umbrella over the raincoat is not explained by my higher degree of 
confidence that the umbrella will keep me dry. Rather, it is explained by my categorical 
belief that it’s more probable that umbrella will keep me dry than that the raincoat will.  
Since we can explain away the cases that motivate positing degrees of belief, we don’t 
need to posit them, or we can reduce talk about them to talk about categorical beliefs. 
Degrees of belief are theoretical dead weight. 
Probabilists have identified several problems with this approach. So, they think it’s 
more natural to simply posit degrees of belief rather than try to explain them away in 
this way. It seems like we can have degrees of belief without the attendant categorical 
beliefs about probabilities.51 For, one may have degrees of belief despite being ignorant 
of the concept of probability. Perhaps some children and non-human animals are like 
this, for example.52 This suggests that to reduce degrees of belief to categorical beliefs 
about probabilities is to assume an implausible degree of probabilistic sophistication in 
agents. Or one might be probabilistically sophisticated, and have a degrees of belief 
about, say, whether Trump will get the Republican nomination, but not yet have formed 
                                                          
51 Eriksson & Hájek (2007, pp. 206-207) provide a few such cases, similar to those I offer 
in this paragraph. 
52 See Frankish (2009, p. 77). 
48 
 
a categorical belief explicitly about the probability that Trump will get the nomination.53  
This kind of case suggests that the reduction of degrees of belief to categorical beliefs 
would make categorical beliefs about probabilities more common than they actually are. 
Alternatively, one might be very probabilistically sophisticated, while still recognizing in 
oneself that one’s degrees of belief diverge from one’s probability estimates. For 
example, I might find that, while I estimate the logical probability, evidential probability, 
and metaphysical chance (propensity) of Trump getting the nomination to be very low, 
I have a strong and irrepressible degree of belief that he’ll get the nomination. In such a 
case, I might be motivated to revise my degrees of belief or my probability estimates. 
Indeed, we might even view it as a good thing to try and match our degrees of belief to 
our beliefs about probabilities of various kinds (for example, to our beliefs about 
evidential probabilities, or to our beliefs about objective chances).54 But such a view 
assumes a distinction between degrees of belief and beliefs about probabilities. Because 
of cases like this, probabilists are skeptical that degrees of belief can be explained away 
in terms of categorical beliefs.  
In addition to pointing out cases where degrees of belief and categorical beliefs 
about probabilities seem to diverge, probabilists also find other flaws with attempts to 
reduce degrees of belief to categorical beliefs about probabilities. Christensen (2004, p. 
18-20), for example, raises the issue of what kind of probability it is that degrees of belief 
are being reduced to beliefs about. For philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians 
                                                          
53 Titelbaum (MS) describes cases like this. 
54 That’s the idea behind the principal principle. 
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have distinguished several different kinds of probability: relative frequency, logical 
probability, evidential probability, metaphysical chance, and subjective probability.  
The kind of probability involved in such a reduction has a significant impact on the 
plausibility of any such reduction. For example, if we go for a subjective interpretation 
of probability, the reduction seems to collapse. On that view, degrees of belief would 
be reduced to beliefs about subjective probabilities, but degrees of belief and subjective 
probabilities are usually thought to be one and the same.55 So, on such an account 
degrees of belief would turn out to be beliefs about degrees of belief.  
If we choose any of the other options (logical probability, evidential probability, 
metaphysical chance, etc.), we run into sophistication issues and counterexamples. For, 
it is doubtful that a very large portion of the population has—with much regularity—
categorical beliefs about relative frequencies, evidential probabilities, logical 
probabilities, or metaphysical chances as such. Indeed, even well-informed people may 
explicitly doubt the existence of logical probabilities and objective chances, and may 
doubt that relative frequencies are relevant to single cases—for example, that Trump 
will win the nomination. But they may still have various degrees of confidence in such 
claims.  Furthermore, even if there is a way to make sense of degrees of belief as beliefs 
about probabilities in a way that accounts for the ubiquity with which we seem to 
                                                          
55 To call subjective probabilities “probabilities” suggests that they conform to the 
probability axioms, which most of our degrees of belief likely do not. Nonetheless, in 
common probabilist parlance, “degree of belief” and “subjective probability” are often 
used interchangeably. I should note, however, that there is another sense of “subjective 
probabilities,” which refers to the degrees of belief of ideal agents, the kind of agents 
whose degrees of belief, the story goes, would satisfy the probability axioms.  
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recognize degrees of belief in ourselves and others, we would still need to account for 
cases in which probabilistically sophisticated individuals have degrees of belief that 
diverge from their estimates of relative frequencies, logical and evidential probabilities, 
and metaphysical chances. 
 So, while accounting for degrees of belief in terms of categorical beliefs about 
probabilities has some initial intuitive appeal, in light of the issues I’ve just described, 
probabilists hold that it’s more plausible to simply posit degrees of belief as a kind of 
mental state in their own right.  As I mention in §2.1.4, some probabilists attempt to 
reduce categorical beliefs to degrees of belief. Others favor eliminating categorical 
beliefs all-together. Still others acknowledge both kinds of doxastic state and attempt 
to characterize the normative and descriptive connections between them without 
proposing any reduction of one to the other.  
2.2.2 Normative Reasons 
The dominant approach to epistemology focuses on categorical belief. It draws on 
several widely accepted norms for categorical belief, most prominently, the consistency 
and closure norms. According to the consistency norm, one’s categorical beliefs ought 
to be deductively consistent. So, for example, one shouldn’t believe that Clinton will be 
the next President and that Bush will be the next President. According to the closure 
norm, our beliefs ought to be closed under deductive entailment. So, if two or more of 
your beliefs jointly entail another claim, then you should believe that claim too.56 For 
                                                          
56 Less demanding forms of the closure norm might not require that you actually believe 
all of the logical consequences of your beliefs. Instead, it might require that you should 
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example, if you believe that if Bush wins, then Clinton will not, and you believe that 
Clinton will win, you should also believe that Bush will lose. 
The consistency and closure norms are pretty intuitively appealing. They express 
the commonly held view that logic provides norms for belief, and they generate 
plausible normative verdicts in many cases, like the examples immediately above.  
In other cases, however, the verdicts generated by the consistency and closure 
norms are less plausible. In general, the consistency and closure norms do not stand up 
to very close scrutiny—at least not as I have stated them above. Both norms seem to be 
too demanding. Unrestricted, the consistency norm demands that we maintain the 
consistency of all of our beliefs—a huge number—even in the face of misleading or 
conflicting evidence (as is often the case). The closure norm demands that we believe 
all of the logical consequences of our beliefs—including even the most complex 
tautologies. Furthermore, in some cases, the consistency and closure norms are not only 
too demanding; they also seem to make the wrong normative demands. For example, 
the closure norm tells me that, if I believe that Joe Biden is a Republican or an octopus 
from outer space, and I believe that Biden is not a Republican, then I should believe the 
he is a space octopus. That is, the closure norm says nothing of the fact that sometimes 
we should revise our beliefs rather than adopt their logical consequences. Similarly, 
there may be cases in which we should maintain inconsistent beliefs rather than 
                                                          
be merely disposed to believe these consequences if you should have the occasion to 
entertain them. 
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disregard our evidence.57 In addition to these general problems with the consistency 
and closure norms, probabilists focus on two particular counterexamples to these 
norms, the lottery paradox and the preface paradox. 
The lottery paradox goes like this.58 Imagine a fair lottery with one million tickets. 
Imagine further an agent who has purchased a ticket in this lottery. Because the lottery 
is large and fair, the agent believes that their ticket will not win, and furthermore they 
believe of each other ticket that it will not win. But because the lottery is fair, the agent 
believes that some ticket will win.  
The paradox here is that the agent’s beliefs seem rational, but they violate the 
intuitively plausible consistency and closure norms. The probability of any one ticket 
winning is vanishingly small, and no ticket is any more likely to win than any other. So, 
the agent’s belief of each ticket that it will not win seems reasonable enough. And, 
because the lottery is fair, it makes sense for the agent to believe that some ticket will 
win. The problem is that these beliefs are inconsistent—they can’t both be true at once. 
Thus, the lottery paradox seems to be a counterexample to the consistency norm. It also 
seems to provide a counterexample to closure: the beliefs, for each ticket, that this 
ticket won’t win jointly entail (under closure) the belief that no ticket will win. 
                                                          
57 See, for example, Harman (1984, pp. 108-109). The lottery and preface cases may be 
just such cases. 
58 The lottery paradox is due to Kyburg (1961). 
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The preface paradox goes like this.59 Imagine an agent who has written a long, 
carefully argued work of non-fiction. The main text of this book includes many claims, 
all of which the agent believes. Imagine further that like many other non-fiction authors, 
the author includes in the preface the claim that there are bound to be some mistaken 
claims in the sequel, for which the author alone—not  their many helpful colleagues—
bears full responsibility. Imagine that the author is not just being modest; they really do 
believe that at least some mistakes—some false claims—have creeped into the main 
text.60 Are the author’s beliefs incoherent? 
Like in the lottery case, the agent’s beliefs seem intuitively rational. The author has 
carefully crafted the claims in the main text, adduced evidence toward them and 
considered objections. Belief in these claims seems rational. Yet it also seems 
reasonable to believe that a long book like the author’s will include at least one mistaken 
claim. Once again, the author’s beliefs are jointly inconsistent and violate closure (unless 
the author believes every claim). If the preface belief is true, then some of the beliefs 
asserted in the main text are false, and if the beliefs in the main text are true, then the 
preface belief is false.  The author can’t consistently hold them all while maintaining 
closure. 
                                                          
59 The preface paradox is due to Makinson (1965). 
60 If you find the preface story implausible, consider a structurally similar case. Consider 
your own belief set. Trivially, you believe all of your beliefs. But you likely also believe 
that at least some of your beliefs are mistaken. This case too violates consistency and 
closure. And it hits very close to home. Easwaran & Fitelson provide such a global version 
of the preface paradox in their (2015). 
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In light of the lottery and preface paradoxes, and the general concerns about 
demandingness and normative appropriateness mentioned above, things don’t look 
good for the consistency and closure norms for categorical belief. However, if we posit 
degrees of belief and probabilistic norms for degrees of belief, and if we re-consider the 
lottery and preface cases in terms of degrees of belief and probabilistic norms for them, 
things don’t look so bad.  
Re-imagined thus, the lottery case is one where the agent has very low degrees of 
belief that each ticket will win, and a very high degree of belief that some ticket will win. 
Construed this way, the paradox dissolves. It seems perfectly rational to be very 
confident that each ticket of a fair lottery will lose, while at the same time being very 
confident that some ticket will win. Indeed, it seems that these are precisely the degrees 
of belief one ought to have in this case. 
Similarly, a re-imagination of the preface case in terms of degrees of belief goes like 
this. The author has high degree of belief that each of the claims of the main text is true, 
but the author also has low degree of belief that they’re all true. Again, these degrees 
of belief seem eminently reasonable. 
In both degree of belief based re-imaginations, the intuitive verdicts that the lottery 
and preface degrees of belief are rational is supported by a probabilistic coherence norm 
for degrees of belief analogous to the deductive consistency norm for categorical 
beliefs. I’ll present the probabilist norm in more detail in §2.3. Thus, probabilists posit 
degrees of belief, in part, because doing so allows them to provide more plausible 
normative verdicts in cases like the lottery and the preface. 
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Like the descriptive reasons for positing degrees of belief presented above, 
probabilists’ normative reasons have also been criticized. Some critics have argued that 
more careful statements of the consistency and closure norms will make them less 
demanding and more plausible. Others have criticized the lottery and preface cases, 
arguing that the agents’ beliefs in these case are not rational, so they don’t serve as 
counterexamples to the consistency and closure norms. Others try to avoid positing 
degrees of belief and probabilistic degree of belief norms by proposing alternative 
(sometimes probabilistic) norms for categorical belief. Still others argue that positing 
degrees of belief and probabilistic degree of belief norms fails to provide genuine 
solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, which are paradoxes about categorical 
belief, not degree of belief. Degree of belief responses just change the subject. 
Ultimately, probabilists admit that, on their own, none of the reasons presented in 
this section give knock-down support for positing degrees of belief. Rather, they 
contend that together these reasons make it more natural to posit degrees of belief than 
to try do without them, and they note that once we do posit degrees of belief and invoke 
the machinery of subjective Bayesianism, we reap significant theoretical rewards. In this 
dissertation, I will take up some of the issues surrounding the reasons presented in this 
section. In particular, I will cast doubt on the view that probabilistic norms for degrees 
of belief are much less problematic than the consistency and closure norms for 
categorical belief. However, from here on out I will assume that there is a graded 
doxastic state that can be weaker or stronger by degrees, and I will call this state “degree 
of belief.” 
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2.3 What Is the Probabilist Norm? 
According to the second tenet of probabilism, our degrees of belief ought to 
conform to the axioms of the probability calculus. As I note above, a naïve interpretation 
of this claim sounds like a category mistake. Degrees of belief are doxastic states, which 
might be understood to be mental representations, mental or behavioral dispositions, 
etc. The probability axioms characterize real-valued functions. Prima facie, it’s a bit 
strange to say that these axioms for real-valued functions are norms for doxastic states. 
But most probabilists wouldn’t bat an eye at this claim. Indeed, this is exactly how 
probabilists usually talk about the probability axioms. There are two apparent reasons 
for this. First, probabilists represent degrees of belief formally in terms of functions from 
sentences to numbers. And, second, probabilists tend to be a bit sloppy about 
distinguishing their formal modeling frameworks from the things those frameworks are 
supposed to model. In this section, I’ll present the probability calculus and the typical 
probabilist interpretation of its axioms and theorems as degree of belief norms. 
2.3.1 The Probability Calculus 
Several formal theories of probability—several probability calculi—have been 
proposed throughout the development of mathematical probability theory. However, 
when probabilists talk about the probability calculus, they usually have in mind 
Kolmogorov’s (1956) axiomatization, which is widely accepted by mathematicians, 
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scientists, and philosophers.61 In this subsection, I’ll present Kolmogorov’s probability 
calculus. 
Kolmogorov stated his probability calculus in set-theoretic terms, and this set-
theoretic version of his calculus is typical in the philosophical literature on probability. 
However, a version of Kolmogorov’s calculus stated in logical rather than set-theoretic 
terms is also common. In Chapter 4, I will argue that the logical approach is preferable 
to the set-theoretic approach in the context of probabilism. So, here I will present both 
versions. I’ll present the set-theoretic approach first, and then I will briefly present the 
logical approach and describe some of the important differences between the two 
approaches.  
Before I get into the details of Kolmogorov’s probability calculus, I want to 
emphasize that it can be viewed on its own as a piece of pure mathematics, without 
regard to any particular interpretation. In this sense, the probability calculus is a 
characterization of a particular kind of mathematical structure: it characterizes a set and 
a pair of functions from that set (or its Cartesian product) to the set of real numbers. 
This structure is called a “probability model” and the functions are called “probability 
functions” because they are supposed to capture many of the essential features of our 
                                                          
61 While Kolmogorov’s calculus is widely accepted, it is not without its critics, and some 
alternative formal theories of probability and uncertainty have been proposed. For 
excellent surveys of criticisms of Kolmogorov’s calculus, see Fine (1973, especially Ch. 3) 
and Lyon (MS). For a survey of alternative formal theories of probability and uncertainty, 
see Huber (2014). The most well-known alternative formal theories of probability are 
due to Popper (1955) and Rényi (1955, 1970). These two alternatives provide 
generalizations of Kolmogorov’s axioms; Kolmogorovian probability functions are 
special cases of Popper functions and Rényi functions. 
58 
 
everyday concept of probability. However, probability models admit other 
interpretations as well. In this dissertation, I will focus on the use of the probability 
calculus as a logic for degrees of belief. So, in this section, although I will present 
Kolmogorov’s calculus primarily as a piece of mathematics, I will also describe its 
intended interpretation as a model of the everyday notion of probability along the way. 
Then, in §2.3.2, I will show how probabilists apply the probability calculus to generate 
norms for degrees of belief. 
On the set-theoretic approach, a probability model or “probability space” consists 
of a non-empty set, Ω, a field, ℱ, of subsets of Ω, and a unary probability function, 
𝑝𝑟(⋅): ℱ ⟶ ℜ. 
The set, Ω, which is often called the “sample space,” could be any non-empty set, 
but it is usually taken to be a set of so-called “elementary events,” the set of all 
possibilities or possible worlds relevant to an application. 
The field, ℱ, is a set of subsets of Ω, which includes Ω, and which is closed under 
complementation (with respect to Ω) and finite intersections of members of ℱ. So, if A 
is a subset of Ω in ℱ, its complement, A̅ (that is, Ω − A, the set of all members of Ω not 
in A), is also in ℱ; and if A and B are subsets of Ω in ℱ, then their intersection, 𝐴 ∩ 𝐵, is 
also in ℱ.62 One example of a field of subsets of Ω is its power set, the set of all of its 
subsets (Easwaran 2011, p. 319, n. 1).  
                                                          
62Often when probability theorists characterize ℱ, they say it is a set of subsets of Ω 
closed under complementation and finite unions. However, this is a difference that 
doesn’t make a difference. If ℱ is closed under finite intersections and 
complementation, then it is also closed under finite unions. 
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The probability function, 𝑝𝑟(⋅), is a one-place function that maps the members of 
ℱ to members of the set of real numbers according to the following axioms.  
For all sets A, B ∈  ℱ: 
1. 𝑝𝑟(A) ≥ 0; (non-negativity) 
2.   𝑝𝑟(Ω) = 1; and (normality) 
3.  If A ∩ B = ∅, then 𝑝𝑟(A ∪ B) = 𝑝𝑟(A) + 𝑝𝑟(B). (finite additivity) 
These axioms guarantee that probability functions are non-negative, normalized (with a 
highest value of 1), and finitely additive. Axiom 1 guarantees that probability values are 
non-negative. Every output of a probability function must be greater than or equal to 
zero. It also guarantees that probability functions are total functions: there is a real 
number output for every element of ℱ input. Axiom 2 normalizes probabilities with a 
highest value of 1. Where Ω is taken to be a set of events, possibilities, or propositions, 
axiom 2 is a requirement that necessities or logical truths (depending on the kind of 
possibilities etc. we’re dealing with) receive probability 1. Axiom 3 says that probabilities 
of disjoint members of ℱ are finitely additive.  
In addition to these three axioms for 𝑝𝑟(⋅), Kolmogorov’s probability calculus also 
includes a definition of a binary conditional probability function, 𝑝𝑟(⋅ | ⋅): ℱ × ℱ ⟶ ℜ 
with the following formula. For all A, B ∈  ℱ: 
4.   If 𝑝𝑟(𝐵) ≠ 0, then 𝑝𝑟(A|B) =
𝑝𝑟(A∩B)
𝑝𝑟(B)
. (ratio formula) 
This binary conditional probability function, 𝑝𝑟(⋅ | ⋅), is intended to capture the 
probability of an event (proposition, possibility, etc.) given—or on the assumption of—
the occurrence (truth) of another event (proposition, possibility, etc.). The ratio formula 
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defines conditional probabilities in terms of a ratio of unconditional probabilities. I want 
to emphasize that the ratio formula gives a mathematical definition of conditional 
probability functions in terms of unconditional probability functions. We should not 
assume without argument that this mathematical definition carries over to the concept 
of probability it is intended to capture.  Several philosophers have rejected such a 
definition, and some have argued that we should treat conditional probability functions 
as basic in our formalizations of probability.63 I will not pursue the adequacy of the ratio 
formula as an analysis of conditional probability in this dissertation. I will, however, 
discuss its role in providing norms for degrees of belief in the next sub-section. 
Axioms 1-3 and the ratio formula make up the core of what is usually referred to as 
“the probability calculus.” As I note above, these formulas are mathematical 
abstractions, and as such they are not terribly intuitive without interpretation. 
Furthermore, they are chosen because they provide a concise and relatively 
uncontroversial account of the properties that probabilities must have in order for them 
to have various intuitive and desirable properties. They don’t themselves state 
properties that laypeople typically associate with the everyday concept of probability. 
But together—with a little set theory and algebra—they have many easily derived 
consequences that capture features that fit more intuitively with the everyday concept 
of probability.  
                                                          
63 See, for example, Hájek (2003) and Hawthorne (2011).  
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In addition to the core axioms and definition of the probability calculus, Kolmogorov 
also proposed an additional constraint on probabilities known as the “countable 
additivity” axiom. This axiom applies in place of the finite additivity axiom on the 
assumption that ℱ is a 𝜎-field—that is, a set of subsets of Ω closed under 
complementation and countable—rather than finite—intersections. Assuming ℱ is a 𝜎-
field, 𝑝𝑟(⋅) is a countably additive “probability measure” if it satisfies axioms 1 & 2 and 
the following additional axiom.  
5.  If {A𝑖} is a countably infinite set of mutually 
disjoints sets (that is, for distinct A𝑖  and A𝑗 
in  {A𝑖}, A𝑖 ∩ A𝑗 = ∅), then 
  𝑝𝑟(⋃{A𝑖}) = ∑ 𝑝𝑟(A𝑖)𝑖 .
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(countable additivity) 
For various reasons, the countable additivity axiom is controversial.65 So, in this 
dissertation, I will consider it an additional constraint separate from the probability 
calculus.  I will not pursue this issue further in this dissertation. 
So, that’s the set-theoretic version of Kolmogorov’s probability calculus. On the 
logical approach, we substitute the machinery of set theory for that of classical 
deductive logic. In stating the probability calculus, this means that we replace Ω and ℱ 
of the set-theoretic approach with a formal logical language, ℒ𝑛, with 𝑛 atomic 
sentences closed under the usual logical operations.66 So, on the logical approach, a 
                                                          
64 Weisberg (2011, p. 504). 
65 For a critical discussion, see Howson & Urbach (2006, pp. 26-29). 
66 ℒ𝑛 could be a sentential or predicate language. If ℒ𝑛 is a finite sentential language, 
then the probability calculus is decidable. If ℒ𝑛 is a first order language for predicate 
logic, we gain further expressive power, but at the cost of decidability. 
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unary function 𝑝𝑟(⋅): ℒ𝑛 → ℜ, is a probability function if and only if it satisfies the 
following axioms, where the complement, union and intersection are replaced with the 
logical operations of negation, conjunction, and disjunction, and the sample space is 
replaced with the notion of tautology. Read ⌜⊨ 𝐴⌝  to say that 𝐴 is a tautology. 
For all sentences 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈  ℒ𝑛: 
1. 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) ≥ 0; (non-negativity) 
2.  If ⊨ 𝐴, then 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) = 1; and (normality) 
3.  If ⊨ ¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵), then 𝑝𝑟(𝐴 ∨ 𝐵) = 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) + 𝑝𝑟(𝐵). (finite additivity) 
Carrying on with the substitution, we define a binary conditional probability function, 
𝑝𝑟(⋅ | ⋅): ℒ𝑛 × ℒ𝑛 ⟶ ℜ with the following formula. For all 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈  ℒ𝑛: 
4.   If 𝑝𝑟(𝐵) ≠ 0, then 𝑝𝑟(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑝𝑟(𝐴∧𝐵)
𝑝𝑟(𝐵)
. 
 
(ratio formula) 
For many purposes, the differences between the set-theoretic and logical 
presentations are mainly superficial—just a matter exchanging some set-theoretic 
notation for logical notation. When the probability calculus is considered as a formal 
abstraction, the set-theoretic approach may be preferable in the sense that set theory 
is a more general formal framework. For under a typical interpretation, the logical 
approach induces the same set-theoretic structure as that required by the set-theoretic 
approach (Huber 2014, §1.3).  However, set theory itself presupposes a logic in which it 
is couched—predicate logic. In any case, in the context of normative modeling for 
degrees of belief, there are points in favor of both approaches. In Chapter 4, I will argue 
at length that the logical approach is preferable for the purposes of probabilism, so that 
is the approach I will assume until then. 
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2.3.2 Treating the Probability Axioms as Norms 
Since probabilists represent degrees of belief with real-valued functions, the most 
obvious interpretation of the second tenet of probabilism is that the credence functions 
that represent an agent’s degrees of belief should be probability functions. Thus, the 
credence functions that represent an agent’s degrees of belief should be non-negative, 
normalized, and finitely additive. And an agent’s conditional degrees of belief should 
afford representation as probabilities per the definition of conditional probability. But, 
additionally, the second tenet of probabilism suggests that the axioms (and theorems) 
of probability theory should serve as norms for the apportionment of degree of belief. 
It’s not obvious how this is supposed to work. But a simple answer is that the 
probability axioms (and theorems) should be translated into doxastic norms by appeal 
to the typical probabilist scheme for representing degrees of belief in terms of degree 
of belief functions. The idea is that we can use this representation scheme in reverse to 
translate norms about real-valued functions into norms about degrees of belief.67 This 
seems to be how most probabilists interpret the claim that degrees of belief should obey 
the probability axioms. 
Unfortunately, not all of the probability axioms themselves afford straightforward 
translation into norms for the apportionment of degrees of belief. But, given the nice 
features and implications of the probability axioms described above, we get some pretty 
intuitive norms when we consider the probability calculus, properly interpreted, as a 
                                                          
67The term “representation scheme” is adopted from Titelbaum (2013). 
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whole. For example, it’s not clear what the first axiom, which requires probabilities to 
be non-negative, means for degree of belief. Considered on its own, in light of the typical 
probabilist representation scheme, it says something like an agent should have at least 
some degree of confidence in every claim. Thus, agents ought to opinionated. But in 
conjunction with the other axioms, axiom 1 implies that one should be sure of the 
falsehood of all contradictions, and one cannot be less confident in any claim than one 
is in a contradiction. Considered on its own, the second axiom says that one should be 
certain of all logical truths. And, in conjunction with the other axioms, the result is a 
requirement of logical omniscience. One should be sure of all tautologies, sure that all 
contradictions are false, and sure of all entailment relations. And it says that one can 
never be more confident in a claim than one is in a tautology. The third axioms says that, 
if two claims are logically incompatible, one’s confidence in the disjunction of the two 
should equal the sum of the two. The ratio formula says that the degree of one’s 
confidence in 𝐴 given 𝐵 should be equal to the ratio of the degree of one’s confidence 
that 𝐴-and-𝐵 compared to the degree of one’s confidence in 𝐵. So, for example, if you 
are very confident that the game will be canceled on the assumption that it will rain, 
your confidence that it will rain and the game will be canceled should be nearly as strong 
as your confidence that it will rain.  
Here are two of the more intuitive theorems of the probability calculus. 
Entailment theorem If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then 𝑝𝑟(𝐵) ≥ 𝑝𝑟(𝐴), for all 𝐴, 𝐵. 
Negation theorem 𝑝𝑟(¬𝐴) = 1 − 𝑝𝑟(𝐴), for all 𝐴. 
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Translated into a degree of belief norm, the entailment theorem says something like the 
following: 
Entailment norm If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then you should be at least as confident in 𝐵 as you are 
in 𝐴. 
 
And when we translate the negation theorem into a norm we get something like this: 
Negation norm Your confidence in ¬𝐴 should be as strong as your confidence in 
𝐴 is weak, and vice versa. 
 
Both of these norms seem like eminently reasonable constraints on degrees of belief. 
Together the probability axioms and theorems, interpreted by means of the 
representation scheme for degree of belief, impose a kind of coherence requirement on 
degree of belief. They also require logical omniscience and opinionation. These are very 
strong norms for degree of belief apportionment. For this reason, many philosophers 
have objected to probabilism for providing implausible, overly-idealized norms. But, as 
I suggest above, this account of the formal representation of degrees of belief and the 
normative role of the probability calculus is not the only interpretation available to 
probabilists. In the next chapter, I will present some of the common objections to 
probabilism. And in later chapters, I will show how a more plausible formal 
representation and account of the normativity of probability can avoid these objections. 
2.4 Justifications for the Probabilist Norm 
Probabilists give three main kinds of arguments to justify the probabilist norm: 
Dutch book arguments, representation theorem arguments, and epistemic utility 
arguments. As I mention above, these arguments are intended primarily to justify the 
probabilist norm, but they also serve to further characterize degrees of belief and what 
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it means for them to be coherent. In the remainder of the chapter, I will present these 
arguments and explain how they help fill in some of probabilism’s details. I will also 
briefly present two other arguments, the normative triangulation and proof in the 
pudding arguments, which probabilists sometimes invoke to justify probabilism in light 
of challenges to the standard arguments. 
2.4.1 Dutch Book Arguments 
Dutch book arguments are the most well-known—and widely criticized—
justifications for probabilism. Ramsey (1964) is often credited with the first Dutch book 
argument, which he gives as an afterthought to his representation theorem argument 
for probabilism, but De Finetti (1964) gives the first full exposition of the argument.68 
The basic idea of a Dutch book argument is that, if one’s degrees of belief are 
probabilistically incoherent, then one is vulnerable to being convinced to buy or sell a 
combination of bets, collectively called a “Dutch book,” that will guarantee one a sure 
loss. Since susceptibility to a combination of sure-loss bets is a bad thing, proponents of 
Dutch book arguments conclude that one’s degrees of belief should be probabilistically 
coherent. 
The basic form of a Dutch book argument is as follows.69 First we assume a 
connection between one’s degrees of belief and one’s betting behavior. Specifically, we 
assume that one’s degrees of belief are connected to the betting quotients one deems 
                                                          
68 See Vineberg (2011), Easwaran (2011), and especially Hájek (2009) for discussion of 
the origin of the Dutch book argument.  
69 My exposition of the argument and common objections to it in this section is based 
on Hájek (2008, 2009) and Vineberg (2011).  
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fair. One’s betting quotient for a particular bet is the ratio of the amount the bettor 
would lose if their bet were incorrect over the amount of money at stake, which is the 
sum of the amount the bettor may lose and the amount the bettor may win. So, for 
example, if I were offered a bet for a $1 stake (payout) that some claim, 𝐴, is true, and 
if I were willing to pay exactly 60 cents for the bet, my betting quotient would be . 6 =
$0.60
$1.00
.70 The nature of the connection between one’s degrees of belief and one’s betting 
quotients is not always stated precisely, so this connection is open to interpretation. At 
very least, one’s betting quotients are supposed to express or evince—if not 
constitute—one’s degrees of belief. 
After we have assumed the connection between degrees of belief and betting 
quotients, we prove the Dutch book theorem, according to which, if an agent’s set of 
betting quotients is probabilistically incoherent, then there is a set of bets the agent 
should be willing to take with these betting quotients that will guarantee the agent a 
loss, regardless of the outcomes of the events on which the wagers are made. The proof 
of this theorem proceeds by cases. For each axiom of the probability calculus, we show 
how a particular set of betting quotients (for an agent) that violates the axiom can be 
employed to generate a combination of bets that guarantees a sure loss (to that agent). 
Next we prove the converse Dutch book theorem, according to which, if an agent’s  
set of betting quotients is probabilistically coherent, then at least one outcome for the 
                                                          
70 This bet counts as fair for me because, given my .6 degree of belief in A, the bet’s 
expected payout to me = (my degree of belief that 𝐴 is true) × (my net gain if 𝐴 is true) 
− (my degree of belief that 𝐴 is false) × (my net gain if 𝐴 is false) =  .6 × ($1 − $. 6) −
(1 − .6) × $. 6 = 0. 
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events on which the wager is made will not generate a loss for the agent.71 Without the 
converse Dutch book theorem, there’s no guarantee that probabilistic coherence will 
protect the agent from being Dutch booked. For, the Dutch book theorem itself does 
not say that probabilistically coherent sets of bets are invulnerable to Dutch book (Hájek 
2009, p. 177). The converse theorem is required to establish that.   
Once we’ve established the Dutch book theorem, we can infer that if one’s degrees 
of belief, which are reflected in one’s betting quotients, are probabilistically incoherent, 
then one is vulnerable to a Dutch book. But in light of the converse Dutch book theorem, 
we know that if one’s degrees of belief are probabilistically coherent, then one is not 
vulnerable to Dutch book. And, since vulnerability to engaging in a combination of sure-
loss bets is a bad thing, we conclude that one’s degrees of belief ought to be 
probabilistically coherent. 
The above argument affords interpretation in at least a couple of important ways. 
As my restatement of the argument suggests, the nature of the connection assumed 
between degrees of belief and betting quotients may be specified in different ways. For 
instance, we might contend that degrees of belief just are our betting quotients. This 
interpretation of the connection between degrees of belief and bets is unpalatable for 
several reasons. Alternatively, we might hold that one’s betting quotients reflect, 
express, or give evidence of one’s degrees of belief, though they are not, strictly 
                                                          
71 The converse Dutch book theorem was proved independently by Kemeny (1955) and 
Lehman (1955). See Hájek (2008, 2009) for discussion. Hájek (2009, p. 177) says that the 
importance of the converse Dutch book theorem is often neglected in presentations of 
the Dutch book argument. 
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speaking, identical. Or we might even suggest that, while our betting quotients often 
reflect our degrees of belief they do not necessarily do so reliably. 
Relatedly, the force of the injunction against probabilistically incoherent degrees of 
belief depends on whether we interpret the Dutch book arguer as holding that we 
should be probabilistically coherent in order to avoid actually being subject to Dutch 
book, or whether we should do so to avoid vulnerability to Dutch book. The significance 
of Dutch book arguments as justifications for probabilism depends on how one resolves 
these issues of interpretation. 
As I note above, Dutch book arguments are not merely justifications for 
probabilism. They also serve as partial characterizations of degrees of belief. The 
arguments assume that, whatever degrees of belief are they are non-categorical 
investments of confidence in claims, and they afford representation by real-valued 
functions. But, prima facie, the argument does not seem to strongly constrain debates 
about whether we ought to be representationalists, dispositionalists, or 
interpretationalists about degree of belief. 
Certainly, the argument has affinities with dispositionalism. On a strict 
interpretation of the connection between degree of belief and betting quotients, the 
argument relies on a form a behaviorism: one’s degrees of belief are nothing other than 
one’s betting quotients. But on more liberal interpretations, according to which betting 
quotients merely reflect or give evidence one’s degrees of belief, Dutch book arguments 
seem to be compatible with interpretationalist and even representationalist accounts 
of degrees of belief as well. On an interpretationalist account, we would say that one’s 
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betting quotients, possibly along with other observable behavior, allow us to attribute 
degrees of belief to agents. And on a representationalist interpretation, we would say 
that our degrees of belief play a causal role in the production of our betting quotients, 
though they are distinct. Incoherent betting quotients are evidence that one’s degrees 
of belief are incoherent. 
While Dutch book arguments contribute to the characterization of the first tenet of 
probabilism, they seem only to justify the second tenet. One’s degrees of belief ought 
to be representable as probabilities, and so ought to obey the epistemic norms the 
probability axioms represent; they must do so in order to avoid vulnerability to Dutch 
book. Dutch book arguments don’t seem to provide any direct justification for the claim 
that beliefs come in degrees. 
The nature of the justification that Dutch book arguments provide, and the notion 
of degree of belief coherence they characterize, depend on how we interpret the 
argument. If we adopt a “strict version” of the argument according to which degrees of 
belief are nothing other than betting quotients, and according to which we should 
maintain coherent betting quotients to avoid actually buying or selling a combination of 
sure-loss bets, then the associated characterization of probabilism is narrower, and the 
justification for probabilism provided by the argument is stronger, but the upshot is less 
interesting. If we are supposed to maintain probabilistic coherence merely in order to 
avoid entering into actual sure-loss bets, we would plausibly respond that we’d rather 
just avoid making bets (Hájek 2008, p. 799).  That’s easier than trying to maintain 
probabilistic coherence! 
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But if we adopt a more liberal version of the argument, a version where degrees of 
belief are related to, but not identical with betting quotients, we get a more interesting 
characterization of probabilism, but a weaker justification for the probabilist norm. For, 
the looser the connection between degrees of belief and betting quotients, the weaker 
justification the Dutch book argument provides (Hájek 2009, pp. 178-179). On this 
interpretation, the significance of Dutch books is that they indicate how probabilistically 
incoherent degrees of belief make us vulnerable to “pragmatic self-defeat” (Talbott 
2011). If our degrees of belief are incoherent, they may lead us to behave in ways that 
result in worse consequences than we might have experienced if our degrees of belief 
were coherent.  On this kind of account, Dutch book arguments serve as a kind of 
dramatization of the sorts of ill consequences one can incur if one’s degrees of belief 
are incoherent. 
On either interpretation of the Dutch book argument, the kind of justification that 
these arguments provide seems to be pragmatic. One ought to be probabilistically 
coherent on pain of eventuating ill consequences due to one’s behavior. This can be 
seen as a positive feature of the argument insofar as it means that the Dutch book 
argument justification of probabilism is independent of other epistemic considerations. 
But it is a negative feature in that it fails to give an epistemic justification for probabilism. 
A way around this problem is suggested by Ramsey, who views the Dutch book 
argument as a dramatic device to illustrate a logical flaw in the degrees of belief of 
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incoherent agents.72 The idea is that if one is susceptible to a Dutch book, then one is 
committed to deductively inconsistent beliefs: one views the same set of bets as both 
fair (in the sense that they are appropriate to one’s betting quotient) and unfair (in that 
they guarantee one a sure loss). On this view, the Dutch book argument is merely meant 
as a way to illustrate the results of this inconsistency. Thus, Ramsey seems to justify 
probabilism on the basis of accepting an epistemic norm of deductive consistency for 
categorical beliefs. While this view establishes an epistemic justification for probabilism, 
it seems to have problems of its own. 
2.4.2 Representation Theorem Arguments 
Representation theorem arguments for probabilism exemplify a general form 
similar to Dutch book arguments. If one’s degrees of belief are not representable by a 
probability function, then one risks an ill consequence. In this case, the idea is that if 
one’s degrees of belief (together with one’s preferences) don’t afford representation by 
a probability function (together with a utility function), then one’s preferences fail to 
satisfy conditions of rationality. So, in order to avoid irrationality, we ought to have 
probabilistically coherent degrees of belief. The first representation theorem argument 
for probabilism is due to Ramsey (1964). Other prominent proponents of representation 
theorem arguments include Savage (1972), Jeffrey (1965), Maher (1993), and Joyce 
(1999).73 
                                                          
72For other “depragmatized” interpretations and versions of the argument, see, for 
example, Christensen (1996), Christensen (2001) and Howson & Urbach (2006). 
73It’s worth pointing out that Joyce’s (1999) treatment of representation arguments 
overcomes some of the usual problems discussed below. Joyce’s account takes the 
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The basic form of representation theorem arguments for probabilism is roughly as 
follows.74 First we assume (or argue) that a version of the standard axiomatization of 
rational preference is correct. That is, the preference axioms provide an appropriate 
representation of the preferences over options or outcomes (or goods) for rational 
agents, and, thereby, they represent norms for rational preference. Different versions 
of the axioms offer slightly different norms, but they tend to include requirements that 
preferences should be transitive, reflexive (and perhaps complete), and impartial (with 
respect to the addition of independent options or outcomes). 
Next we appeal to a representation theorem, according to which, one is 
representable as satisfying the axioms of rational preference if and only if one can be 
represented as an expected utility maximizer by means of a utility function and a 
probability function. Such representation theorems are acknowledged to be beyond 
doubt given the assumption of appropriate axioms for rational preference.75  
                                                          
agent to have both preferences and comparative confidence levels, and he presents his 
preference axioms in terms of these two relations. Then, his representation theorem 
shows that his confidence-preference axioms are satisfied by an agent just in case the 
comparative confidence relation is representable by a probability function, the 
preference relation is representable by a utility function, and the preference orderings 
that satisfy the confidence-preference axioms correspond to the orderings among the 
resulting expected utilities. Thanks to Jim Hawthorne for pointing this out. 
74 My presentation of the argument and its interpretation is based on the expositions in 
Zynda (2000), Easwaran (2011), and especially Hájek (2008). 
75 In Chapter 4, I will talk about a different kind of representation theorem, according to 
which if an agent’s degrees of belief are representable with a comparative confidence 
relation satisfying certain axioms, then the agent’s degrees of belief can also be 
represented with a probabilistic credence function (or set thereof).  
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Given the representation theorem, we then infer that if one cannot be represented 
as an expected utility maximizer via a utility function and a probability function, then 
one cannot be represented as satisfying the axioms of rational preference. So, if one 
can’t be represented with a probability function (usually interpreted as a credence 
function), then one can’t be represented by the rational preference axioms. That is, one 
is irrational. So, to avoid irrationality, we ought to maintain probabilistically coherent 
degrees of belief. 
There are a three of important points of this argument that merit attention and 
interpretation. First, the argument seems to operate by sleight of hand (Hájek 2008, pp. 
803-804). We draw a conclusion about norms for degrees of belief from assumptions 
about the formal representation of preferences. We don’t mention degrees of belief at 
all until the conclusion of the argument. To draw this conclusion, we tacitly assume that 
the probability function that is required by the representation theorem is a credence 
function. We assume that being representable by a probability function means that we 
have degrees of belief, which are representable with a probability function. Another way 
to put it is that the argument is tacitly realistic about the probabilistic representation. 
Without this assumption we cannot draw any conclusions about probabilism from 
assumptions about rational preferences.76 
                                                          
76 Indeed, Zynda (2000) shows that, if an agent’s preferences satisfy the preference 
axioms, then they can be represented as a non-expected utility maximizer via a non-
probability function and a non-utility function. This suggests that there’s no reason to 
favor the probabilistic representation over the non-probabilistic representation, so the 
representation theorem argument fails to support its conclusion, the probabilist norm 
(Hájek 2008, pp. 805-806). 
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Second, it’s important to note that the argument assumes the correctness of a 
version of the rational preference axioms. If the axioms don’t provide an appropriate 
formal representation of the preferences of rational agents and if they don’t provide 
appropriate norms for preference, then the argument fails. It’s also important to note 
that this assumption is akin to the assumption that representation by a probability 
function implies that one has coherent degrees of belief. The assumption of the 
appropriateness of the rational preference axioms is an assumption that representation 
according to the axioms implies that one has rational preferences. Are the preference 
axioms any better justified than the probabilist norm?  
Like Dutch book arguments, representation theorem arguments provide a further 
characterization of the notion of degree of belief. The most obvious way that 
representation theorem arguments provide a further characterization of degree of 
belief is by drawing connections between degree of belief and preference: if one’s 
preferences are rational, then one’s degrees of belief must also be rational. 
In light of this connection, it seems natural to adopt a dispositionalist—even 
behaviorist—interpretation of degree of belief. On this kind of interpretation, one’s 
degrees of belief are entirely explained in terms of one’s behavior. The representation 
theorem places additional constraints on how the behavior that constitutes one’s 
degrees of belief must relate to the behavior that reveals one’s preferences. 
The representation theorem argument also fits well with an interpretationalist 
account of degree of belief. On this sort of account, degree of belief is understood as a 
theoretical entity appealed to explain behavior in conjunction with other theoretical 
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entities, like preference. On an interpretationalist view, the representation theorem 
argument further specifies the way in which we must interpret behavior in terms of 
degree of belief and preference. 
While the representation theorem argument accords well with dispositionalism and 
interpretationalism, it can also be understood in accordance with a representationalist 
account of degree of belief. On this kind of account, the representation theorem 
argument helps specify the causal relationship between, namely, degree of belief and 
preference. 
Like Dutch book arguments, representation theorem arguments seem to provide 
justification only for the second tenet of probabilism. It seems only oriented at justifying 
treating the probability axioms as representing norms for degree of belief. It does not 
offer any direct justification for the claim that beliefs come in degrees. Though one 
might argue that it could give indirect justification for the first tenet on the basis that, if 
one has rational preferences, one can be represented with probability function. One 
might take this as an indication that rational preferences require that agents have 
doxastic states that come in degrees. 
The justification that we get for probabilism in a representation theorem argument 
comes from the appropriateness of the axioms for rational preference and the 
assumption that the probabilistic representation they require is representative of states 
the agent actually has. So, the justification for probabilism that we get from the 
representation theorem argument is entirely parasitic on the justification for the 
preference axioms. So, in order to fully understand the justification that RTAs provide 
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for probabilism, we must also investigate the justification on the axioms for rational 
preference. That’s outside the scope of the current project.  
Additionally, the justification for probabilism depends on the assumption that 
probabilistic representation of the agent required by the representation theorem is true 
to states the agent is actually in. But there may be reason to doubt this assumption. It 
may be that agents are in states similar to, but clearly distinct from degrees of belief 
that afford probabilistic representation. If this is the case, then the representation 
theorem argument doesn’t justify probabilism. It merely justifies the value of being 
probabilistically representable. 
Supposing that these assumptions are appropriate, and the representation 
theorem argument for probabilism goes through as intended, it is important to note 
that the justification it purports to provide for probabilism is non-epistemic. For 
according to the representation theorem argument, probabilism is justified by some 
features of rational preferences. As in the case of the Dutch book argument, the non-
epistemic nature of the justification for probabilism could be construed as a positive 
feature of the representation theorem argument. It provides a non-epistemic ground 
for epistemic norms. But it can also be construed as a negative feature. It seems like we 
should be able to come up with an epistemic justification for our epistemic norms. 
2.4.3 Epistemic Utility Arguments 
As I explain above, Dutch book arguments and representation theorem arguments 
for probabilism are usually seen as providing merely pragmatic, non-epistemic 
justification for probabilism. Many probabilists want to justify probabilism on what they 
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see as purely epistemic grounds. Now I will briefly present two kinds of arguments, often 
called “epistemic utility arguments,” that are intended to provide this kind of 
justification. These arguments attempt to identify an epistemic value, like accuracy, and 
then show that our degrees of belief should be probabilistically coherent in order to 
better satisfy this value. 
2.4.3.1 Calibration Arguments 
Calibration is a measure of how well one’s degrees of belief match corresponding 
relative frequencies. One’s credence function is perfectly calibrated, if for each 𝑟 
between 0 and 1, the proportion of true claims to which one assigns a degree of belief 
𝑟 has the value 𝑟. So, for example, one’s degrees of belief regarding the chance of rain 
are perfectly calibrated if it rains on 10% of the days for which one’s degree of belief 
that it will rain is .1, it rains on 75% of the days for which one’s degree of belief that it 
will rain is .75, and so on.77 The first calibration arguments for probabilism are due to 
van Fraassen (1983) and Shimony (1988).78 
The basic idea of calibration arguments for probabilism is to prove the following 
kind of claim: if one’s degree of belief function is probabilistically incoherent, then there 
is some probabilistically coherent function that is better calibrated. Since, calibration is 
a good thing, the argument goes, our degrees of belief ought to obey the probability 
axioms. 
                                                          
77This example is borrowed from Hájek (2008, p. 807). 
78 My presentation of the argument is based on the presentations in Joyce (2004) and 
Hájek (2008). 
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The calibration argument begins with a proof of the calibration theorem, according 
to which, if one’s degree of belief function violates the probability axioms, then there is 
some probability function that is better calibrated than one’s degree of belief function 
under every deductively consistent assignment of truth-values to claims (Hájek, 2008, 
p. 807). Then, on the assumption that perfect calibration is epistemically valuable, we 
infer that a degree of belief function that is better calibrated is superior to less well-
calibrated degree of belief functions. Thus, we conclude that, since degree of belief 
functions that are probabilistically coherent are better calibrated than incoherent 
degree of belief functions, our degrees of belief ought to be probabilistically coherent. 
The characterization of degree of belief that we get from calibration arguments is 
most naturally construed representationally. On this view, an agent’s degrees of belief 
in claims are mental representations that ought to be attuned to the frequencies with 
which the claims in question are true. While calibration arguments fit well with 
representationalist interpretations of degree of belief, they also seem to be compatible 
with dispositionalist and interpretationalist construals of degree of belief. On a 
dispositionalist interpretation, calibration arguments show how the dispositions that 
constitute degree of belief ought to be attuned to the relative frequencies of the truth 
of the claim. For example, on a behaviorist interpretation, one’s actions on the 
assumption that 𝐴 ought to accord well with the relative frequencies of the truth of 𝐴. 
On an interpretationalist account, calibration arguments characterize how the degrees 
of belief attributed to rational agents ought to represent the agents’ observable 
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behavior as conforming to the relative frequencies with which the claims in which they 
invest degree of belief are true. 
Like the other arguments for probabilism, calibration arguments are aimed 
primarily at justifying the second tenet of probabilism. They are intended to provide 
non-pragmatic, epistemic justification for probabilism by showing that coherent degrees 
of belief are better calibrated to the world in a certain sense. The justification that 
calibration arguments provide depends crucially on the assumption that perfect 
calibration is an epistemic good in its own right. However, several authors have 
challenged the assumption that calibration is a genuine epistemic good.79 
2.4.3.2 Accuracy Arguments 
The basic idea underlying accuracy arguments for probabilism is to establish (via a 
mathematical proof) that probabilistically coherent credence functions are more 
accurate than incoherent functions (according to some measure of accuracy). Since, we 
favor accurate degrees of belief, our degrees of belief ought to be probabilistically 
coherent. The first accuracy argument for probabilism is due to Joyce (1998). In recent 
years, accuracy arguments for probabilism and other tenets of Bayesianism have taken 
off.80  
Accuracy arguments for probabilism begin with a proof of the gradational accuracy 
theorem, according to which, if one’s degree of belief function violates the probability 
axioms, then there is a probability function that is strictly more accurate under every 
                                                          
79See, for example, Seidenfeld (1985), Joyce (1998), and Hájek (MSa). 
80 See Pettigrew (2011) for a survey. 
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logically consistent assignment of truth values to claims.81 That is to say, if one’s degree 
of belief function is probabilistically inconsistent, there is another probabilistically 
consistent degree of belief function that is more accurate, for every possible way the 
world could be. That is, any incoherent degree of belief function is accuracy-dominated 
by a coherent function. Since being accuracy-dominated is a bad thing, we conclude that 
our degrees of belief ought to be probabilistically coherent. 
Like calibration arguments, accuracy arguments for probabilism fit naturally with 
representationalist accounts of degrees of belief. On this kind of view, one’s degrees of 
belief are mental representations that ought to accurately reflect the way the world 
actually is. In order to avoid inaccuracy, one ought to maintain probabilistically 
consistent degrees of belief. 
Accuracy arguments also seem to be compatible with dispositionalist and 
interpretationalist accounts of degree of belief. On a dispositionalist account, accuracy 
arguments require the dispositions that constitute degrees of belief to accurately reflect 
the way the world is. If the dispositions in question are behavioral, then one ought to 
behave as if the true claims are true. If the dispositions are mental, then they ought to 
represent the world accurately, or in accord with other accurate representations. On an 
interpretationalist account, accuracy arguments are construed as the injunction to 
behave so that one can be rationally attributed accurate degrees of belief. 
                                                          
81 My presentation of the gradational accuracy argument is based on Hájek (2008) and 
Pettigrew (2011). 
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Like the other arguments for probabilism I have considered, accuracy arguments 
are aimed only at establishing the second tenet of probabilism. And, like calibration 
arguments, they purport to provide non-pragmatic, epistemic justification for 
probabilism. 
2.4.4 Normative Triangulation and Proof in the Pudding Arguments 
In addition to the three standard kinds of arguments for probabilism just surveyed, 
probabilists sometimes also offer two additional kinds of arguments for probabilism, 
which I call the “normative triangulation”82 and “proof in the pudding” arguments. 
Unlike the standard arguments, these arguments are not intended to characterize 
degrees of belief, or what it means for them to be coherent. Indeed, in some cases,83 
these arguments are meant to compatible with primitivism about degree of belief.  
According to the normative triangulation argument, while each of the standard 
arguments for probabilism has important flaws, they each also help characterize 
degrees of belief and what it means for them to be coherent, and they help tie 
probabilism to our other commitments about degrees of belief.84 Degrees of belief are 
connected to betting behavior, and they do bear a normative connection to preferences, 
and (at least sometimes) it is good for them to be calibrated and accurate. As Hájek 
(2008, p. 816) puts it, together the standard arguments help us “triangulate” to 
                                                          
82 Following Hájek (2008, p. 816). 
83 Like Hájek (2008). 
84 See Christensen (2001), Eriksson & Hájek (2007), and Hájek (2008) for this kind of 
view. 
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probabilism. This quote from Christensen (2001, p. 375),85 writing of Dutch book and 
representation theorem arguments, sums up the view nicely:  
Neither one comes close to being a knock-down argument for Probabilism, and 
non-probabilists will find contestable assumptions in both. But each one, I think, 
provides Probabilism with interesting and non-question-begging intuitive support. 
And that may be the best one can hope for, in thinking about our most basic 
principles of rationality. 
 
According to the proof in the pudding argument, probabilism is also justified by its 
theoretical fruits. The idea is that probabilism provides the foundation of a very rich 
research program, namely subjective Bayesianism, which shows great promise for 
providing a unified theory of doxastic rationality, practical rationality, and scientific 
confirmation. It also helps resolve several troubling philosophical problems in these 
areas. And it provides an excellent characterization of a highly useful psychological and 
epistemological notion, namely degree of belief. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented a typical statement of probabilism and the most 
prominent (and widely discussed) options for filling in the details. I presented probabilist 
characterizations of degrees of belief, and justifications for positing degrees of belief. I 
also presented the probability calculus, its interpretation as a source of degree of belief 
norms, and the standard arguments probabilists use to justify the probabilist norm. This 
presentation was intended primarily to acquaint the reader with probabilism. However, 
                                                          
85 Quoted in Easwaran (2011, p. 318). 
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this presentation as also intended to demonstrate the need for probabilists to fill in the 
details of their view. 
In Chapter 3, I will argue more explicitly that probabilists need to fill out the 
foundations of their view. I will show how three common objections to probabilism arise 
from probabilism’s typical under-articulation. I will argue that probabilists must spell out 
the methodological and normative foundations of their view in a unified, systematic way 
in order to avoid the most pressing objections. Then, in Chapters 3 and 4 I will develop 
an account of these foundations that is more detailed, and more satisfactory than those 
available to date. 
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3 Probabilism & Its Discontents 
In Chapter 2, I presented the typical two-tenet characterization of probabilism along 
with many of the main options for filling it out. This presentation was intended to 
characterize probabilism, the subject of this dissertation, but it was also intended to 
demonstrate some of the ways that probabilism’s details need to be filled in. Thus, 
Chapter 2 was intended to familiarize the reader with probabilism and plant the seed of 
an argument for the claim that probabilists need to fill out their view and articulate its 
foundations. 
However, the mere fact that probabilism’s typical characterization leaves many 
questions unanswered doesn’t, on its own, give us very compelling reasons to attempt 
to develop an account of its foundations. Probabilists may have good reasons to focus 
on applications of their view and keep the foundations implicit. For probabilism is a 
pretty simple, intuitive view, and it is easy to get it up and running as it applies to 
particular problems  with only a minimal understanding of the philosophical foundations 
of the view. Probabilism is also a very flexible view. It has applications to everyday 
epistemological problems as well as problems in philosophy of science and decision 
theory. Probabilists may be wary of compromising the intuitiveness, simplicity, and 
flexibility of the view by weighing it down with foundational baggage. Hence the 
“probabilist formula” in the probabilist literature that I mentioned in the introduction: 
give the two-tenet sketch of probabilism and start churning out the formulas for specific 
applications. 
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In this chapter, I will provide additional reasons to think that probabilists need to 
articulate unified foundations for their view. My approach will be to draw upon crucial 
components of the dialectic between probabilists and their critics. I will present three 
main sources of objections to probabilism: the probabilist scheme for formally 
representing degrees of belief, probabilism’s apparent requirement that an agent be 
strongly “opinionated,” and probabilism’s apparent requirement that an agent be 
“logically omniscient.” Critics of probabilism—often probabilists themselves of one 
stripe or another—object to these aspects of probabilism for three main reasons: (1) 
they are psychologically implausible, (2) they are excessively demanding or idealistic, 
and (3) they are of doubtful value. Over the years, probabilists have developed various 
responses to these criticisms—for example, probabilism relies upon both 
methodological and normative idealizations; probabilists should be local modelers (and 
local models are not so overwhelmingly idealistic), etc. This dialectic raises several deep 
questions about probabilism’s normative and methodological foundations. 
Furthermore, while probabilists’ responses to these objections may begin to reveal 
answers to these foundational questions, they have only done so in a piecemeal way, 
leaving it unclear whether any single unifying coherent account of the foundations can 
be supplied. So, I contend that probabilists need to provide unified foundations for their 
view. Only by doing so can they provide a clear account of the content and aims of the 
view, showing that a coherent rebuttal of objections can stand up to scrutiny. 
Furthermore, such a unified account can contribute to reining in illicit applications of 
the view based on misunderstandings of its content and aims.  
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In §3.1 I will present details of the dialectic between probabilists and their critics. In 
§3.2 I will draw out the main critical themes and responses from this dialectic. I will also 
identify several deeper problems suggested by the usual objections, and I will classify 
strategies probabilists may employ to respond to them. In §3.3, I will explain how some 
of the usual probabilist responses are at cross-purposes, and I will argue that 
probabilists must provide unified foundations in order to avoid such internal conflicts in 
the articulation of their view.  
3.1 The Dialectic: Probabilists & Their Critics 
Probabilism—and Bayesianism, generally—have been subject to several important 
objections since they first started gaining popularity. In this section, I will present three 
of the main sources of objections to probabilism. In doing so, my aim is not to suggest 
that other objections to probabilism are unimportant, or that probabilist responses to 
those objections are entirely satisfactory. I have chosen to focus on the following 
objections and responses because of the centrality of the foundational issues the 
attendant dialectic reveals. 
First, I will present the dialectic concerning probabilism’s scheme for representing 
degrees of belief formally. Then I will consider objections and replies concerning 
probabilism’s apparent requirements that agents be opinionated and logically 
omniscient. 
3.1.1 The Formal Representation Scheme 
Recall the probabilist scheme for formally representing degrees of belief presented 
in Chapter 2. Probabilists represent the claims in which an agent invests degrees of belief 
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with the sentences of a logical language, ℒ. The atomic sentences of ℒ represent the 
atomic claims in which the agent invests confidence, and ℒ is closed under the usual 
logical operations, so it contains all of the truth-functional combinations of these atomic 
sentences. The agent’s degrees of belief are represented with a pair of functions defined 
on ℒ, an unconditional credence function, 𝑐𝑟(⋅): ℒ → [0,1], and a conditional credence 
function, 𝑐𝑟(⋅ | ⋅): ℒ × ℒ → [0,1]. The outputs of these functions represent the strength 
of the agent’s degree of belief in the claims represented by the input sentences of ℒ. 
Thus, each of the agent’s degrees of belief is represented with a precise numerical value. 
Values closer to 1 represent stronger degrees of belief; values closer to 0 represent 
weaker degrees of belief (that is, stronger degrees of belief that the claim is false). The 
probabilist norm requires the credence functions that represent an agent’s degrees of 
belief to be probability functions. 
I will present three objections to this formal representation scheme. The first—
perhaps naïve—objection holds that probabilism is implausible because it requires 
agents to have numbers—numerical degrees of belief—“in their heads.” The second, 
more sophisticated objection holds that agents’ doxastic attitudes are not even 
representable with precise numerical credence functions. The third objection holds that 
since humans are in general not very good intuitive judges of probability, any 
probabilistic representation of degrees of belief is implausible. 
3.1.1.1 Numbers in the Head? 
The no numbers in the head objection holds that probabilism’s formal 
representation scheme seems to assume that we have uniformly explicit, precise 
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numerical degrees of belief “in our heads,” but that this assumption is simply false. We 
rarely—if ever—have precise, explicitly numerical degrees of belief, and it doesn’t seem 
like we could or should have them all the time. Our phenomenology does not reveal 
many conscious numerical degrees of belief. We sometimes attach percentage 
estimates or other numerical quantities to our degrees of belief. But these percentages 
are just estimates of the strength of our degrees of belief; they aren’t inherent to the 
degrees of belief themselves. Sometimes it is difficult to precisely quantify the strength 
of our confidence. In some cases, such difficulties are instances of the general problem 
of fixing our doxastic attitudes in relation to our evidence and our other doxastic 
attitudes. In other cases, our degrees of belief defy precise numerical estimation 
because they are vague or imprecise.  
It doesn’t seem like we have subconscious numerical degrees of belief either. For 
one thing, it’s not clear what this would mean. We’d have to appeal to a theory of what 
degrees of belief are qua mental state in order to make sense of this. Additionally, it 
would be strange for us to have subconscious numerical degrees of belief given how 
rarely our conscious degrees of belief are numerical, and how difficult it is sometimes to 
quantify our confidence. Given the difficulties we sometimes encounter in quantifying 
our degrees of belief, it seems like we couldn’t have uniformly precise numerical degrees 
of belief. And it’s also not clear why we would want to. 
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The no numbers in the head objection is not one that you’ll often encounter in the 
literature.86 It depends on a conflation of degrees of belief with their formal 
representations. Or, more charitably, it requires a strong realism about probabilism’s 
formal representation scheme. As such, it is a bit naïve and a bit of a straw man. 
However, it is the sort of objection one often hears from those encountering 
probabilism for the first time. And it is understandable given that probabilists rarely 
characterize their view in enough detail to preclude this interpretation. Indeed, the way 
many probabilists talk and write about degrees of belief and their numerical 
representations invites the conflation of the two. So, while the no numbers in the head 
objection may be naïve, it raises an important question, namely, what exactly does it 
mean for our degrees of belief to be represented with real-valued credence functions? 
When probabilists encounter the no numbers in the head objection, they typically 
explain the problem away without much fanfare. They explain that probabilism’s formal 
representation scheme doesn’t require agents to have numerical degrees of belief in the 
head. The numerical representation of degrees of belief is just that—a representation. 
This doesn’t mean that agents have explicitly numerical degrees of belief—whether 
consciously or subconsciously. To say that an agent 𝛼’s degree of belief in a claim 𝐴 can 
be represented by a credence function with an output .999 (𝑐𝑟𝛼(𝐴) = .999) is not 
necessarily to say that 𝛼 has a mental state that attaches .999 to 𝐴. Minimally, it means 
                                                          
86 Harman (1986, p. 22) considers a version of probabilism that posits explicitly 
numerical degrees of belief in agents, and he raises this objection, but he acknowledges 
the implausibility of such a view and does not attribute it to probabilists. See also Zynda 
(2000, p. 50) for a brief discussion. 
91 
 
that 𝛼 is nearly certain that 𝐴 is true. For the representation scheme holds that numbers 
closer to 1 represent stronger degrees of belief, and .999 is pretty close to 1.87  
Depending on the specific account of the numerical representation, the precise 
credence value .999 may have additional significance. For example, it may indicate that 
𝛼 would deem it fair to engage in a bet (on either side) that pays out $999 (to one who 
bets against A) if 𝐴 is false for a gain of $1 (to one who bets for 𝐴) if A is true. But it does 
not guarantee that 𝛼 has an explicitly numerical degree of belief in 𝐴. Numerical 
credence functions are meant to capture the gradational structure of our degrees of 
belief, but they may not do so perfectly. The precise numerical representation of 
degrees of belief is mostly a technical convenience for ease of representation and 
computation. 
These responses provide a superficial resolution to the no numbers in the head 
objection: probabilism doesn’t make the objectionable assumption that agents have 
explicitly numerical degrees of belief; it merely represents agents’ degrees of belief 
numerically. However, these responses do not resolve the deeper issue of exactly what 
it means for one’s degrees of belief to be representable with numerical credence 
functions or for one’s credence functions to be probability functions. To resolve these 
deeper issues probabilists must provide a more detailed account of what it means to 
have degrees of belief and what the gradational structure of degrees of belief is really 
                                                          
87 The language of “closeness” suggests that the numbers in the probabilist 
representation scheme have more than mere ordinal significance. For there are 
uncountably many real numbers between .999 and 1.  So, in an ordinal sense, .999 is 
still infinitely far from 1. 
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like. Only then can we fully understand what it means for our degrees of belief to be 
represented with sharp, real-valued credence functions. Only then can we understand 
to what extent this representation is faithful and to what extent it is distorted for the 
sake of simplicity and computational tractability. 
The no numbers in the head objection also raises issues about whether, and how 
much, the abilities and limitations of actual human agents should constrain probabilist 
theorizing, including the probabilist formal representation scheme. If probabilism is 
meant to guide or provide a standard of evaluation for human cognition, perhaps its 
requirements should be constrained by the capabilities of actual humans. If humans 
couldn’t have degrees of belief as richly structured as the real line in the unit interval, 
perhaps probabilism’s formal representation scheme is inappropriate. Probabilists may 
be able to avoid this objection without grappling with the reasons that support it by 
insisting that probabilism is a normative theory, and as such is not beholden to the 
limitations of humans. But this raises further questions about the nature and sources of 
the normativity of probabilism’s requirements. 
3.1.1.2 Numerical Representability? 
So, explaining that probabilism doesn’t assume that we have sharp numerical 
degrees of belief in the head doesn’t get probabilists off the hook. There’s still a lot to 
explain about what it means for our degrees of belief to be representable with sharp 
numerical credence functions. But even if we grant the probabilist response to the no 
numbers in the head objection and we set aside most of these questions about the 
nature of degrees of belief, their gradational structure, and how faithfully credence 
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functions represent it, there are other reasons to doubt the appropriateness of 
probabilism’s formal representation scheme. Critics offer two more objections to the 
probabilist representation scheme, which I will call the “psychological objection” and 
the “evidential objection,” respectively. According to the psychological objection, the 
precise numerical representation of degrees of belief is psychologically implausible: we 
don’t seem to have precise numerical degrees of belief; and it doesn’t seem like we 
could. According to the evidential objection, sometimes our evidence requires us to 
adopt imprecise degrees of belief that cannot be faithfully represented with sharp 
numerical credence functions. These objections are refinements of the no numbers in 
the head objection, and they show that concerns about psychological plausibility and 
normative appropriateness persist even on a more sophisticated interpretation of the 
probabilist representation scheme. 
3.1.1.2.1 The Psychological Objection 
Critics propose the psychological objection for reasons similar to those offered in 
support of the no numbers in the head objection. There are many claims for which we 
do not seem to have sharp degrees of belief that admit of precise numerical 
representation. Furthermore, it doesn’t seem like we could have uniformly sharp 
degrees of belief. So, it doesn’t seem appropriate to require agents to have degrees of 
belief that admit of numerically precise representation.88 
                                                          
88 For discussion, see, for example, Kaplan (2002, p. 435), Joyce (2011, pp. 282-283), and 
Christensen (2004, pp. 144-150). 
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Probabilists offer three responses to the psychological objection. First, they explain 
that our lack of conscious awareness of the sharpness of our degrees of belief, and our 
inability to articulate our degrees of belief with numerical precision do not mean that 
our degrees of belief are imprecise, and that, therefore, they may not be modeled with 
numerical precision.89 Our degrees of belief simply might not be available to 
introspection. They might be subconscious mental representations or they might be 
behavioral dispositions of which we have limited awareness. That is, our degrees of 
belief might be precise despite our inability to recognize them as such.  
Critics respond in turn that our lack of awareness of the sharpness of our degrees 
of belief and the difficulty of assigning precise numerical estimates of the strength of 
our confidence should cast doubt upon characterizations of degrees of belief as 
subconscious mental representations or behavioral dispositions that might disagree 
with our conscious feelings of confidence.90 This idea is that if an account of degrees of 
belief (as subconscious mental representations or behavioral dispositions) attributes 
degrees of belief to agents that conflict with their conscious feelings of confidence, this 
is a reason to doubt that account of degrees of belief. 
Second, probabilists note that their numerical representation of degrees of belief is 
a normative idealization.91 Probabilism is an account of ideal rationality. It’s a theory of 
                                                          
89 For an example of such a response, see Eells (1982, p. 41 ff.) cited in Kaplan (2002, p. 
435, n. 2) and Christensen (2004, p. 144). 
90 Kaplan (2002, p. 435) attributes this view to Goldman (1986, pp. 326-328). 
91 For example, see Christensen (2004, pp. 146-147). 
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how agents ought to apportion their degrees of belief, or, alternately, a theory of how 
it is good for agents to apportion their degrees of belief. As such, probabilism is not 
constrained by the abilities of actual epistemic agents. The facts that actual agents rarely 
have sharp degrees of belief that afford faithful numerical representation, and that 
agents like us do not seem capable of having uniformly precise degrees of belief do not 
cast doubt on the claim that agents ought to have precise degrees of belief or that it 
would be good for agents to have precise degrees of belief. 
Third, probabilists also explain that in addition to being a normative idealization, 
the numerical representation of degrees of belief is also an instance of so-called 
“Galilean idealization”—the practice of intentionally misrepresenting the modeled 
phenomenon in order to achieve a more tractable model.92 Representing degrees of 
belief with precise numerical values between 0 and 1 allows probabilists to employ the 
elegant, fecund, and decidable93 probability calculus rather than a messier, more 
complicated, but more realistic formal modeling framework. The representation of an 
agent’s degrees of belief by means of a unique pair of probabilistic credence functions 
makes it easy to compute the coherence of the agent’s degrees of belief. And this 
idealization is close enough for most real purposes. Less precise numerical 
representations and qualitative formal representations would be less computationally 
convenient and would gain little benefit for practical purposes. Together, these 
                                                          
92See Christensen (2004, pp. 145-146) for an example of a probabilist who gives this sort 
of account of the idealization implicit in probabilistic modeling degrees of belief. For a 
more detailed account of Galilean idealization, see Weisberg (2007, p. 640). 
93 Assuming that the underlying logic is decidable. See Fitelson (2008). 
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probabilist responses provide plausible defense of the sharp probabilistic 
representation of degrees of belief. Some probabilists will not want to endorse the first 
response in order to avoid disconnecting our degrees of belief from our conscious 
awareness. But many probabilists avail themselves the second and third responses.  
These responses seem to allow probabilists to avoid the psychological objection, 
but, in doing so, they raise further questions. Like the no numbers in the head objection, 
the psychological objection raises the issue of how realistically we ought to interpret the 
numerical representation of degrees of belief, and how much the normative significance 
of probabilism should be constrained by the abilities of real agents. Probabilists avoid 
the psychological objection by allowing that the unique numerical representation of 
degrees of belief may be an oversimplification for the sake of computational 
convenience, and by denying that the abilities of real agents impose a firm constraint on 
normative theorizing. But this response prompts critics to raise once more the questions 
of how much technical simplification is acceptable and about the extent to which the 
abilities of real agents should provide constraints on probabilist norms. 
3.1.1.2.2 The Evidential Objection 
The response that probabilism employs various idealizations seems to save it from 
the psychological objection, but at the cost of attributing to probabilism a misleading 
nomenclature associated with its formal representation of degrees of belief, and an 
implausible account of epistemic normativity. The evidential objection to the precise 
numerical representation of degrees of belief poses a more difficult challenge. 
According to the evidential objection, sometimes our evidence is “incomplete, 
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imprecise, or equivocal” (Joyce 2011, p. 283). In such cases, our evidence requires us to 
adopt incomplete, imprecise, or equivocal degrees of belief that cannot be faithfully 
represented with unique, sharp probabilistic credence functions.94 
Joyce provides the following example of such a case (2011, p. 283): 
Black/Grey Coins. An urn contains a large number of coins which have been painted 
black on one side and grey on the other. The coins were made at a factory that can 
produce coins of any bias β: (1 − β) where β, the objective chance of the coin 
coming up black, might have any value in the interval 0 < 𝛽 < 1. You have no 
information about the proportions with which coins of various biases appear in the 
urn. If a coin is drawn at random from the urn, how confident should you be that it 
will come up black when tossed? 
In this case it seems that adopting any sharp credence that the coin will come up black 
would be to disrespect the evidence. Any point-valued credence will be more precise 
than the evidence supports. Thus, it seems that the sharp numerical representation of 
degrees of belief required by probabilism can be at odds with various evidential 
requirements.95 So, it’s normatively inappropriate for probabilism to require the 
representation of ideal epistemic agents with precise numerical degrees of belief. For, 
in the face of such evidence, even computationally and mnemonically ideal, but 
evidentially limited epistemic agents would adopt imprecise degrees of belief. 
                                                          
94 See Christensen (2004, pp. 147-150) and Joyce (2011) for discussion. 
95It may be important to distinguish the notion of precision or sharpness from the notion 
of uniqueness. Many epistemologists have argued recently that for any set of evidence, 
there is a unique doxastic attitude that it supports. This thesis seems to be consistent 
with the claim that evidence may require an agent to adopt a non-sharp degrees of 
belief, so long that the evidence supports a unique credence. So, perhaps the credence 
required by the evidence in the black/grey coins case is best modeled by a set of 
probability functions that yield outputs throughout the (0,1) interval. This credal state 
is non-sharp, but nonetheless unique. 
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Thus, the probabilist cannot brush off the evidential objection to the numerical 
representation of degrees of belief by explaining the normative idealization of 
probabilism. It seems that even ideal agents should sometimes have imprecise degrees 
of belief. 
This leaves the probabilist with the response that the precise numerical 
representation of degrees of belief is a Galilean idealization—a simplification for the 
sake of computational tractability. This response might save the probabilist from the 
evidential objection, but it does so at a cost. For it raises the issue of how much 
simplification is acceptable in the formal representation of degrees of belief. It seems 
that the precise numerical representation of degrees of belief is unacceptable because 
its computational convenience puts it at odds with evidential norms. This suggests that 
the probabilist formal representation of credence ought to be revised to allow for 
imprecise, incomplete, or equivocal degrees of belief. Thus, the evidential objection pits 
the normative aspirations of probabilism against its technical convenience. 
A common probabilist response to the evidential objection is to grant that the sharp 
numerical representation of degrees of belief is sometimes inappropriate, and to 
augment the traditional probabilist formal modeling framework by allowing that an 
agent’s doxastic state may be best modeled in a given instance by a set of credence 
functions which together represent the coarse-grained range of an agent’s imprecise 
degrees of belief.96 As we saw in Chapter 2, qualitative probabilists even suggest that 
                                                          
96 See Walley (1991), Christensen (2004, pp. 147), White (2009), and Joyce (2011), 
among others, for this kind of response. 
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agents’ doxastic states should be represented with qualitative comparative confidence 
relations, which may in turn be modeled with probabilistic credence functions or sets 
thereof.97 These qualitative probabilist modeling frameworks allow us to model agents 
with incomplete, equivocal, and imprecise degrees of belief. 
The evidential objection and the probabilist responses to it raise familiar issues 
concerning how to interpret probabilist formal models, how realistically the formalism 
should be construed, how much simplification is appropriate in a formal model, how the 
abilities of real agents constrain normative theorizing, and how the requirements of 
probabilism interact with other epistemic norms, such as evidential norms. Probabilists 
must answer these questions in order to fully respond to the above concerns about the 
sharp numerical representation of degrees of belief. 
3.1.1.3 Issues Raised by Poor Human Probability Judgment 
Even if we grant that precise numerical representation of degrees of belief is 
appropriate (for a wide range of cases, perhaps), we might still worry about the 
probabilistic representation of degrees of belief. We might worry that, because humans 
are poor intuitive judges of probability, our degrees of belief are unlikely to be faithfully 
probabilistically representable, and, therefore, the probabilistic representation of 
degrees of belief is inappropriate.98 
Researchers in the cognitive biases and heuristics tradition have amassed 
compelling evidence that the intuitive probability judgments of humans depart from the 
                                                          
97 See Hawthorne (2009; MS). 
98 This seems to be the suggestion in Pollock (MS). 
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dictates of probability theory in significant and systematic ways.99 For instance, they 
have found in experiments that humans often ignore prior probability distributions 
when reasoning about the prevalence of phenomena within a particular population 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1974). They have also found that humans often fail to conform to 
the probabilistic rule that the probabilities of entailed sentences must be at least as high 
as those that entail them (Tversky & Kahneman 1983). Since humans often make such 
fundamental probabilistic errors, it seems that humans’ degrees of belief are unlikely to 
often be faithfully representable with probabilistically coherent credence functions. 
Some philosophers see the significant and systematic descriptive inadequacy of the 
probabilistic representation of degrees of belief as a reason to doubt its appropriateness 
for a normative account of doxastic rationality. These philosophers worry that 
probabilistic representability cannot be epistemically good or obligatory, if humans 
systematically fail to live up to that standard.  
The primary probabilist response to this worry is that probabilism is a normative 
account of doxastic rationality. It is not a description of the way agents actually invest 
confidence in claims. The fact that humans are poor intuitive judges of probability, and 
that our degrees of belief do not often admit of probabilistic representation, is 
compatible with the claim that probabilistic representability is an appropriate normative 
requirement. The above mentioned research on human reasoning also shows that 
                                                          
99 For overviews of this literature at different stages of its development, see, for 
example, Kahneman et al. (1982), Gilovich, et al. (2002), and Kahneman (2011) and Pohl 
(2012). 
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humans are poor deductive reasoners by the standards of formal deductive logic. Does 
this make formal deductive logic an inappropriate standard for human deductive 
reasoning? Some probabilists including Christensen (2004, pp. 154-164) and Titelbaum 
(2013, pp. 60-75) explain further that probabilism is an evaluative—as opposed to 
deontological—account of doxastic rationality. Its requirements describe epistemic 
ideals that agents may or may not be able to meet, rather than epistemic obligations 
that agents ought to live up to. As such, it is not constrained by the abilities of actual 
agents. 
This response allows probabilists to insist upon the appropriateness of probabilistic 
representations of degrees of belief. But it raises the issue of exactly what the normative 
significance of probabilism’s requirements is supposed to be. Are these requirements 
deontological or evaluative? Or do they have some other kind of normative force? What 
is their significance for humans? How do these requirements relate to other epistemic 
norms? 
3.1.2 Opinionation 
As we saw in Chapter 2, probabilism seems to include an opinionation requirement. 
Kolmogorov’s axioms specify that probability functions are total functions: they map 
each input to some output or another. So, a probabilistic credence function maps each 
sentence of the modeling language to some real number between 0 and 1. Translated 
into a norm for degrees of belief, this seems to be a requirement that an agent must 
have a unique, precise degree of belief toward every claim represented in the modeling 
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language. Recall that this includes every logical (or set-theoretic) combination of the 
atomic claims represented in the modeling language. 
However, that’s not all there is to the opinionation requirement. For probability 
functions represent the strength of an agent’s confidence in a univocal numerical scale. 
That is, the strength of an agent’s confidence in each claim is represented with a real 
number between 0 and 1. And we can appeal to these numbers to compare differences 
in the agent’s confidence in claims. Implicitly, this numerical representation makes every 
pair of claims comparable on a single scale. So, in addition to requiring that you have 
some attitude or other to every claim, opinionation also seems to require that you 
should be able to compare the strength of your confidence in every claim to every other 
with an arbitrarily high degree of precision. So, the opinionation requirement seems to 
demand that we should have a huge number of precise doxastic attitudes, all of which 
are comparable to each other.  
Critics of probabilism express three main worries about the opinionation 
requirement. First, they worry that the opinionation requirement is inappropriate 
because it requires us to have more doxastic attitudes than we could possibly have. 
Second, they worry that opinionation requires us to have more doxastic attitudes than 
we would want to have—it requires us to clutter our minds with irrelevancies. Third, it 
requires us to have more degrees of belief than we could possibly hope to maintain 
coherently—we could not conduct the necessary computations to maintain coherence. 
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3.1.2.1 Can We Have So Many Doxastic Attitudes? 
Exactly how many doxastic attitudes does opinionation require us to have? The 
answer to this questions depends on which claims are supposed to be represented in a 
given model. This in turn will depend on the modeling language employed, and on how 
the objects of degree of belief are structured. If the modeling language includes all of 
the logical combinations of the atomic claims in the modeled agent’s natural language 
or all of the logical combinations of atomic claims towards which the agent has degrees 
of belief, the opinionation requirement will be very demanding.  For instance, if the 
objects of degrees of belief have a set-theoretic structure (for example, if they are 
propositions understood as sets of possible worlds), then opinionation would require 
that an agent who has degrees of belief about 𝑛 atomic propositions to have degrees of 
belief toward 22
𝑛
 truth-functionally distinct propositions.100 If the doxastic objects have 
the finer grained structure of sentences in a logical language, the opinionation 
requirement would require an infinite number of doxastic attitudes, since there are 
infinitely many sentences in any language containing at least one atomic sentence. We 
could not, it seems, have so many doxastic attitudes.101 
                                                          
100 That is, for 𝑛 propositions there are 2𝑛 state-descriptions (truth-table lines), and so 
there are 22
𝑛
 sets of state-descriptions (sets of truth-table lines), where each such set 
consists of those state-descriptions that combine to make up a disjunction of state-
descriptions (where the empty set corresponds to a contradiction, and the set of all 
state-descriptions corresponds to a tautology). 
101 Titelbaum (2015) mentions a similar objection to logical omniscience principles. He 
calls it the “cognitive capacity objection” (2015, p. 255). 
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Probabilists tend to give two main responses to this worry. First, they remind critics 
that probabilism is a normative theory.102 They explain that the epistemic requirements 
of probabilism characterize epistemic ideals. Their status as such is not diminished by 
the cognitive short-comings of humans. So the requirement that agents have degrees of 
belief about every claim is an epistemic ideal despite the fact that human agents 
couldn’t hope to live up to it. 
Second, some probabilists offer an additional sort of response. They contend that 
critics have not merely misapprehended the normative status of probabilism; critics 
have also misapprehended the aims and method of probabilistic modeling. They explain 
that probabilistic models should not be undertaken on the global scale, modeling an 
agent’s entire doxastic state at a given time.103 This project, they suggest, is overly 
ambitious and complex. Rather, they suggest that each probabilist model should be 
constructed at a local level to model simplified situations in order to generate normative 
specific verdicts about how agents ought to invest their degrees of belief. On this 
approach, each model would specify a small number of atomic expressions. So, the 
number of truth-functionally distinct expressions included in the model would be 
relatively small.  So, the local approach would not impose an excessively demanding 
opinionation requirement. 
                                                          
102 See Christensen (2004, Ch. 6) for detailed discussion of this kind of response to 
concerns that probabilism is overly normatively idealistic. 
103 Garber (1983) proposes the local modeling strategy, and Titelbaum (2013) defends it 
at length. See also Levi (1967), Shimony (1970), and Savage (1972) for earlier, less 
explicit defenses of local modeling. 
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These responses raise familiar issues about how to interpret probabilist formal 
models and how to understand their normative significance. The first response saves 
probabilism from psychological plausibility concerns by a familiar strategy, namely, 
affirming the status of probabilism as a normative theory, and explaining that normative 
theories are not beholden to the limitations of actual agents. As we’ve seen above, it’s 
not obvious that this response is adequate. Probabilists will have to say more about the 
normative foundations of epistemology before they can deflect this objection by mere 
reference to the normative nature of probabilism. The second response raises further 
questions about the purpose of probabilistic modeling. Is the probabilistic modeling 
framework a mere instrument for generating normative verdicts? Or is it supposed to 
help explicate some philosophical notion, like coherence or rationality? 
3.1.2.2 Would We Want to Have So Many Doxastic Attitudes? 
A related worry concerns whether we, as real agents, would even want to have 
degrees of belief in such a vast range of claims. Some authors have suggested that 
having degrees of belief in so many claims would simply clutter our cognitive lives with 
irrelevancies.104 A language sufficiently rich to model an agent’s doxastic state would 
likely include many odd claims, including extremely complex logical combinations of 
unrelated atomic claims. Why would we want attitudes towards extremely complex 
                                                          
104 To my knowledge, Harman (1986) is the first to make this point. Harman’s focus is on 
the normative connection between deductive logic and categorical belief, but his point 
applies equally well to the normative connection between the probability calculus and 
degree of belief. See MacFarlane (MS) and Field (2009) for additional discussion. 
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tautologies or logical combinations of totally unrelated atomic claims? Such attitudes 
are not epistemically valuable. They would consume our limited mnemonic resources.  
Probabilists respond to this worry much like they respond to the previous worry 
about opinionation. Some probabilists reaffirm that probabilism is a normative theory. 
They explain that the fact that human minds, if opinionated, would be hopelessly 
cluttered does not show that opinionation and probabilistic coherence fail to set the 
appropriate normative standard for degrees of belief. They cite various justifications for 
probabilism to show how failure to abide by opinionation and the other such normative 
requirements of probabilism result in terrible consequences. 
Other probabilists reiterate the response that opinionation is a demanding 
cognitive requirement only when viewed from a global modeling perspective. If we 
adopt a local modeling perspective, the opinionation requirement will not require us to 
clog our minds with degrees of belief in irrelevant claims. For the modeling languages 
employed in probabilist models will be specifically designed to yield limited normative 
verdicts. These models will employ very limited modeling languages, and local modelers 
will not focus on generating verdicts about irrelevant logical combinations of claims. 
Again, these responses raise questions about what the proper normative 
interpretation of probabilism should be, and about how we should understand the aims 
and methods of formal probabilist modeling. In addition to raising questions about 
whether probabilism is an evaluative theory, the first response also raises the question 
about what value of rational degrees of belief are supposed to have. Is this value 
determined by practical interests, so that only degrees of belief relevant to one’s 
107 
 
interests are valuable? Or are all rational degrees of belief valuable in some wider sense, 
even if they are not relevant to one’s practical interests? And as before, the second 
response raises the question of whether probabilist models should be local or global, 
but it makes especially perspicuous the question of whether the normative interest of 
probabilism is in its local or global application. 
3.1.2.3 Too Hard to Compute? 
Another related concern is that opinionation, in conjunction with the other 
probabilist requirements, requires us to maintain probabilistic coherence for a huge 
number of doxastic attitudes. As the previous worries contend, humans are cognitively 
limited agents. It doesn’t seem like we could hold all of the attitudes opinionation 
requires, and it seems like it would be cognitively harmful for us to try. Relatedly, our 
cognitive limitations would seem to prevent us from computing the coherence of so 
many degrees of belief. Probabilistic coherence (a.k.a. probabilistic consistency with the 
probability calculus) on a language for sentential logic (or on the language of Boolean 
combinations of sets) is decidable (Fitelson 2008). But the decision problem for 
probabilistic coherence is more computationally complex than the decision problem for 
the logical consistency of sets of sentential logic sentences. In some realistic cases, the 
sun would die long before an agent could compute the coherence of all of their 
probabilistic degrees of belief. 
Probabilist responses to this concern are similar once again to those just presented 
with regard to the other worries about opinionation. Probabilists might refer once more 
to the fact that probabilism is a normative theory. The computational limitations of 
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humans do not impose constraints on its normative requirements. It is still epistemically 
good or obligatory to maintain probabilistic coherence among an opinionated degree of 
belief set, even though a human could not do so (just as deductive logical consistency 
may be the appropriate normative standard for categorical belief, but computationally 
beyond reach in many realistic cases). Or probabilists might lean on the local modeling 
approach again, noting that probabilist models do not impose immodest computational 
demands when approached from a local perspective. 
As before these responses raise questions about the normative significance of 
probabilist requirements, and about how to conceive of the probabilist modeling 
enterprise. This worry poses an extreme example of the objection that probabilism 
should be constrained by the abilities of human agents. By toeing the normative line in 
response to this worry, the probabilist seems to admit that it is good (or perhaps, 
obligatory) to maintain a coherent opinionated degree of belief set, even though in 
some realistic cases computing the coherence of such a set could take longer than 
humans have existed.  
This response seems to suggest that the real cognitive abilities of humans place 
absolutely no constraints on the normative requirements of probabilism. This raises 
deep questions about the nature and source of probabilism’s normative force. The 
second response also provokes worries about the normative significance of the local 
modeling approach.  As usually presented, the primary normative claim of probabilism 
is its requirement that agents should maintain probabilistically coherent degrees of 
belief. If this requirement can be watered down to a sufficiently local level, probabilism 
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seems to lose much of its normative force. It seems to reduce to the claim that modeling 
belief strengths with probabilities is sometimes useful for small, locally tractable 
problems. Who would have doubted that? 
3.1.3 Logical Omniscience 
As we saw in Chapter 2, probabilism seems to impose a logical omniscience 
requirement on agents. It requires agents to be representable with probabilistic 
credence functions. And Kolmogorov’s second probability axiom (normality)105 requires 
all logical truths to have probability 1. If we translate the normality axiom into a degree 
of belief norm by applying the probabilist scheme for representing degrees of belief in 
reverse, this seems to yield the requirement that agents must be certain of all logical 
truths. (On the set-theoretic version of the axioms, the equivalent requirement is that 
all set-theoretic expressions for the set , no matter how complex, be recognized to 
equal , and thus be assigned probability 1.) 
However, this is not the only logical omniscience requirement that probabilism 
seems to impose.  For, in conjunction with the other axioms, the normality axiom entails 
theorems which translate into norms that impose additional logical omniscience 
constraints. For example, one such norm holds that we should be at least as confident 
in each claim as we are in the claims that entail it. Another holds that we should be 
certain that all contradictions are false.  
                                                          
105 For all 𝐴 ∈ ℒ, if ⊨ 𝐴, then 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) = 1. 
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Additionally, the opinionation requirement can itself be construed as a kind of 
logical omniscience requirement. For it holds that we should have attitudes toward all 
of the logical (set-theoretic) combinations of the basic claims towards which we have 
attitudes. Awareness of these logical (set-theoretic) combinations is itself a form of 
logical omniscience.106 
Critics of probabilism raise worries about the logical omniscience requirement 
similar to those they raise about the opinionation requirement, as well as a couple of 
others. I present these in sequence below. 
3.1.3.1 The Problems 
3.1.3.1.1 Excessive Demandingness 
The most common objection to the logical omniscience requirement is that it is too 
demanding. Critics object that the logical omniscience requirement is too demanding 
for two reasons.107 First, there’s what Titelbaum (2015, p. 255) calls the “cognitive 
capacity objection.” As I just explained, the logical omniscience requirement seems to 
demand that we should be certain in the truth of all logical truths, certain of the 
falsehood of all contradictions, and at least as confident of each claim as we are in claims 
that entail it. Having so many doxastic attitudes, the objection holds, is beyond our 
cognitive capacity. For, even in sentential logic there are infinitely many logical truths 
and falsehoods, and infinitely many entailment relations among claims. Humans 
                                                          
106 Earman (1992, p. 122) calls this form of logical omniscience “LO2.” He refers to the 
demand for certainty in all logical truths as “LO1” (1992, p. 121). 
107 See again Christensen (2004, Ch. 6). See Cherniak (1986) for a discussion of the 
demandingness of the deductive consistency norm for categorical belief. 
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couldn’t possibly have infinitely many doxastic attitudes. We simply could not maintain 
the sheer number of degrees of belief required. Our mnemonic abilities fall far short of 
this standard. 
Second, there’s what Titelbaum (2015, p. 255) calls the “cognitive reach” objection: 
some logical truths, logical falsehoods, and entailment relations are too complex or 
obscure for us to recognize them as such. Our computational limitations also prevent us 
meeting this standard.  
These objections suggests that probabilism is an inappropriate norm, because it 
makes demands that real agents couldn’t hope to meet. In this regard probabilism is on 
a par with a logical consistency norm for categorical belief, which would require us to 
believe all logical truths and to disbelieve all contradictions.108  
3.1.3.1.2 Cognitive Clutter 
Relatedly, critics also raise cognitive clutter concerns about the logical omniscience 
requirement. Even if we could be logically omniscient, it’s not clear that all of this logical 
awareness would be of any value to us. We might worry that so many degrees of belief 
(probabilistic or not) would clutter our minds with irrelevancies unimportant to our 
pragmatic and epistemic ends. And since our cognitive limitations prevent us from 
having so many degrees of belief, these cognitive clutter concerns are even more 
pressing. For many logical truths and falsehoods are extremely obscure and distant from 
                                                          
108 Christensen (2004, p. 151) also makes this point. 
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our practical lives. To cite a recent example from the literature,109 there are logical truths 
(consequences of the axioms for the real numbers) that concern the trillionth digit in 
the decimal expansion of 𝜋. Even if certainty in logical truths were intrinsically valuable, 
surely we would be better off having degrees of belief about matters more relevant to 
our practical interests than about such obscure logical truths. 
3.1.3.1.3 Rational Uncertainty in Logical Truths 
Critics also note that the logical omniscience requirement seems to prevent 
probabilists from accommodating rational uncertainty in logical truths. It seems like we 
may adopt rational, yet uncertain (below credence 1) degrees of belief in claims that 
turn out to be logical truths. But probabilism seems to require us to be certain of all 
logical truths. And if we must be certain of all logical truths, then we can’t very well be 
uncertain of any.  
Titelbaum suggests the following example, where his uncertainty in a logical truth 
seems to be warranted (2013, p. 106). Titelbaum explains that Talbott (2005) claims that 
the trillionth digit in the decimal expansion of 𝜋 is 2 on the basis of having consulted 
Google on the matter. Before reading Talbott’s article, Titelbaum was uncertain about 
whether or not the trillionth digit of π is 2—his degree of belief could  have been 
modeled with a credence .1 on the basis that he thinks that the occurrence of each digit 
(from ‘0’ through ‘9’) is equi-probable because π is a “normal” number.110 After reading 
                                                          
109 See Titelbaum (2013, p. 106 ff.) who cites Talbott (2005). Similar examples can also 
be found in Savage (1967) and Hacking (1967). 
110That is, no digit 0–9 is more likely than any other to occur at any point in its decimal 
expansion. 
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Talbott’s article, Titelbaum’s confidence that the trillionth digit of 𝜋 is 2 increased 
greatly, though he was still not totally certain. After all, Talbott (and Google) could be 
mistaken. Further corroborating evidence could raise Titelbaum’s confidence even 
more. Titelbaum’s response to his new information, and his high, but uncertain 
credence that the trillionth decimal of π is 2 seem to be rational given his evidence. His 
reliance on Talbott and Google seems to support high confidence, but not certainty. But 
probabilism, in light of the logical omniscience requirement, seems to yield the verdict 
that Titelbaum’s credence is irrational. He has an uncertain degree of belief in a logical 
truth. Thus, prima facie, the logical omniscience requirement leads probabilists to make 
the wrong judgment in some cases about which degrees of belief are rational. As 
Titelbaum (2013, p. 106–107) notes, this problem with the logical omniscience 
requirement has not been well-acknowledged, less so than the preceding worries. 
3.1.3.1.4 Rational Logical Learning 
The logical omniscience requirement leads to a related worry concerning rational 
logical learning. Considering the preceding example once again, it seems like Titelbaum’s 
revision of his credence in light of his new evidence is rational. Titelbaum had a 
reasonable initial degree of belief based on his evidence, and he revised his degree of 
belief reasonably in light of new evidence after reading Talbott’s article. But probabilism 
seems to require the verdict that Titelbaum violated the standard of ideal rationality 
when he initially deemed it equiprobable than any digit 0-9 was the trillionth digit of π, 
and that Titelbaum was still irrational when he became more confident, but still 
uncertain, that the trillionth digit is 2. Any degree of belief short of certainty (in 
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whatever the actual value of the digit happens to be) violates ideal rationality. 
Probabilism cannot accommodate Titelbaum’s apparent logical learning. In general, the 
logical omniscience requirement seems to prevent probabilists from allowing that one 
can rationally gain confidence in logical truths. Even upon completing a proof, one might 
not yet assign certainty to the result. After all, logicians make mistakes. But probabilism 
calls irrational any revision of degrees of belief in logical truths that yields a result short 
of certainty. Rational logical learning can only occur when one remedies a flaw in one’s 
degrees of belief about logic by gaining certainty in logical truths. 
3.1.3.2 Responses 
3.1.3.2.1 Changing the Scope of Possibility—Hacking 
Probabilists offer several different responses to these worries. Hacking (1967) 
suggests avoiding these problems by characterizing a notion of “personal possibility.” A 
sentence is personally possible for an agent if the agent can understand it and the agent 
doesn’t know it to be false (Hacking 1967, p. 318).111 Hacking suggests limiting the 
probabilist modeling language to the set of sentences the modeled agent can 
understand, and modifying the probability axioms also so that they only demand agents 
to maintain coherence among the sentences they understand that aren’t ruled out by 
the agent’s knowledge. Thus, when it comes to logical truths, Hacking suggests 
modifying the logical omniscience requirement to the requirement that agents must be 
                                                          
111 Hacking assumes that knowledge is not necessarily closed under entailment (1967, 
p. 319). For example, he says that one could know that 𝐴 → 𝐵 and that 𝐴, yet 
nonetheless ¬𝐵 could be possible for the agent. 
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certain of all of the logical truths that they understand.112 This is a sort of fore-runner to 
the local modeling approach. Hacking sees this approach as characterizing a notion of 
“personal probability”113 that fits within a normative hierarchy, with the traditional 
notion of probabilistic coherence sitting high above personal probabilistic coherence, 
but just below total omniscience—logical and factual (1967, pp. 320-321). 
This response makes significant headway in diminishing demandingness and 
cognitive clutter concerns about the logical omniscience requirement. It is much more 
plausible that we can have degrees of belief in all of the logical truths we can understand 
than in all of the logical truths. And so the class of truths we can understand threatens 
much less cognitive clutter. The computational demands are also greatly diminished. At 
the very least we will be able to compute enough to recognize each logical truth as such, 
though we may not initially recognize it as such, even if the computation of the 
coherence of these truths with all of our other degrees of belief remains beyond our 
grasp. But Hacking’s response does not extinguish the demands that the logical 
omniscience requirement places on us. Being certain of every logical truth we can 
understand will require significant cognitive resources at the cost of other perhaps more 
valuable pursuits. 
Thus, as Hacking admits, this response is still subject to concerns about 
demandingness and cognitive clutter. And thus it is not immune to concerns that it is 
                                                          
112 Since knowledge is factive, an agent couldn’t know a logical truth to be false. 
113 Not to be confused with the notion of “personalist probability,” which is another 
name for subjective probability or degree of belief. 
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normatively inappropriate. But this response also provokes several other questions. For 
it seems to soften the demands of the logical omniscience requirement at the cost of 
being normatively too weak.114 There are logical truths for which we might want to hold 
agents normatively accountable even if they do not understand these claims because 
we think they should understand. For example, we might think an agent ought to be 
certain of a simple tautology of the form 𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴 (where ⌜𝐴⌝ is an atomic sentence, 
let’s say), even if the agent doesn’t understand it. This brings us back to the issue of 
what level of normative strength is appropriate to probabilism. Hacking suggests a 
hierarchy of epistemic norms associated with different purposes. He suggests that both 
the highest ideals on this hierarchy and the more realistic standard are both essential to 
epistemic theorizing. This is an idea I will return to in Chapter 5. 
3.1.3.2.2 Local Modeling—Garber 
Garber (1983) offers a different approach that also requires limiting the modeling 
language. In general, Garber advocates a local modeling approach. With respect to 
modeling logical awareness, Garber advocates limiting the modeling language to a 
sentential language. On this approach, all non-sentential logical truths are treated as 
extra-systematic constraints to be specified by the modeler in particular cases.  Thus, 
the probabilist need not require agents to be certain of all logical truths at all times, but 
only of the logical truths of sentential logic, and, perhaps, particular further logical truths 
as specified by the modeler.  
                                                          
114Titelbaum (2013, p. 110) attributes this point to Eells (1985). 
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Like Hacking’s response, this response greatly diminishes the force of the 
demandingness and cognitive clutter concerns. Limiting the omniscience requirement 
to the sentential logical truths (and some higher-level truths specific to particular 
circumstances) removes a significant class of truths from the set for which agents seem 
to be accountable. But, as before, this response still seems to require agents to have 
more degrees of belief than they could have. There are still many, many sentential 
logical truths. And many sentential logical truths are still far too complex for human 
agents to be expected to recognize them as logical truths. Additionally, as before, this 
response does not obviously assuage concerns about logical uncertainty and logical 
learning. The extrasystematic constraints imposed by modelers in particular situations 
might help to weaken these concerns. But Garber’s account still seems to make rational 
logical uncertainty and rational logical learning of sentential logical truths impossible. 
Garber’s response seems to be superior to Hacking’s in that it is normatively 
stronger in a sense. For Garber’s approach requires agents to be certain of all truth-
functional truths represented in the modeling language, whereas Hacking’s approach 
merely demands certainty in the logical truths the agent can understand. But there may 
be obvious truth-functional truths the agent doesn’t understand, though they should, 
as I explain above. Garber’s approach demands certainty in these truths, but Hacking’s 
does not.  So, Hacking’s approach permits a form of logical obtuseness115 by permitting 
uncertainty in logical truths the modeled agent doesn’t understand. But Garber’s view 
                                                          
115 The term “logical obtuseness” is borrowed from MacFarlane (MS). 
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also seems to be too strong in another sense.116 It still imposes very high cognitive 
demands by requiring truth-functional omniscience. Once again, this raises the issue of 
how strong the normative demands of probabilism ought to be interpreted as being. 
3.1.3.2.3 Coherent Extendability—Zynda 
Zynda (1996) gives a different response. Rather than proposing ways to limit the 
class of truths for which agents ought to be held accountable, Zynda suggests a 
reinterpretation of the normative import of probabilism. He explains that the probabilist 
norm, including the logical omniscience requirement, does not require agents to adopt 
probabilistic degrees of belief in particular claims. Probabilism is simply a coherence 
requirement. It requires only that if agents invest credence in particular claims, then 
those degrees of belief must be modelable with credence functions that obey the 
probability calculus. Thus, probabilism does not require agents to be certain of all logical 
truths and certain of the falsehood of all contradictions. It merely requires that, if an 
agent has a degree of belief about a logical truth, then they should be certain of it. In 
other words, agents’ degrees of belief should be coherently extendable to credence sets 
that assign certainty to all of the logical truths. 
Thus, Zynda’s response seems to largely avoid concerns about demandingness and 
cognitive clutter. Probabilism doesn’t require us to be certain of all logical truths. It 
doesn’t place the attendant enormous cognitive demands on us. It merely requires that 
if we adopt degrees of belief in logical truths, that these degrees of belief be certainties. 
                                                          
116 Again, Titelbaum (2013, p. 110) attributes this point to Eells (1985). 
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Thus, you might say that it requires logical infallibility rather than logical omniscience. It 
doesn’t require you to be certain of all logical truths. Instead, it requires that if you adopt 
an attitude toward a logical truth, it must be the attitude of certainty. 
This isn’t to say that probabilism, as Zynda understands it, doesn’t place any strong 
cognitive demands on agents. Understood this way, probabilism will still require agents 
to maintain coherent credence sets—credence sets that are extendable to opinionated 
logically omniscient sets at that. This is still a very demanding requirement. It requires 
agents to have excellent memory and to be excellent computers. Many agents will 
encounter some very complex logical truths, and probabilism will still require them to 
be sure of these truths and to incorporate these certainties coherently into their total 
credence sets. But then, it is no surprise that probabilism is a demanding requirement. 
For as Zynda notes, it is intended as a normative ideal. Furthermore, as Titelbaum notes, 
this kind of response does not resolve the issues concerning rational logical uncertainty 
and logical learning. On this view, probabilism still requires agents to be certain of the 
logical truths they do invest credence in, and to hold degrees of belief that are coherent 
with certainty in these truths even if the agent doesn’t actually consider such truths. So, 
this version of probabilism still yields the verdict that any agent who has a degree of 
belief less than certainty for a logical truth violates the standards of ideal rationality. 
Zynda’s response raises a couple of issues about how to interpret probabilism’s 
normative significance. First, it raises the issue of why logical infallibility is an 
appropriate normative requirement, but logical omniscience is not. Zynda’s response 
dodges many concerns about demandingness and cognitive clutter. But it isn’t clear that 
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this is a good thing. We need to appeal to firm principles that place constraints on 
normative theorizing. Second, it raises the issue of what kind of verdicts we want 
probabilism to produce. On Zynda’s view, probabilism gives verdicts only about 
incoherence. It never requires agents to adopt some specific degrees of belief for a 
claim. Thus, like Hacking’s approach, it also permits a form of logical obtuseness. But it 
seems sometimes appropriate to judge an agent to have violated the ideals of rationality 
for failing to adopt some specific degree of belief in a simple, epistemically accessible 
claim. Zynda’s approach fails to do so. Here again, we need to appeal to principles of 
normative epistemic modeling to adjudicate such questions. 
3.1.3.2.4 Titelbaum 
Titelbaum’s (2013, Ch. 5) response to the logical omniscience worries incorporates 
elements of each of the foregoing accounts. Like Hacking and Garber, Titelbaum 
advocates a local modeling approach.117 He takes the point of probabilism to be the 
delivery of normative verdicts about agents’ degrees of belief in particular situations.  
To arrive at these verdicts, he thinks formal modelers should specify simplified versions 
of situations, and subject these to small, local probabilist models that yield the 
appropriate normative verdicts.   
                                                          
117 See Titelbaum (2013, Chs. 2-4) for a detailed account of his modeling methodology. 
See Titelbaum (2013, p. 33, n. 2) for an explicit connection between this methodology 
and Garber’s (1983) notion of local modeling. And see Titelbaum (2013, pp. 108-110) for 
an explanation of how his framework accommodates logical omniscience problems and 
how it relates to Hacking’s and Garber’s approaches.   
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Like Zynda, Titelbaum also advocates limiting the normative import of probabilism 
to judgments of incoherence.118 So, on his view, probabilism never requires an agent to 
adopt a particular degree of belief in a particular claim. Rather, Titelbaum’s version of 
probabilism yields negative evaluations of agents whose degrees of belief are either 
explicitly incoherent or which cannot be coherently supplemented with additional 
degrees of belief. 
Titelbaum (2013, pp. 108-110) also employs a further modeling technique that 
insulates his formal probabilist modeling framework from logical omniscience worries. 
Titelbaum makes a version of the finite additivity axiom the only essential constraint of 
his formal modeling system common to every model (2013, p. 45). He accounts for the 
content of the other standard probability axioms in terms of standard extrasystematic 
certainty conditions required by his formal models. Thus, in most cases, Titelbaum’s 
formal models will include a requirement akin to logical infallibility—interpreted as an 
injunction to maintain degrees of belief that are extendable to a set that is modelable 
with a probabilistic credence function—rather than demanding full-blown logical 
omniscience.  
However, Titelbaum acknowledges that in some cases in which agents entertain 
degrees of belief in logical truths, the standard interpretation of Titelbaum’s probabilism 
may not be appropriate due to logical omniscience concerns (2013, pp. 108). In these 
cases, Titelbaum advocates modifying his version of probabilism to avoid  inappropriate 
                                                          
118 See Titelbaum’s discussion of his “Evaluative Rule” (2013, pp. 56-59). 
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normative verdicts—for instance the verdict that it is incoherent for an agent to be 
uncertain that 2 is the trillionth decimal of π. Titelbaum makes two suggestions about 
how to make the appropriate modifications. First, he suggests that in cases where logical 
omniscience worries arise, rather than requiring agents to be certain of all logical truths, 
we should require agents to be certain of all obvious logical entailments (2013, p. 110). 
Titelbaum also considers a second option, namely that in some cases it might be 
appropriate to abandon any firm extrasystematic constraints on degrees of belief in 
logical truths (2013, p. 109-110). In some cases, he suggests, it should be left entirely up 
to the modelers to decide which logical truths are appropriate as required certainties 
for agents. 
Like Zynda’s view, Titelbaum’s view largely avoids concerns about demandingness 
and cognitive clutter. But Titelbaum’s view also offers a response to concerns about 
modeling rational logical uncertainty and logical learning. In the example of Titelbaum’s 
degrees of belief about the trillionth digit of π, neither of Titelbaum’s proposed 
modeling responses will judge him to have violated ideal rationality. For truths about 
the trillionth digit of π are far from obvious, and modelers worth their salt would not 
judge such uncertainty irrational. As Titelbaum (2013, p. 110) notes, this requirement is 
stronger than Hacking’s requirement that agents be sure of all of the logical truths they 
understand, but weaker than Garber’s requirement that agents be sure of all sentential 
logical truths. It allows us to judge agents negatively for their incoherent degrees of 
belief (or commitments to degrees of belief) in claims they do not understand, but it 
does not require us to be certain of any huge class of logical truths. 
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Titelbaum’s response raises some of the same questions as Zynda’s concerning 
what kind of normative verdicts we want probabilism to produce and what kind of 
normative force we want these verdicts to have. But Titelbaum’s response also raises 
questions about how we should apply formal models to formulate doxastic norms and 
generate normative verdicts about doxastic attitudes. It raises the question of whether 
we want probabilism to provide global norms that apply in all cases, or whether we want 
to generate local norms that apply only to simplified versions of particular cases. As 
before, to answer these questions adequately, we will need principled views about the 
purpose of formal modeling and the intended normative force of the probabilist norm. 
3.2 Digestion of Dialectical Themes 
Now that I have presented this portion of the dialectic between probabilists and 
their critics, I will draw out some of the major themes from their exchange of objections 
and replies. My purpose will be to show how this dialectic raises deep questions about 
probabilism’s foundations, and how it begins to reveal various probabilist answers to 
these questions.  
3.2.1 Themes from the Objections 
Above I presented objections to three aspects of probabilism: its formal 
representation of degrees of belief, its opinionation requirement, and its logical 
omniscience requirement. The objections to these aspects of probabilism fall into three 
main kinds: descriptive adequacy objections, demandingness objections, and value 
objections. 
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Most of the objections to probabilism’s formal representation of degrees of belief 
via probability functions considered above are challenges to its descriptive adequacy. 
These objections challenge probabilism on the grounds that its characterization of 
degrees of belief via the formal probabilistic representation is inaccurate and 
inadequate. Some of these objections are based on misapprehensions of the view. For 
example, the no numbers in the head objection conflates probabilism’s credence 
functions with the degrees of belief they are designed to represent, which need not be 
numerical. And most versions of the objection that actual agents don’t have 
probabilistically coherent degrees of belief misapprehend probabilism as a purely 
descriptive theory, mistaking the probabilist norm for a descriptive claim. There are also 
other descriptive adequacy objections, however, that hit closer to the mark. For 
probabilism is not an entirely normative theory: it posits the existence of degrees of 
belief within the minds of human agents (in some sense of “within”), and models them 
with credence functions. As such these aspects of probabilism are clearly subject to 
descriptive adequacy constraints. And, as we saw above, there are good reasons to 
question the representational faithfulness of probabilism’s precise numerical 
representation of degrees of belief.  
These descriptive adequacy objections raise various methodological questions 
about probabilism’s formal representation scheme. For example, they raise various 
questions about how realistically credence functions represent degrees of belief: How 
exactly are credence functions meant to model degrees of belief? What is the underlying 
characterization of degrees of belief, and how do the mathematical properties of 
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credence functions correspond to the properties of degrees of belief? The descriptive 
adequacy objections also raise the issue of how much methodological idealization—how 
much descriptive inaccuracy—is tolerable in the representation of degrees of belief via 
credence functions. 
While the purely descriptive aspects of probabilism are clearly subject to descriptive 
adequacy conditions, there are also reasons to think its normative aspects should be 
constrained by considerations about what human beings and our mental states are 
really like. For, if probabilism makes normative demands or recommendations that 
humans can’t live up to, it seems that its normative interest and promise are diminished. 
Many of the objections to probabilism considered above are objections of this kind—
demandingness objections. These objections hold that the probabilist norm is 
implausible because it is too demanding. Thus, these objections seem to assume a kind 
of “ought”-implies-“can” principle. Some versions of the psychological objection to the 
probabilist representation scheme and some of the objections to the logical 
omniscience and opinionation requirements are demandingness objections. These 
demandingness objections clearly raise questions about whether and how the 
normative aspects of probabilism ought to be constrained by facts about human abilities 
and psychology. However, the demandingness objections also raise questions about the 
probabilist norm’s normative force, and the purpose of normative probabilist modeling.  
The probabilist responses to these objections raise further questions in this vein. 
In addition to challenging probabilism’s descriptive adequacy and demandingness, 
some of the objections surveyed above also challenge the value of achieving 
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probabilistic coherence among our degrees of belief. For example, the evidential 
objection to the probabilist representation of degrees of belief is a challenge to the value 
of having precise degrees of belief that admit of point-valued numerical representation. 
Because our evidence is sometimes imprecise, incomplete, or equivocal, the objection 
holds, representation via numerically precise credences is not always desirable. This 
objection raises the question of how much methodological idealization is tolerable from 
a normative standpoint. What benefits does the computational and representational 
tractability of point-valued representations of degrees of belief provide, and do these 
benefits outweigh any tendency to produce inappropriate verdicts in cases where the 
agent’s actual degrees of belief are incomplete, imprecise, or equivocal given the 
available evidence? 
The cognitive clutter objections to the opinionation and logical omniscience 
requirements can also be construed as value objections. For, they challenge the value 
of having opinionated and logically omniscient degrees of belief. One version of the 
clutter objection is a kind of mix between a demandingness objection and a pure value 
objection: given that we have limited mnemonic and computational abilities, it would 
be a poor use of our cognitive resources to pursue opinionation and certainty in all 
logical truths. This version of the objection challenges the value of opinionation and 
logical omniscience given our cognitive limitations. But the clutter objections are not 
necessarily based on our cognitive limitations. Stronger versions of these objections 
question the value of opinionation and logical omniscience even on the assumption that 
we could be opinionated or logically omniscient. Even on that assumption, according to 
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the stronger versions of the objections, it wouldn’t be valuable for us to clutter our 
minds with an infinite number of attitudes—an infinite number of which will never have 
any practical impact on our lives. This stronger version of the clutter objection is 
especially challenging when applied to the opinionation requirement. For, while it 
seems like it would be useful to be certain of all of the logical truths, if one could be, it’s 
not clear why one would want to have degrees of belief in all of the logical combinations 
of claims. 
Like the demandingness objections, the challenges to probabilism’s value posed by 
this form of clutter objection raise questions about the purpose of probabilist modeling 
and the normative force of the probabilist norm. But they also raise questions about the 
justification of the probabilist norm and the source of its normative force. Why should 
we value opinionation and logical omniscience, and what kinds of value do they have? 
3.2.2 Themes from the Probabilist Responses 
The probabilist responses to the objections surveyed above break down into four 
main kinds in terms of two distinctions. Some of the responses are what I call concessive 
strategies, while others are dogmatic. As you might expect, the concessive strategies 
concede to the objection and modify probabilism in order to accommodate the 
objection. Dogmatic strategies, on the other hand, either deny the force of the objection 
or they hold that, while the objection does have force, it does not merit modifying 
probabilism. We can distinguish the responses further according to whether they 
concern methodological or normative issues. 
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Some of the probabilist responses to descriptive adequacy objections are 
methodologically concessive. For example, when adopted as ways to make the 
probabilist representation of degrees of belief more psychologically realistic or more 
descriptively adequate, imprecise or qualitative forms of probabilism are 
methodological concessions. They amount to admissions that the point-valued 
numerical representation of degrees of belief is too precise and therefore descriptively 
inadequate.  
Other probabilist responses to descriptive adequacy objections are 
methodologically dogmatic. They admit that the point-valued representation of degrees 
of belief is often descriptively inaccurate, but they maintain that the increased 
computational tractability of working with point-valued credence functions rather than 
sets of such functions or, alternatively, comparative confidence relations is worth the 
cost in terms of descriptive accuracy.  
These responses begin to answer methodological questions about the probabilist 
representation scheme raised by the descriptive adequacy objections. The concessive 
approaches characterize degrees of belief to allow imprecise attitudes, and they admit 
that computational tractability and representation simplicity are not worth the cost of 
descriptive inaccuracy. The dogmatic approaches, on the other hand, take the opposite 
position. While these different approaches begin to answer the questions raised 
above—and, thus, they begin to fill in probabilism’s methodological foundations—they 
still leave many questions unanswered. In particular, they do not provide complete or 
explicit answers to the question of exactly how the mathematical features of the 
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probabilist formalism model the properties of degrees of belief. They also leave open 
the question of whether the concessive approaches or the dogmatic approaches are 
superior. 
Most of the probabilist responses to demandingness and value objections are 
normatively concessive. For example, while the local modeling approach is intended 
primarily to make probabilist modeling of particular cases more tractable, it is also 
intended to ameliorate demandingness concerns about the opinionation and logical 
omniscience requirements. For, on the local modeling approach, a given probabilist 
model is intended only to represent a very small subset of an agent’s degrees of belief. 
So, the opinionation and logical omniscience requirement, while they will still require 
an infinite number degrees of belief,119 will require degrees of belief in only a relatively 
small (finite) number of logically distinct propositions.  
In addition to conceding somewhat to demandingness and value objections, the 
local modeling approach takes a very clear stand on the purpose of probabilist modeling: 
namely, the primary purpose is to generate verdicts about how to apportion our 
confidence in particular cases. Thus, the local modeling response makes a very clear 
contribution to the specification of probabilism’s foundations. 
Adopting a set-theoretic approach to modeling the objects of degrees of belief—in 
particular, approaches on which the doxastic objects are epistemic, doxastic, or personal 
possibilities—can also be seen as a concession to demandingness and value concerns. 
                                                          
119 Here I’m assuming that the objects of degree of belief are as finely-grained as 
sentences in a formal language. 
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Such approaches appear to weaken the demands of the logical omniscience and 
opinionation requirements due to the extensionality of sets. After all, for a finite number 
of atomic doxastic objects, opinionation and logical omniscience will require merely 
finitely many total doxastic states on a set-theoretic approach. So, adopting this 
approach seems to be at least a minor concession to claims that logical omniscience and 
opinionation are too demanding.  
Adopting the extendability form of the probabilist norm is also a concessive 
strategy. In particular, this form of the norm concedes to demandingness and value 
objections to the opinionation and logical omniscience requirements. For it does not 
require opinionation in any form, and it does not require a full-blown form of logical 
omniscience. It requires the somewhat weaker demand of logical infallibility. Thus, it 
seems to grant that the opinionation and logical omniscience requirements are either 
too demanding or lack sufficient value. This response begins to specify the normative 
connections between the probability calculus and degrees of belief. 
Additionally, while modifications to the probabilist formalism can be 
methodological concessions, they can also be normative concessions—concessions that 
the precision of probabilism’s point-valued representation of degrees of belief is 
excessive and of dubious value. Both popular modifications to the probabilist 
formalism—those that represent degrees of belief with sets of credence functions and 
those that represent them with a confidence ordering relation—allow imprecise, 
incomplete, or equivocal degrees of belief in the face of imprecise, incomplete, or 
equivocal evidence. Thus, in response to the question of whether some normative 
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inappropriateness is worth the cost of improved computational tractability and 
representational simplicity, these responses answer “no.” 
While most of the probabilist responses to demandingness and value objections are 
concessive, the evaluative reinterpretation response is most naturally viewed as 
dogmatic. According to this response, the probabilist norm has evaluative normative 
force, and as such it is not subject to “ought”-implies-“can” concerns. Like the 
extendability response, this response also begins to specify the precise normative 
connections between the probability calculus and degrees of belief. 
3.3 Conclusion: The Need for Unified Foundations 
In this chapter, I have presented central issues in the dialectic between probabilists 
and their critics, and I have drawn out some of the major themes from this exchange. I 
presented three main sources of objections to probabilism, and I presented several of 
the major responses to these objections. I showed how the objections I surveyed fall 
into three main kinds (descriptive adequacy, demandingness, and value), and how the 
probabilist responses tend to be concessive or dogmatic in the face of these concerns. I 
also showed how this dialectic raises various questions about probabilism’s 
methodological and normative foundations, and how probabilist responses to 
objections begin to reveal different answers to these foundational questions.  
I want to conclude this chapter with an argument that probabilists must articulate 
unified foundations for their view. My basis for this conclusion is simple. As it is 
characterized in Chapter 2, probabilism is subject to several powerful objections. These 
objections raise various important questions about probabilism’s foundations, its 
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content, and its aims. While probabilists have various responses to the objections, 
responses which reveal answers to foundational questions, the various responses 
provide different kinds of answers. Indeed, in some cases the responses are at odds—
and, thus, appear not to be co-tenable. In some cases this incoherence is blatantly 
obvious. For example, it wouldn’t make sense to advocate modifying the probabilist 
representation scheme to make it more descriptively adequate while also holding that 
such modifications are unnecessary or not worth the cost in terms of computational 
tractability and representational simplicity. Indeed, in general, it doesn’t make much 
sense to endorse any of the opposing concessive and dogmatic responses to the same 
objection.  
However, in some cases, the incoherence of different responses is subtle. For 
example, recently it has become popular among probabilists to advocate both the 
extendability form of the probabilist norm, and an evaluative interpretation of the norm. 
According to this view, the probabilist norm says that one’s degrees of belief ought to 
be coherently extendable to a richer—opinionated and logically omniscient—degree of 
belief set that can be faithfully modeled with a probability function. This version of 
probabilism doesn’t require opinionation, and it requires logical infallibility rather than 
logical omniscience. Additionally, the force of the “ought” in the probabilist norm is that 
of evaluation rather than obligation or responsibility. It is good for one’s degrees of 
belief to be extendable to probabilistic coherence. 
At first glance, these responses seem perfectly coherent, for both of them seem to 
be oriented at avoiding demandingness objections to the opinionation and logical 
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omniscience requirements. The problem, however, is that the two responses set out to 
avoid these concerns in ways that seem to be at odds. The extendability approach 
modifies the probabilist norm to weaken its demands. Thus, it concedes to the force of 
demandingness objections. The evaluative reinterpretation response, however, is 
dogmatic in the face of demandingness concerns. It holds that the probabilist norm is 
not subject to demandingness concerns because it is an evaluative principle, and 
evaluative principles like the probabilist norm are not subject to “ought”-implies-“can” 
type constraints. These two responses seem to be at cross purposes. The extendability 
form of the norm seems to be intended to bring satisfaction of the norm within the 
reach of real agents, while the evaluative reinterpretation of the norm seems to be 
intended to side-step demandingness concerns by specifying an ideal for degrees of 
belief that does not take the abilities of real agents into account. In the end, I think these 
responses are compatible. However, I think it is unclear—at least initially—why 
probabilists would want to endorse both responses. 
Thus, I contend that probabilists should provide unified foundations for their view 
in order to make the content and aims of the view clear, to coherently rebut the 
objections presented in §3.1, and to avoid using the view to derive illicit conclusions on 
the basis of a misunderstanding of the view’s content or aims. In the remainder of this 
dissertation, the task I have set for myself is to begin the project of spelling out unified 
foundations for probabilism. I start with probabilism’s methodological foundations in 
Chapter 4, where I provide an account of probabilism’s aims, its formalism, and its 
modeling methodology. In Chapter 5, I provide an account of probabilism’s normative 
134 
 
foundations. In particular, I defend an account of the translation of the axioms and 
theorems of the probability calculus into degree of belief norms and an account of the 
justification of these principles.  
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4 Methodological Foundations 
At the end of Chapter 3, I argued that probabilists need to provide a unified account 
of probabilism’s foundations in order to clarify its aims and consequences, and in order 
to rebut common objections. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of 
probabilism’s methodological foundations. I start with an account of the nature and 
aims of probabilist modeling. Along the way I provide an account of the nature and aims 
of formal modeling in general, and probabilist modeling in particular.   
After I characterize the nature and aims of probabilist modeling, I begin to present 
and defend the particular probabilist modeling framework that I think makes the best 
sense of probabilism, which I call the Comparative Confidence Framework—CCF for 
short. There are three key aspects of CCF’s modeling methodology that jointly 
distinguish it from extant alternatives in the literature. First, CCF is a probabilist formal 
modeling framework120 rather than the mere statement of the probabilist norm in 
formal terms. Second, CCF employs a logical rather than set-theoretic formal system. 
Third, CCF employs a fundamentally qualitative and comparative—rather than 
quantitative—representation of degrees of belief. I will carry on the project of 
articulating CCF in Chapter 5, where I will characterize CCF’s normative foundations. 
4.1 The Nature and Aims of Probabilist Modeling 
As I just explained, the primary purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of 
probabilism’s methodological foundations. However, probabilism’s methodology 
                                                          
120 In the sense of Titelbaum (2013), to be described below. 
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depends crucially on its aims. So, before I specify my version of probabilist methodology, 
my aim in this section is to defend an account of the nature and aims of probabilist 
modeling. Since probabilism is a species of formal modeling in general, I’ll begin with an 
account of what formal modeling is and why we engage in it. Then I’ll provide a detailed 
account of what goes into a formal modeling framework. Finally, I’ll provide an account 
of the specific aims of probabilist modeling. 
4.1.1 The Nature of Formal Modeling in General 
Formal modeling is the use of formal tools—like logic and mathematics—to 
represent and gain insights about features of the world. Somewhat ironically, it’s 
difficult to give a precise account of formality in this sense.121 So, I’ll rely on a rough 
characterization according to which the tools of logic and mathematics are formal in the 
sense that we can use the structures they describe to provide abstract, schematic 
representations of features of the world.122 So, in formal modeling, we recognize 
similarities between formal structures and features of the world. We use these formal 
structures to represent and gain insights about the target phenomena that interest us.   
Formal modeling figures prominently in the methodologies of the sciences and 
somewhat less prominently in philosophy. Scientists rely on descriptive mathematical 
models of physical, chemical, biological, psychological, and sociological phenomena in 
order to recognize important features of these phenomena and to better understand 
the relationships between their scientific concepts. Likewise, philosophers employ 
                                                          
121 For an excellent discussion, see MacFarlane (2000). 
122 This rough characterization of formal methods is based on that in Hájek (MSc). 
137 
 
logical and mathematical models to better understand and explicate their philosophical 
concepts and arguments, and to apply these concepts and arguments to particular 
cases. 
In the case of probabilism, we use the formal structures of credence functions and 
the probability calculus to gain insights about degrees of belief and degree of belief 
norms. We recognize the similarity between the structure of the real line between 0 and 
1 and the gradational structure of degrees of belief, and we use the structure imposed 
by the probability axioms to characterize a notion of coherence for degrees of belief. 
The models we generate using formal tools can be descriptive or normative, and 
empirical or a priori. We’re all familiar with descriptive, empirical formal modeling in the 
context of science. Scientists of many different stripes use mathematical tools to aid in 
their descriptions of various physical, chemical, biological, and psychological, and social 
phenomena. However, we can also use formal tools to model phenomena outside the 
context of empirical science. Philosophers commonly use logic and mathematics to 
model philosophical concepts like knowledge, justification, and necessity. And 
normative uses of formal modeling are also common. Examples of this sort of modeling 
are most common in the study of reasoning and decision-making. But, in principle, we 
could use formal methods to reveal insights in other normative domains, too.  
As Hájek (MSc) notes, formal methods fall along a spectrum of formality. 
Representing an argument in premise, premise,..., conclusion form is on the low end of 
the formality spectrum. While it does schematize the argument in order to better reveal 
its logical structure, it doesn’t significantly abstract from the content of the argument, 
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and it’s less a representation of the argument than a re-formulation of it. Probabilist 
modeling of degrees of belief with abstract logic or set-theory and algebra is on the 
higher end of the formality spectrum. 
It’s also important to note that formal modeling is distinct from some other uses of 
formal tools. For instance, formalism is sometimes used merely for the purpose of 
abbreviation, to avoid the labor of writing out lengthy principles and notions (Titelbaum 
2013, p. 299).  Philosophers often abbreviate claims and theses with logical symbolism. 
Consider, for example Williamson’s (2000) thesis, which is often referred to as “E = K,” 
that one’s body of evidence is one’s body of knowledge. Here Williamson isn’t modeling, 
he’s just employing logical symbols in a shorthand.   
We also sometimes employ formalism not explicitly to model, but simply to aid in 
computation or the completion of some other task.  For example, a would-be law 
student with basic training in symbolic logic might, while taking the LSAT, abbreviate 
sentences from a reasoning problem with sentence letters and Boolean connectives 
from a logical language in order to make the logical form of the problem clearer. In such 
a case, the test-taker is not modeling the logical structure of the problem in a very 
sophisticated or explicit way. Rather, the logical formalism is serving more like a 
shorthand or abbreviation to help the student reason more efficiently. 
Similarly, we sometimes use formalism to perform other tasks by exploiting the 
similarity between the formal structure and some aspect of the world. For example, 
computer programmers regularly employ formal languages that are apt to model 
various features of the world. But often these programmers use their programming 
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languages not explicitly to model, but to execute tasks based on the structural 
similarities of the language with features of the world.  
4.1.2 The Aims of Formal Modeling in General 
So, why bother with formal modeling? What kinds of insights can we gain by 
engaging in formal modeling? In this sub-section, I’ll explain the purpose of formal 
modeling by way of surveying the benefits that formal modeling can bring. I note, 
however, that formal modeling is a double-edged sword. Below I present many of the 
virtues of formal modeling and the benefits it can bring, but there are corresponding 
vices and harms that can also arise from formal modeling. I mention some of these vices 
in passing, but I do not present them in detail. 
One of the main benefits of formal modeling is that it promotes what Titelbaum 
(2013, p. 300) calls “good methodological hygiene.”123 The idea is that when formal 
modeling is done well, it requires us to isolate, simplify, and precisify our philosophical 
concepts and assumptions. This may be a virtue in its own right, but it also promotes 
critical reflection about our concepts and assumptions, and care in formally 
representing them. It requires us to think hard about how best to state our views and 
employ our concepts, and, in so doing, it can make perspicuous their flaws and virtues. 
Formal modeling can also reveal hidden assumptions and motivate us to augment our 
philosophical lexicon to fill in conceptual gaps. 
                                                          
123Several other philosophers have also noticed this phenomenon. See Hájek (MSc), 
Hansson (2000), and Wheeler (MS). 
140 
 
Formal modeling also promotes logical economy124 by providing minimal and 
parsimonious formal representations of our concepts and assumptions in simple formal 
languages with minimal axioms. This encourages us to recognize the inter-reducibility of 
our philosophical concepts and assumptions. This in turn promotes good 
methodological hygiene and can help us gain better understanding of our philosophical 
notions and views, and their interrelations. 
Employing formal models can also allow us to identify and gain insights about 
complex and delicate logical and mathematical relations among our concepts and claims 
by abstracting from their content. For instance, by representing arguments in a symbolic 
logic, we can recognize properties of our arguments without being concerned with 
whether or not the premises and conclusion are true. By appealing to a formal 
representation of an argument, one might better convince an interlocutor that a 
particular argument is poor because it is invalid even if the premises and conclusion are 
true. 
In addition to making the logical and mathematical connections among concepts 
and claims easier to recognize, formal modeling can also make it easier to identify their 
properties and draw out their implications through inference. Indeed, as I’ll argue 
below, a properly articulated formal modeling framework will include syntactical rules 
for generating new formulas within the formal system and modeling rules for generating 
insights about the modeled phenomena. In this way, formal modeling can give us a 
                                                          
124“Logical economy” is a modification of Hansson’s “deductive economy” (2000, p. 
165). 
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systematic, algorithmic means of drawing out the implications of our claims and gaining 
insights about the modeled phenomena. This can help safeguard us from error (Hájek, 
MSc).125 
The logical economy and systematic, algorithmic nature of formal modeling also 
promotes a kind of completeness (Hansson 2000, p. 167). As I’ve noted above, it 
encourages us to determine all of the important features of the phenomena we’re 
modeling, those features that turn out to be essential for the model to work properly. It 
also encourages us to draw out all of the important implications of our assumptions by 
making the process of doing so easier to accomplish. 
Relatedly, formal representation can help us to identify previously unnoticed 
features of phenomena. In modeling some phenomenon, we might notice that the 
formal model is similar to the formal model of another phenomenon (Hájek MSc). 
Likewise, we might recognize common features of phenomena, and thereby recognize 
their common susceptibility to formal modeling, thereby gaining even further insights 
about the phenomena in question. So, we might thereby come to gain new insights 
about both phenomena through a form of theoretical cross-pollination. 
Interestingly, we can also use formal modeling to guard against the potential vices 
of formalization. Done well, in the fashion I describe below, formal modeling, promotes 
the careful implementation of formal representations. It encourages us to be watchful 
for illicit applications of the formal representations to domains to which they don’t 
                                                          
125Of course, if we are mistaken in generating these algorithms or inept in formally 
representing the phenomena, our “insights” will be of limited value. 
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apply. It also helps us be careful about drawing illicit conclusions about the modeled 
phenomena from the features of the models themselves. Furthermore, by employing 
multiple formal models of the same phenomena—especially by employing multiple 
formal models from different modeling frameworks—we can guard against 
oversimplifying our formal representations and reifying artifacts of the formal 
representations. 
4.1.3 The Elements of a Formal Modeling Framework 
Now that I have given a general account of formal modeling and characterized the 
benefits that it can bring, I want to characterize formal modeling in more detail by 
presenting the elements of well-crafted formal modeling framework. The account I 
describe here is adopted from Titelbaum (2013, Chs. 2-3). 
First, following Titelbaum (2013, p. 11), I want to distinguish between specific 
formal models and the general formal modeling frameworks in which they are created. 
Probabilism is often characterized in conversation as a “formal model” of degrees of 
belief and degree of belief norms. But, as Titelbaum points out, this isn’t quite right. 
Probabilism is more aptly described as a formal modeling framework, a “scaffolding” on 
which we can build many individual formal models, which represent particular cases, 
within the general formal modeling framework (2013, p. 11). For probabilism supports 
the creation of many particular models of the degrees of belief of many different agents 
at different times. Indeed, probabilism may be used to generate multiple models of a 
single individual’s degrees of belief at a single time. 
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According to Titelbaum (2013, Ch. 2), a formal modeling framework has three main 
parts: a formal system, an interpretation of this system as it represents and applies to 
the modeled phenomenon, and a set of modeling rules which specify when and how the 
framework may be applied.126 It’s important to note that often philosophers and 
scientists do not present these elements of their formal modeling frameworks explicitly. 
Indeed, as Titelbaum notes, many philosophers do not think of probabilism and similar 
uses for formalism as instances of modeling. Nonetheless, when formal modeling is 
done well, it includes these three main components. And while it can be tedious to 
present all of the aspects of a formal modeling framework in detail (its formal system, 
for example), presenting these details is important for preventing abuse of the modeling 
framework. 
The formal system consists of the formal parts of the framework that can be 
characterized without respect to their interpretation. In particular, the formal system 
includes a modeling language consisting of an alphabet of symbols and a set of 
formation rules that specifies which strings of symbols count as well-formed expressions 
of the language. The formal system also includes a set of what Titelbaum calls 
“systematic constraints,” which apply to all models within the framework. In a 
probabilist modeling framework, the systematic constraints characterize the inferential 
                                                          
126As Titelbaum (2013, p. 17) acknowledges, the elements of a formal modeling 
framework could be carved up a little differently, but this account includes the key 
elements. 
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apparatus of the probability axioms and logical and mathematical transformation rules 
that allow us to derive consequences within the formal system. 
A formal modeling framework’s interpretation ties its formal system to the target 
phenomenon—the phenomenon it is intended to represent. An interpretation has three 
main parts: an account of the target phenomenon that is to be modeled, a scheme for 
representing this phenomenon within the formal system of the framework, and a 
scheme for applying insights derived in the formal system back onto the target 
phenomenon. 
The main reason that we need to characterize the target phenomenon is to know 
what we’re trying to model with our formal system. We need at least a basic 
characterization of the target phenomenon in order to get an interpretation up and 
running. We also need to characterize the target phenomenon in order to assess how 
well the formal system represents its features. Are all of the relevant features of the 
target phenomenon represented in the model? Is the representation skewed in 
important ways? Are there aspects of the formal model that do not correspond to any 
real features of the target phenomenon? 
In many cases, the target phenomena of a formal modeling framework is empirically 
observable, and the modeling framework is designed to generate models that describe 
or make predictions about these phenomena. In many philosophical applications of 
formal modeling, like probabilism, things are a little more complicated. For philosophical 
modeling is often normative in addition to being descriptive. For example, decision 
theory is often construed as theory of how humans ought to behave given their degrees 
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of belief and preferences.  Additionally, in philosophical modeling, the purpose of 
modeling is not just to describe, make predictions, or generate verdicts about the target. 
Often these models are also intended to help characterize, explicate, or analyze some 
philosophical concept. For example, the target of a probabilist model is an agent’s 
doxastic state at a given time. A probabilist model represents an agent’s degrees of 
belief, and generates verdicts about whether these degrees of belief are coherent or 
rational. However the probabilist modeling framework is also supposed to shed light on 
the notions of degree of belief, coherence, and rationality—on what they are and what 
roles they play in an agent’s life.  
Apart from characterizing the phenomenon its models are about, a formal modeling 
framework’s interpretation should also specify the connections between the formal 
system and the target phenomenon. Titelbaum advocates the importance of articulating 
what he calls the “representation scheme” and the “application scheme” of the 
framework. The representation scheme specifies how the target phenomenon is 
represented in the framework’s models by elements of the formal system. The 
application scheme, on the other hand, specifies how we can gain insights about the 
target phenomenon by reading features of particular formal models back onto the 
target phenomenon. In the case of probabilism, the representation scheme tells us how 
an agent’s degrees of belief are represented in models using a logical language and 
credence functions defined on this language. So, for example, one such principle might 
be: 
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Representation 
of Certainty 
If an agent, 𝛼, is certain of a claim, 𝐴, then 𝑐𝑟𝛼(𝐴) = 1. 
The application scheme tells us how to generate normative verdicts about an agent’s 
degrees of belief based on our formal models. Here’s one possible example of such a 
principle: 
Tautological Certainty If ⊨ 𝐴, then 𝛼 ought to be certain of 𝐴.   
Titelbaum (2013, pp. 12-15) provides a clever triangular representation of how bridge 
principles connect a formal system, a target phenomenon, and a set of theoretical 
concepts.127 
 
The edges represent bridge principles. A formal modeling framework’s representation 
and application schemes connect the formal system and the target phenomenon, but 
we can also articulate bridge principles connecting the formal system and the target 
phenomenon directly to the theoretical concepts that the modeling framework is 
designed to represent and provide insights about. 
                                                          
127Titelbaum’s (2013, p. 12) general formal modeling triangle connects a formal system, 
a philosophical concept, and a set of norms. I generalize the triangle to apply to 
descriptive/predictive modeling rather than to normative modeling only. I also make it 
explicit that a formal modeling framework could be designed to model a set of 
theoretical concepts, rather than just a single master concept. 
Target phenomenon 
Figure 1: Formal Modeling Triangle 
Theoretical 
concept(s) 
Formal system 
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Here’s a version of the triangle for probabilism.128 
 
Probabilists use the formal system of the probability calculus to create models, which 
represent agents’ degrees of belief in particular cases. Then they apply the formal 
models back onto the world by translating facts about the formal models into normative 
verdicts about the rationality of the degrees of belief represented in the models. This 
process helps us characterize general connections between the concept of rational or 
coherent degree of belief with the probability calculus and normative verdicts in 
particular cases. 
 In addition to the formal system and its interpretation, the third main part of a 
well-articulated formal modeling framework is a set of modeling rules, which specify 
when and how the framework should be applied to particular cases. These rules help 
                                                          
128 This triangle is also a slight modification of Titelbaum’s representation of probabilist 
triangle. It’s worth noting that in his own Bayesian modeling framework, the Certainty-
Loss Framework, Titelbaum attempts to connect a probabilistic formal system directly 
to a set of norms without an intervening philosophical concept (2013, p. 16). Titelbaum 
takes this approach not because he doesn’t value insights about various philosophical 
concepts (like rational degree of belief), but because he wants to resist the view that all 
probabilist modeling should be aimed as providing an analysis of probability (or some 
other master concept) as is often assumed (2013, p. 16, n. 9). 
Degree of belief norms 
Figure 2: Probabilist Triangle 
Rational degree 
of belief 
Probability 
calculus 
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specify what Titelbaum calls the framework’s “domain of applicability,” the set of 
phenomena that it can model adequately (2013, p. 85).129 As Titelbaum notes, we 
shouldn’t expect a single modeling framework to apply correctly to every instance of the 
target phenomenon (2013, p. 86). After all, modeling may require simplification and 
some attendant distortion. These distortions can cause the framework to yield 
systematically incorrect verdicts, descriptions, or predictions in some kinds of cases. So, 
to avoid being misled by the model, we need to specify modeling rules that demarcate 
the framework’s proper domain of applicability. We also need rules to guide us in the 
proper use of the framework, especially in cases where different models built from the 
framework provide conflicting verdicts (Titelbaum 2013, p. 57, n. 3).  
4.1.4 The Aims of Probabilist Modeling 
Now that I’ve said more about what formal modeling is and why philosophers and 
scientists engage in it in general, I will revisit the aims of probabilist modeling in 
particular. I’ve already said quite a lot in the preceding discussion (especially Chapter 2) 
about why probabilists use credence functions to represent degrees of belief and the 
probability calculus to generate degree of belief norms. I won’t rehash that material 
again here. Rather, my purpose in this sub-section is to characterize the aims of 
                                                          
129 Fine (1973) uses the similar term, “domain of application,” to refer to the set of 
phenomena for which the framework provides models. This usage is slightly different 
from Titelbaum’s. For, as Titelbaum (2013, p. 85, n. 3) notes, there may be scenarios 
that a framework can represent in its models, but for which it will provide predictably 
incorrect verdicts (descriptions, predictions). Such scenarios are within the framework’s 
domain of application (in Fine’s sense), but beyond its domain of applicability (in 
Titelbaum’s sense). 
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probabilist modeling so that I can provide a more unified account of probabilism’s 
modeling methodology in accord with these aims, and so that I can appeal to these aims 
in my defense of particular methodological choices in the remainder of the chapter.  
I think that probabilist modeling is oriented at three main aims: characterizing 
certain philosophical concepts including degree of belief, coherent degree of belief, and 
rational degree of belief; formulating general norms for degrees of belief; and 
generating verdicts about the coherence and rationality of degrees of belief in particular 
cases by applying these norms via probabilist models. Probabilists want to use their 
modeling framework to gain insights about the nature of degrees of belief and a 
normative standard of coherence for them. And they want to understand how this 
standard fits into broader theories of degree of belief rationality, and doxastic and 
practical rationality generally. 
 These aims are inter-related. Generating normative verdicts about agents’ degrees 
of belief in particular cases requires the formulation of a set of norms that can be applied 
to particular cases. And the formulation of degree of belief norms depends on an 
understanding of the notion of degree of belief and a normative standard for degrees of 
belief. However, part of understanding the concepts degree of belief, coherence, and 
rationality is having a sense of what the norms for degrees of belief really are, and how 
these norms apply to particular cases.  
Thus, I contend, probabilism’s aims cannot be easily separated from one another. 
So, in addition to being designed to generate normative verdicts about particular cases, 
a probabilist modeling framework should also be designed explicitly to aid the 
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characterization of degree of belief, coherence, and rationality, and the formulation of 
degree of belief norms. In the remainder of this chapter, I will begin to characterize such 
a probabilist modeling framework. 
Before I move on, however, I want to take a moment to comment on the connection 
to the local approach to probabilist modeling mentioned in Chapter 3. On this approach, 
probabilists apply their formal system to produce many simple models of stylized 
descriptions of narrowly circumscribed cases in order to generate normative verdicts 
about those cases so described. The local approach is contrasted with the global 
approach, which is characterized as the attempt to produce a comprehensive, univocal 
model of the appropriate degrees of belief in every claim whatsoever, given all of the 
available evidence. Local modelers criticize the global approach based on the 
intractability of creating and employing such a model, and based on skepticism about 
the existence of a unique, correct model of the appropriate degrees of belief about 
everything. 
Setting aside the issue of whether, in principle, there could be a univocal probabilist 
model in this sense, it’s clear that the models we construct using the probabilist 
formalism must be local. For a comprehensive model of all of an agent’s degrees of belief 
would be intractable. Even if we could construct such a model, it would be unwieldy; 
the costs of its use would not be worth the benefits. Thus, I admit, that probabilists must 
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be local modelers in applying their formalism to generate verdicts about particular 
cases.130  
However, I want to reiterate that the generation of verdicts about degrees of belief 
in particular cases is not the sole purpose of probabilism. So, probabilists can’t be merely 
local modelers because, as I explain above, probabilist modeling frameworks must also 
be oriented towards characterizing concepts like degree of belief, coherence, and 
rationality, and formulating general degree of belief norms. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I provide a version of probabilism that aids in the characterization of these 
concepts and the formulation of degree of belief norms.  
4.2 CCF: A Probabilist Modeling Framework 
Now that I have provided a clearer account of the aims of probabilism and the 
elements of a well-articulated formal modeling framework, I will provide a probabilist 
modeling framework in accordance with these aims, with an eye towards avoiding or 
defanging the typical objections to probabilism presented in Chapter 3. I call this 
framework the Comparative Confidence Framework—CCF for short. I will characterize 
each of CCF’s elements in accord with the account of these elements from the preceding 
sections. However, to make the formal system and its intended interpretation clearer, I 
won’t present them separately. I will begin, in §4.2.1, by providing the characterization 
of degrees of belief that I will rely on in specifying the rest of the interpretation of CCF’s 
                                                          
130 Much as deductive logic is used to model deductive reasoning locally, rather than to 
represent every statement or proposition that a real agent may entertain, and all the 
deductive relationships among them. 
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formalism. (I favor this version for specific reasons, which I’ll provide along the way.) 
Then, in §4.2.2, I will propose a scheme for representing degrees of belief within CCF. 
Finally, in §4.2.3, I will present a version of the qualitative probability calculus that, I will 
argue, generates appropriate degree of belief norms. I will leave my treatment of CCF’s 
application scheme to Chapter 5.  
4.2.1 Basic Characterizations of Degree of Belief, Coherence, and Rationality 
Before I present CCF’s formal system and its interpretation, I’ll provide a basic 
characterization of the target phenomena it’s meant to model. As I explained in the 
previous sub-section, probabilism is aimed at characterizing degrees of belief and a 
normative standard for them, formulating norms that characterize this standard, and 
applying these norms to generate verdicts about agents’ degrees of belief in particular 
cases. So, in this sub-section, I will provide a basic characterization of degree of belief 
and its associated normative concepts of coherence and rationality, in order to inform 
my presentation of the other elements of CCF in the remainder of the dissertation. 
I’ll start with the notion of degree of belief. I won’t attempt to analyze, explicate, or 
give an operational definition of this notion. As we saw in Chapter 2, each of the most 
prominent analyses, explications, and definitions faces significant difficulties. So, 
following Eriksson & Hájek (2007), I will endorse primitivism about degree of belief as a 
working assumption. That is, I will treat degree of belief as a primitive concept that 
cannot be faithfully analyzed or explicated in terms of other concepts. So, while I will 
not analyze, explicate, or define degree of belief in terms of anything more basic, I will 
153 
 
provide a foundational characterization of degree of belief that will serve to clarify CCF’s 
target phenomenon. 
Without further ado, here is my approach. I characterize degree of belief as a 
gradational doxastic state. That is, degree of belief is a belief-like mental state about the 
way the world is. In other words, it is a mental state that has a “mind-to-world” direction 
of fit. In this sense, degree of belief is a representational rather than aspirational or 
conative state. As such, it is to be contrasted with other types of mental states, such as 
desire and intention.  
Our degrees of belief are connected to—and (imperfectly) indicated by—our 
behavioral dispositions (including our betting behavior and tendencies to assert, exhibit 
surprise, etc.), our preferences, and other such mental states. But while our degrees of 
belief are connected to these other dispositions and states, I do not take them to be 
analyzable, explicable, or definable in terms of them. I take degrees of belief to be real, 
naturally occurring mental states in their own right. 
Degree of belief is a gradational doxastic state in the sense that one’s degree of 
belief about a claim can be weaker or stronger. One can be quite certain in a claim, 
pretty sure of it, unsure about it, pretty sure it is false, certain that it is false, etc. These 
differences in the strength of one’s degrees of belief can be very fine-grained, and in 
some cases the strength of one’s degree of belief can be identified very precisely and 
narrowly. In other cases, degrees of belief may be vague, fuzzy, or thick. So, the 
gradational structure of degrees of belief may be very fine-grained, but it may not be 
uniformly so.  
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Thus far, in characterizing degrees of belief, I have avoided commitment to a view 
about the objects of degrees of belief—e.g., as structured propositions, or sets of 
possible worlds. As we saw in Chapter 2, the issue is fraught with controversy, and 
tangled up with issues in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language that would 
take us well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Though I won’t commit to a view of 
precisely what the objects of degrees of belief are, I do want to characterize them well 
enough to model them formally. Mainly, I want to point out that whatever the doxastic 
objects are, they may be very fine-grained—fine-grained enough for an agent to have 
different doxastic attitudes about the truth of “Clark Kent is Superman” and “Clark Kent 
is Clark Kent,” and about the truth of “this glass is full of water” and “this glass is full of 
H2O,” and even perhaps to have different attitudes about “Neither Raquel nor Bernie 
got the job” and “Raquel didn’t get the job and Bernie didn’t get the job.” So, in 
specifying CCF’s formal system, we should choose a modeling language that can 
accommodate this fineness of grain. This fineness of grain is necessary if we are to 
represent (and model) the degrees of belief of non-ideal agents, who may be unaware 
of many metaphysical, logical, and, perhaps, even linguistic equivalences. 
Characterizing degrees of belief and their objects is a large part of characterizing 
the target of probabilist modeling.  But, as I explain at length above, we also need a basic 
understanding of the normative notion or notions that probabilist norms and verdicts 
are about. Once again, I won’t attempt here to provide a complete account of all the 
normative notions that probabilism may address, but I do want to say enough to clarify 
the discussion to follow. 
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I’ll distinguish two normative notions that are typically associated with probabilism: 
coherence and rationality. Probabilism, I take it, is intended primarily to characterize a 
notion of coherence among degrees of belief. This notion of coherence is akin to the 
notion of consistency among categorical beliefs. We may use the probability calculus to 
characterize coherence in much the same way that we use the propositional or predicate 
calculus to characterize logical consistency. This notion of coherence among degrees of 
belief is about how well an agent’s degrees of belief regarding various statements (or 
propositions) fit together. The coherence of an agent’s degrees of belief is distinct from 
the issue of how well-supported they are by the agent’s evidence. Thus, assessments of 
the coherence of an agent’s degrees of belief may contribute to assessments of the 
agent’s rationality. However, such assessments do not always wholly determine the 
agent’s rationality. So, in characterizing a notion of coherence for degrees of belief, we 
only partially characterize the notion of degree of belief rationality.   
The notions of coherence and rationality are normative in the sense that they 
characterize what human agents’ degrees of belief ought to be like. I will say more about 
the force of this “ought”—the sense of the normativity of these notions—in Chapter 5.  
The basic idea is that coherence and rationality characterize states that are epistemically 
good, right, obligatory, praiseworthy, etc. The norms that probabilism provides are 
norms about the ways in which our degrees of belief ought to hang together. And 
probabilist verdicts about the “rationality” of agents in particular cases are really 
verdicts about the coherence of the agents’ degrees of belief in those cases. 
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4.2.2 Representation Scheme 
Now that I’ve given a basic account of the targets of probabilist modeling, I’ll specify 
CCF’s scheme for representing degrees of belief within its formal system. Along the way, 
I’ll introduce CCF’s modeling language. There are two key features of CCF’s formal 
system and representation scheme that I will defend in this section. First, I will defend 
the use of a logical rather than set-theoretic modeling language on the basis that the 
logical approach better accommodates the representation of the degrees of belief of 
non-ideal agents. Second, I will defend a formal representation of degrees of belief that 
is fundamentally qualitative and comparative rather than quantitative. 
4.2.2.1 A Logical Representation of Doxastic Objects 
The first component of CCF’s formal system is a standard language for predicate 
logic (with identity, and perhaps functions), ℒ, containing countably many atomic 
sentences closed under the usual logical operations (as described in Chapter 2). In CCF’s 
representation scheme, sentences of ℒ are used in models to represent the objects of 
an agent’s degrees of belief. Following my earlier convention, I will use 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, …as 
metalinguistic variables ranging over the sentences of ℒ. I choose to employ a language 
for predicate logic rather than a merely sentential language because it permits increased 
expressive power. However, I could have just as easily chosen a finite sentential 
language, which has the benefit of simplicity. However, for many applications, one might 
employ only a restricted part of the formal language—for example, the sentential part 
may suffice, and perhaps only a finite number of atomic sentences will be needed.   
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While CCF employs sentences of a logical language to represent doxastic objects, I 
want to reiterate that I am not assuming that sentences are the objects of degrees of 
belief. As I explained above, I will not take a stand in this dissertation about what the 
objects of degrees of belief really are. But, whatever they are, they are fine-grained 
enough that agents may have different doxastic attitudes about the truth of different 
natural language sentences that express the same proposition (Titelbaum 2013, p. 35). 
The sentences of a sentential language provide a fine-grained enough structure to allow 
the representation of agents who have different degrees of belief in metaphysically 
equivalent expressions, and in logically equivalent expressions as well. 
The ability of logical approaches to represent the degrees of belief of agents who 
are ignorant of logical and metaphysical equivalences gives it a clear advantage over set-
theoretic approaches in the context of using the probability calculus to model the 
degrees of belief of real agents. For, even if some set-theoretic approaches can 
represent agents who are ignorant of some equivalences between doxastic objects, 
every set-theoretic approach will fail to represent some cases of logical non-
omniscience. This is because of the pure extensionality of sets: a set is nothing other 
than a collection of members. So, for example, consider the sets A ∩ B and A̅ ∪ B̅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. Even 
though these sets are expressed with different strings of symbols and formed by 
different operations, they are composed of the same members, and are, thus, identical. 
So, a set theoretic approach will be unable to represent an agent who is ignorant of this 
identity, and as a result may have distinct degrees of belief regarding them.  Any set-
theoretic representation of the objects of degrees of belief builds this kind of set-
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identity into its modeling language. So, any set-theoretic approach will be unable to 
faithfully model the doxastic objects of an agent for whom such identities do not hold. 
It’s worth noting, however, that some probabilists have suggested that this same 
feature—the pure extensionality of sets—makes set-theoretic approaches superior to 
logical approaches in the context of modeling logical omniscience. This is because, as 
Easwaran (2011a, pp. 323-324) explains, on a logical approach, the logical omniscience 
requirement will demand that an agent should be certain of infinitely many tautologies 
for a finite number of atomic sentences. Whereas, on a set-theoretic approach, the 
agent will be required to be certain of a merely finite number of doxastic objects. Thus, 
the set-theoretic approach appears to yield a less demanding version of the logical 
omniscience requirement. But, as Hawthorne (2009, p. 55, n. 8) points out, this 
appearance can be misleading. Even though the logical omniscience requirement on a 
(finite) set-theoretic approach will require certainty regarding only a finite number of 
doxastic objects, it builds a form of logical omniscience into the modeling language,  
since it builds set identities (and the recognition of these identities by agents) into the 
language. 
 So, while the extensionality of sets may appear to be an advantage in the context 
of demandingness concerns about the logical omniscience requirement, in fact, the set-
theoretic approach faces a logical omniscience problem equally as difficult as that of the 
logical approach. But the set-theoretic approach has the added flaw that it is unable to 
faithfully represent the degrees of belief of logically non-omniscient agents. This is a 
major flaw, given the probabilist aim of using probabilist models to generate verdicts 
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about the degrees of belief of real agents in particular cases. We can’t use probabilist 
models to generate verdicts about agents (e.g. an agent’s failure to recognize that two 
statements are logically equivalent) if we can’t faithfully represent agents’ degrees of 
belief in our models. So, even though the set-theoretic formulation of the probability 
calculus is somewhat simpler than the logical approach, in the context of the using the 
probability calculus to model non-ideal agents, the logical approach is superior.  For this 
reason I will employ a logical modeling language in CCF’s formal system. 
4.2.2.2 A Qualitative, Comparative Representation of Confidence 
In addition to the logical language, ℒ, CCF’s modeling language also includes a 
binary relation, ≽, defined on the sentences of ℒ, which I call the “weak comparative 
confidence relation.”131 The weak comparative confidence relation is an order relation 
that compares pairs of sentences of ℒ. In CCF’s representation scheme, ⌜𝐴 ≽ 𝐵⌝ 
represents the modeled agent as at least as confident of 𝐴 as of 𝐵. In a particular model, 
all of the binary comparisons among sentences come together to form an ordering or 
ranking of sentences of ℒ. This ranking represents an agent’s degree of belief set in the 
modeled scenario.   
I further augment my modeling language with three additional comparative 
confidence relations defined in terms of ≽: the strict comparative confidence relation, 
≻, the comparative confidence equivalence relation, ≈, and the comparative confidence 
                                                          
131 This aspect of my framework’s representation scheme is adapted from Hawthorne 
(2009). Similar approaches are found in Savage (1972) and Joyce (1999). See Fine (1973), 
Fishburn (1986), Wong et al. (1991), and Capotorti & Vantaggi (2000) for overviews of 
comparative confidence approaches. 
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indeterminacy relation, ∼. ⌜𝐴 ≻ 𝐵⌝ represents that the agent as strictly more confident in 
𝐴 than in 𝐵 (𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 but 𝐵 ⋡ 𝐴). ⌜𝐴 ≈ 𝐵⌝ represents that the agent is equally confident in 𝐴 
and 𝐵 (𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ≽ 𝐴). ⌜𝐴~𝐵⌝ represents the agent’s confidence that 𝐴 compared 𝐵 
as indeterminate (𝐴 ⋡ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ⋡ 𝐴). In addition to the comparative confidence relations, 
we also draw on a certainty predicate, 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(⋅). ⌜𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(𝐴)⌝ represents that the agent is 
certain that 𝐴. 
So, in CCF, we model an agent’s degrees of belief in a scenario by first assigning 
atomic sentences of ℒ to represent the basic objects of the agent’s degrees of belief. 
We then represent the agent’s degrees of belief with a comparative confidence ordering 
defined on the fragment of ℒ that consists of the set of atomic sentences assigned to 
the agent’s basic doxastic objects closed under the usual logical operations. In particular, 
we represent the agent’s certainties according to the scheme above. This ordering may 
include ties, and cycles, and it may be incomplete (some sentences of the modeling 
language might not be ranked).  
Thus, CCF’s representation scheme is fundamentally qualitative and comparative 
rather than quantitative. In CCF, a comparative confidence ordering plays the role of the 
numerical unconditional credence function in traditional quantitative probabilist 
modeling frameworks.  This kind of qualitative approach has the advantage that it avoids 
the psychological implausibility and normative inappropriateness of the precise 
numerical representation of degrees of belief discussed in Chapter 3. For, on CCF’s the 
qualitative approach, the fundamental representation of degrees of belief is merely a 
confidence ordering. This approach does not assume that a comparative confidence 
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ordering will admit of any faithful representation with a numerical credence function—
much less a precise, unique such function. For, as I note above, the ordering may include 
cycles that would preclude the faithful representation of an agent’s degrees of belief 
with a function (or set of functions) that assigns a unique numerical value to each 
sentence. Furthermore, this representation is perfectly capable of representing 
imprecise or indeterminate degrees of belief for agents who simply don’t have richly 
articulated comparisons of belief strength among statements. CCF is compatible with 
the imprecision and indeterminacy of the degrees of belief of real agents, due to their 
psychological limitations and, perhaps, their attempts to match the strength of their 
confidence with their imprecise, incomplete, or indeterminate evidence. 
It’s important to note, however, that just because the qualitative approach does 
not assume the numerical representability of degrees of belief, this does not mean that 
it denies the possibility of such representability. Rather, the qualitative approach helps 
to clarify the conditions under which numerical representations of degrees of belief are 
appropriate. If a confidence ordering has certain formal properties (including, for 
example, reflexivity, transitivity, and additivity), then it will be representable with a (set 
of) numerical credence function(s) that preserve its ordering: given ≽, there will be an 
associated credence function, 𝑐𝑟(⋅), such that, for all 𝐴, 𝐵, if 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵, then 𝑐𝑟(𝐴) ≥
𝑐𝑟(𝐵). If the ordering has certain additional properties, which I will discuss below, then 
the set of representing credence functions can be whittled down to a unique function 
that precisely represents the strength of an agent’s confidence in each claim, and which 
captures the magnitude of the differences in strength of the agent’s confidence among 
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claims. Representing an agent’s degrees of belief with a comparative confidence relation 
(at the most fundamental level of the representation) helps clarify when numerical 
representation is appropriate and which features of the numerical representation 
correspond to features of the modeled degrees of belief. Thus, the qualitative approach 
avoids excessive precision in its representation when it should do so, but it is also 
capable of representing numerically precise degrees of belief when agents have them.  
In this connection, it’s also important to note that the quantitative approach does 
not in fact have two advantages over the qualitative approach that it may at first seem 
to have.132 The first apparent advantage of the quantitative approach is that it allows us 
to represent the magnitude of the differences in the strength of an agent’s confidence 
among claims, whereas a qualitative approach can represent only the ordinal properties 
of the agent’s confidence. The second apparent advantage of the quantitative approach 
is that it allows us to represent an agent’s degree of belief in a particular claim in 
isolation, whereas the qualitative approach represents an agent’s confidence in a 
particular claim only in comparison to other claims.  
It’s true that on the qualitative, comparative approach, an agent’s degrees of belief 
are always represented in relation to other claims, not in isolation. And it’s also true that 
a particular pairwise comparison, like 𝐴 ≻ 𝐵, merely represents that the agent is  more 
confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵 without representing how much more confident the agent is that 
𝐴 than that 𝐵. So, if the numerical approach can represent magnitudes of difference in 
                                                          
132 See Levinstein (2013, Ch. 1) for discussion of these and other apparent advantages 
of the quantitative approach. 
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confidence, and if it can represent the strength of an agent’s confidence in particular 
claims in isolation, then it does seem to have an advantage over the qualitative, 
comparative approach. 
However, as I explain above, when a comparative confidence ordering representing 
an agent’s degrees of belief has the right structural properties, it can be faithfully 
represented with a credence function—or set thereof—that may provide an apt 
representation of the magnitude of difference between an agent’s confidence in 
different claims, and which may support representations of isolated degrees of belief in 
the form of expressions like 𝑐𝑟(𝐴) = .9, where the precision of this numerical value may 
be significant. So, a qualitative approach can represent magnitudes of the differences 
between an agent’s degrees of belief in claims. When such a fundamentally qualitative 
approach can be legitimately supplemented with numerical credence functions that 
represent its confidence orderings, the representation of differences in relative strength 
between degrees of belief is made more perspicuous, and meaningful representations 
of agents’ confidence in isolated claims becomes possible.  
Furthermore, the quantitative approach is able to faithfully represent isolated 
degrees of belief and relative difference in strength among degrees of belief only when 
its credence functions induce comparative confidence orderings that have the kinds of 
properties mentioned above (reflexivity, transitivity, additivity, etc.). That is, the 
quantitative approach makes stronger assumptions than the qualitative approach, since 
each credence function provides a unique ordering among the degrees of belief of the 
agent, whereas a qualitative comparative confidence relation need not do so. Thus, as 
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we will see below, assuming that real agents’ degrees of belief can be faithfully 
represented with numerical credence functions—assuming that credence functions can 
represents agents’ isolated degrees of belief and the relative strengths of their degrees 
of belief—is tantamount to assuming that real agents’ degrees of belief can be mapped 
to real numbers between 0 and 1 in a way that makes them (already) probabilistically 
coherent. A qualitative approach need not do so, and so may represent cases where real 
agents depart from the ideal of numerical representability.  
So, the quantitative approach has these apparent advantages only in the presence 
of some strong idealizing assumptions that are often inappropriate for the purposes of 
representing the degrees of belief of real agents. A fundamentally qualitative approach, 
on the other hand, promotes careful attention to the nuances of the degrees of belief 
of real agents. It also helps clarify when numerical representation of degrees of belief is 
appropriate, and helps to convey the significance of factors that contribute to the 
numerical representation in such cases. So, because a fundamentally qualitative 
approach avoids excessive numerical precision and clarifies when numerical precision is 
appropriate, that’s the approach I will adopt below as I develop CCF. 
4.2.3 Qualitative Comparative Confidence Axioms 
Along with the logical modeling language and the comparative confidence relations, 
the third main element of CCF’s formal system is a set of axioms for comparative 
confidence relations that plays an analogous role to that of Kolmogorov’s axioms in 
traditional, quantitative probabilist modeling frameworks. Thus, these axioms specify a 
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kind of coherence for comparative confidence relations that we can use to generate 
degree of belief norms via CCF’s application scheme.  
Just as there are several ways to axiomatize quantitative probability functions 
(several distinct sets of axioms that characterize the same probability functions), there 
are also several axiom systems for qualitative, comparative probability relations. 
However, whereas Kolmogorov’s axioms for quantitative probability are accepted as 
standard, there is no single standard set of comparative probability axioms.133 I will 
employ a set of axioms closely related to those of Hawthorne (2009).134 I have chosen 
these axioms not so much because they are the simplest or most parsimonious, but 
because they are stated intuitively and in a way that makes it easy to draw connections 
to degree of belief norms.  These axioms also clarify the connections between different 
properties of comparative confidence relations and the representability of these 
relations with quantitative probability functions. In the appendix, I present two 
alternative equivalent sets of comparative confidence axioms that are somewhat 
simpler, and preferable for some purposes. These alternative axioms also more closely 
resemble the most popular comparative probability axioms like those surveyed in Fine 
(1977), Fishburn (1986), Wong et al. (1991), and Capotorti & Vantaggi (2000). 
Hawthorne specifies his axioms in two stages. First he states a set of seven axioms 
that specify what he calls “rudimentary confidence relations” (2009, p. 54). These 
                                                          
133For overviews of different axiomatizations of comparative probability, see, for 
example, Fine (1973), Fishburn (1986), Wong et al. (1991), and Capotorti & Vantaggi 
(2000). 
134 Hawthorne’s axioms, in turn are based on those of Savage (1972). 
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axioms characterize a kind of quasi-order, a reflexive and transitive—but not necessarily 
complete—ordering of sentences of ℒ. Hawthorne explains that a rudimentary 
confidence ordering is induced by any probabilistic credence function, but he 
acknowledges that some rudimentary confidence functions may not be representable 
with probability functions (2009, pp. 58-59).  
In the second stage, Hawthorne states an additional pair of axioms that place 
additional constraints on the rudimentary confidence relations. When a rudimentary 
confidence relation satisfies these additional axioms, it can be represented by a unique 
probabilistic credence function (Hawthorne 2009, p. 59-63). Then Hawthorne 
characterizes a notion of proper extendability of a rudimentary confidence relation to a 
relation that satisfies these additional axioms. He explains that the axioms for the 
properly extendable rudimentary confidence relations characterize an ordering 
structure that is induced by any probability function.135 He also explains that every 
properly extendable rudimentary confidence relation can be represented by at least one 
probabilistic credence function—usually a set of such functions, all of which represent 
the confidence relation equally well. In what follows, I will provide a slightly modified, 
but equivalent version of Hawthorne’s axioms. 
We begin by characterizing the rudimentary confidence relations. I’ll present the 
axioms and then provide a brief gloss of each. A relation, ≽, defined on a logical language 
                                                          
135 That is, for every probability function, 𝑝𝑟(⋅), there is a properly extendable 
rudimentary confidence relation, ≽, such that if 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) > 𝑝𝑟(𝐵), then 𝐴 ≻ 𝐵, and if 
𝑝𝑟(𝐴) = 𝑝𝑟(𝐵), then 𝐴 ≈ 𝐵. I borrow the language of a function inducing the structure 
of a relation from Capotorti & Vantaggi (2000, p. 210). 
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ℒ is a rudimentary confidence relation if and only if it satisfies the following axioms. For 
all 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷 ∈ ℒ 
0 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(𝐴) if and only if 𝐴 ≽ (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) (certainty-confidence-
connection); 
1 ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) ⋡ (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) (non-triviality); 
2 𝐵 ≽ ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) (minimality); 
3 𝐴 ≽ 𝐴 (reflexivity); 
4 If 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ≽ 𝐶, then 𝐴 ≽ 𝐶 (transitivity); 
5.1 If 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(𝐶 ↔ 𝐷) and 𝐴 ≽ 𝐶, then 𝐴 ≽ 𝐷 (right equivalence); 
5.2 If 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(𝐶 ↔ 𝐷) and 𝐶 ≽ 𝐵, then 𝐷 ≽ 𝐵 (left equivalence); 
6.1 If for some 𝐸, 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐸)), 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐸)), 
and (𝐴 ∨ 𝐸) ≽ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐸), then 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 
(subtractivity); 
6.2 If 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵, then for all 𝐺 such that 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐺)) 
and 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐺)), (𝐴 ∨ 𝐺) ≽ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐺) 
(additivity); 
7 If ⊨ 𝐴, then 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(𝐴) (tautological certainty). 
It’s a little hard to explain the axioms without applying an interpretation to them. 
So, in what follows, I will describe how each axiom characterizes the abstract structural 
properties of the confidence relations, and I will follow up this abstract explanation with 
an intuitive interpretation of the axiom as it applies to degrees of belief. I want to stress, 
however, that these intuitive interpretations of the axioms are place-holders. I will put 
off the precise specification of CCF’s application scheme, including its scheme for 
translating the comparative confidence axioms into degree of belief norms, until 
Chapter 5. There I will present various options for formulating degree of belief norms 
based on CCF’s axioms, and I will show how choices among these options have a huge 
impact on the implications and plausibility of the resulting norms. 
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Hawthorne (2009, pp. 53-54) presents Axiom 0 as a definition, but perhaps it is 
better expressed as an axiomatic relationship between certainty and comparative 
confidence. It simply says that every sentence, 𝐴, that satisfies the certainty predicate 
is ranked at least as high as the tautology (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). Applied to confidence, this means 
that if one is certain that 𝐴, then one should be at least as confident that 𝐴 as that the  
simple tautology (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴); and vice versa, if one is are at least as confident that 𝐴 as 
that 𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴, then one should be certain that 𝐴.  
I’ll present Axioms 1 & 2 together. Axiom 1, non-triviality, says that the simple 
tautologous sentence form (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) is never ranked lower than the simple 
contradictory sentence form ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). That is, either (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) and ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) are 
not compared in the ordering, or (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) is ranked strictly higher than ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). 
However, Axiom 2, minimality, says that every sentence, 𝐵, is ranked at least as high as 
¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴), which holds the lowest place in the ordering.  Substituting (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) for 𝐵, 
this means that (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) is ranked strictly higher than ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) in the ordering.  
Thus, each rudimentary confidence ordering is non-trivial in the sense that at least one 
sentence, (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴),136 is ranked strictly higher than at least one other sentence, ¬(𝐴 ∨
¬𝐴). And since the minimality axiom invokes all sentences 𝐵 of ℒ, it guarantees that 
every sentence appears in the ranking—at least in comparison to simple contradictions 
of the form ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴), but not necessarily in comparison to any other sentences. 
                                                          
136 One sentence form—of which there will be many instances—to be precise. 
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Applied to degrees of belief, Axioms 1 & 2 say that you should be strictly more 
confident in tautologies of the form (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) than you are in simple contradictions of 
the form ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴), and you should be at least as confident in any claim as you are in 
contradictions of the form ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). The general spirit of these axioms, when applied 
to confidence, is that you should be more confident in simple tautologies than simple 
contradictions, and you should never be strictly less confident in any claim than you are 
in a simple contradiction. 
Axiom 3, reflexivity, requires that each sentence is ranked at least as high as itself 
in the ordering. Given the definitions of ≈ and ≻, this entails that for each sentence 𝐴,  
𝐴 ≈ 𝐴 and 𝐴 ⊁ 𝐴. A sentence should never show up at more than one level in the 
ranking. Thus, reflexivity rules out certain kinds of cycles in the ordering. Like the 
minimality axioms, reflexivity also guarantees that every sentence 𝐴 of ℒ appears in the 
ranking—compared, in this case, to itself but not necessarily any other sentence.  
Applying the reflexivity axiom intuitively to confidence is a little tricky. One possible 
interpretation says that you should be at least as confident in any claim, 𝐴, as you 
actually are that 𝐴. From this it seems to follow that you should be exactly as confident 
as you are in every claim: if, for example, you are certain of 𝐴, then you should be certain 
of 𝐴. But this sounds like a kind of a priori vindication of each of your degrees of belief, 
and that can’t quite be right. For there may often be many different degree of belief sets 
that all afford representation with confidence relations that satisfy the rudimentary 
confidence axioms. A better way to apply the reflexivity axiom to confidence is to 
interpret it as saying that, whatever your degree of belief in a particular claim is, you 
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should be single-minded about it in comparison to other claims.137 You shouldn’t have a 
degree of belief structure that amounts to you being strictly more confident in a claim 
than itself. 
Axiom 4, transitivity, says that if 𝐴 is ranked at least as high as 𝐵, and 𝐵 is ranked at 
least as high as 𝐶, then 𝐴 is ranked at least as high as 𝐶. Transitivity thereby extends the 
interdiction on cycles in the ordering put in place by the reflexivity axiom. Together, the 
reflexivity and transitivity axioms make the rudimentary confidence orderings what 
mathematicians call “quasi-orders” or “preorders” (Roberts 1985, p. 15; Hawthorne 
2009, p. 56). The transitivity axiom translates into a pretty intuitive norm for confidence: 
if you’re at least as confident in 𝐴 as you are in 𝐵 and you are at least as confident in 𝐵 
as you are in 𝐶, then you should be at least as confident in 𝐴 as you are in 𝐶.138 
Axiom 5.1 and 5.2, substitutivity of equivalences (left and right), says that when the 
sentence, (𝐶 ↔ 𝐷), stating the material equivalence of 𝐶 and 𝐷, is ranked at least as 
high as ¬((𝐶 ↔ 𝐷) ∨ ¬(𝐶 ↔ 𝐷)),  𝐶 and 𝐷 should share the same place(s) in the 
ordering. Applied to confidence, Axioms 5.1 & 5.2 says that if you are certain in two 
claims have the same truth value, then your confidence judgments including them 
should agree. In particular, along with the reflexivity axiom, Axiom 5 says that if you are 
                                                          
137 This does not mean that your degrees of belief should be sharp or precise.  
138 It’s worth noting that, while transitivity has significant intuitive pull, it has been 
challenged. See Fishburn (1986, p. 339). 
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certain that two claims have the same truth value, then you should be equally confident 
in them.139 
Axioms 6.1 & 6.2, subtractivity and additivity, collectively say that subtractions or 
additions of incompatible disjuncts don’t make a difference in comparisons of pairs of 
sentences. According to subtractivity, if there is some 𝐸 for which ¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐸) is ranked at 
least as high as ¬(¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐸) ∨ ¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐸)), ¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐸) is ranked at least as high as 
¬(¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐸) ∨ ¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐸)), and (𝐴 ∨ 𝐸) is ranked at least as high as (𝐵 ∨ 𝐸), then 𝐴 is 
ranked at least as high as 𝐵. Removing the incompatible disjunct, 𝐸, does not allow the 
ordering to reverse so that, say, (𝐴 ∨ 𝐸) ≻ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐸) but 𝐵 ≻ 𝐴. Similarly, according to 
additivity,  if 𝐴 is ranked at least as high as 𝐵, then whenever  there is some 𝐺 for which 
¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐺) is ranked at least as high as ¬(¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐺) ∨ ¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐺)), ¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐸) is ranked at 
least as high as ¬(¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐺) ∨ ¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐺)), then(𝐴 ∨ 𝐺) is ranked at least as high as (𝐵 ∨
𝐺). Adding the incompatible disjunct, 𝐺, doesn’t change the order between 𝐴 and 𝐵. 
While the subtractivity and additivity axioms are a little more complex than the other 
axioms, they apply pretty straightforwardly to confidence: adding or subtracting 
disjuncts that you are certain are incompatible with claims in a confidence comparison 
should not change your confidence comparisons between the pairs of claims to which 
this incompatible disjuncts are added or from which they are subtracted.  
                                                          
139 By reflexivity, 𝐶 ≽ 𝐶 and 𝐷 ≽ 𝐷. Assuming 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡(𝐶 ↔ 𝐷), by Axiom 5.1 (or 5.2),  𝐶 ≽
𝐷 and 𝐷 ≽ 𝐶. So, by the definition of ≈, 𝐶 ≈ 𝐷. Applied to confidence, this gives us the 
norm that if one is certain that two claims have the same truth value, then one should 
be equally confident in them. 
172 
 
Axiom 7, tautological certainty, places each logical truth, 𝐴, at least as high in the 
ordering as the simple tautologous form ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). In conjunction with the other 
axioms, this places all logical truths at the top of the confidence ordering.  As a 
confidence norm, tautological certainty says just what it sounds like: you should be 
certain of all logical truths. Thus, it is a logical omniscience requirement. Such 
requirements are controversial, as we saw in Chapter 3. And, in Chapter 5, I will discuss 
various ways that we can formulate less demanding versions of the tautological 
certainty norm. Ultimately, however, I will defend a version of the logical omniscience 
requirement. But I will put off that discussion for now. 
Together, Hawthorne’s axioms for the rudimentary confidence relations specify a 
kind of coherence very similar to Kolmogorov’s probability axioms. As Hawthorne (2009, 
p. 55) notes, these axioms are actually a little bit weaker than typical sets of qualitative 
probability axioms, which usually include two additional kinds of axioms, a 
completeness axiom (𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 or 𝐵 ≽ 𝐴, for all 𝐴, 𝐵) and an additional more complicated 
axiom the like of which I’ll present below. Though the rudimentary confidence axioms 
are weaker than standard qualitative probability axioms, they characterize a structure 
that is induced by any Kolmogorovian quantitative probability function. That is, for any 
probability function, 𝑝𝑟(⋅), there’s a rudimentary confidence relation, ≽, such that  𝐴 ≽
𝐵 just when 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) ≥ 𝑝𝑟(𝐵) (Hawthorne, 2009, p. 58). For a given 𝑝𝑟 function, just 
define the relation ≽ as follows: 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 if and only if 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) ≥ 𝑝𝑟(𝐵). Then check that, 
so defined, ≽ satisfies the comparative confidence axioms. 
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While every probability function induces a rudimentary confidence relation, not all 
rudimentary confidence relations can be faithfully represented with probability 
functions (Hawthorne, 2009, p. 58). This is due in part to the fact that some rudimentary 
confidence relations may be incomplete: there may be some 𝐴 and 𝐵 for which 𝐴 ⊁ 𝐵, 
𝐵 ⊁ 𝐴, and 𝐴 ≉ 𝐵. In many ways, this is a positive feature of the rudimentary 
confidence axioms: they provide coherence constraints for degrees of belief without 
making the strong assumption of completeness. For as Hawthorne (2009, p. 59) notes, 
the degrees of belief of many real agents may often be incomplete. This may be due to 
insufficient evidence, or cognitive or practical limitations.  Indeed, in some cases, like 
Joyce’s Black/Grey coins case discussed in Chapter 3, complete degrees of belief may be 
normatively inappropriate given the evidence. Or you may, for instance, simply have no 
good way of judging right now whether you should be more confident, less confident, 
or equally confident that it will rain tomorrow in Norman than that I currently have more 
than $5 in my wallet. So, the rudimentary confidence relations provide a handy tool for 
generating norms for incomplete degrees of belief. 
However, Hawthorne (2009, pp. 59-60) points out that even if degree of belief 
completeness is too demanding in some cases, or otherwise normatively inappropriate, 
the notion of completeness may still have a role to play in characterizing norms for 
degrees of belief. For, as Hawthorne (2009, p. 59) points out, an incomplete confidence 
relation may satisfy Axioms 0-7, but there might be no way to coherently supplement 
the relation with additional comparisons to make it complete. In such a case, as 
Hawthorne puts it, the incompleteness of the relation hides an “implicit incoherence” 
174 
 
in the relation (2009, p. 59).  So, in the second stage of his axiomatization, Hawthorne 
characterizes a notion of proper extendability to preclude such cases of implicit 
incoherence.  
Hawthorne characterizes the properly extendable rudimentary confidence 
relations as follows (2009, p. 60): a rudimentary confidence relation ≽𝛼 defined on a 
logical language ℒ is properly extendable if and only if there is a rudimentary confidence 
relation ≽𝛽 defined on ℒ
+ (an extension of  ℒ) that agrees with the determinate part of 
≽𝛼 (≈𝛽 if and only if ≈𝛼, and ≻𝛽 if and only if ≻𝛼) on ℒ, and that also satisfies the 
following axiom for all sentences of ℒ+: 
(X) (i) (completeness) 𝐴 ≽𝛽 𝐵 or 𝐵 ≽𝛽 𝐴; and  
 (ii) (separating equi-plausible partitions)140 if 𝐴 ≻𝛽 𝐵, then for some integer 𝑛 
there are 𝑛 sentences 𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛 that 𝛽 takes to be mutually incompatible 
(𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝛽 (¬(𝑆𝑖 ∧ 𝑆𝑗)) for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) and jointly exhaustive (𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝛽(𝑆1 ∨ … ∨ 𝑆𝑛)), 
and in all of which 𝛽 is equally confident (𝑆𝑖 ≈𝛽 𝑆𝑗 for each 𝑖, 𝑗) such that for 
each 𝑆𝑘, 𝐴 ≻𝛽 (𝐵 ∨ 𝑆𝑘). 
As before, I’ll explain Axiom (X) in terms of the abstract structure it requires, and 
then I’ll provide an interpretation in terms of confidence. To satisfy Axiom (X), a 
confidence relation, ≽𝛽, must be defined on a language enriched with a large equi-
plausible partition. That is, the language must include a set of sentences, {𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛}, 
such that for each pair 𝑖, 𝑗 (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) of which ¬(𝑆𝑖 ∧ 𝑆𝑗) is ranked at least as high as 
(¬(𝑆𝑖 ∧ 𝑆𝑗) ∨ ¬¬(𝑆𝑖 ∧ 𝑆𝑗)), (𝑆1 ∨ … ∨ 𝑆𝑛) is ranked at least as high as ((𝑆1 ∨ … ∨ 𝑆𝑛) ∨
                                                          
140 A set {𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛} of sentences is an 𝑛-ary equi-plausible partition for 𝛽 just in case  
𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝛽 (¬(𝑆𝑖 ∧ 𝑆𝑗)) and 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝛽(𝑆1 ∨ … ∨ 𝑆𝑛). 
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¬(𝑆1 ∨ … ∨ 𝑆𝑛)), and each sentence in the set has an equal place in the ranking. Axiom 
(X.i), completeness, says that every sentence in this enriched language must be 
compared to every other. So, there should be no gaps in the ordering. And Axiom (X.ii), 
separating equi-plausible partitions, says that whenever a sentence, 𝐴, is ranked strictly 
higher than another sentence 𝐵, the disjunction (𝐵 ∨ 𝑆𝑘) must be ranked strictly below 
𝐴 for each 𝑆𝑘. If a rudimentary confidence relation satisfies Axiom (X), then whenever 𝐴 
is ranked strictly above 𝐵, there is at least one disjunction (𝐵 ∨ 𝑆𝑘) that separates them 
in the ordering (𝐴 ≻ (𝐵 ∨ 𝑆𝑘) ≻ 𝐵) (Hawthorne 2009, p. 60). 
Applied to confidence, completeness says that there should be no holes in your 
degree of belief set. You should be opinionated—with some determinate degree of 
belief in every logical combination of the atomic claims toward which you have doxastic 
attitudes. 
To explain how Axiom (X.ii), separating equi-plausible partitions, applies to 
confidence, Hawthorne suggests an example in which an agent, 𝛽, is more confident in 
𝐴 than 𝐵, and there is a very large fair lottery with 𝑛 tickets. Additionally, Hawthorne 
assumes that 𝛽 is equally confident that each ticket will win, and certain that exactly 
one of the tickets will win (2009, pp. 60-61). In such a case, Hawthorne explains, Axiom 
(X.ii) requires that, since 𝛽 is more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵, the lottery must have so many 
tickets that 𝛽 is more confident in 𝐴 than that either 𝐵 is true or any one particular ticket 
will win. 
So, that’s what it means for a rudimentary confidence relation to be properly 
extended, and for an agent’s confidence to be representable with such a relation. A 
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rudimentary confidence relation, ≽𝛼, is properly extendable, if, in addition to satisfying 
Axioms 0-7, there is a confidence relation, ≽𝛽, defined on an a language enriched with 
equi-plausible partitions, which agrees with the determinate part of ≽𝛼  and which 
satisfies Axiom (X). So, the notion of degree of belief coherence Hawthorne 
characterizes holds that one’s degrees of belief ought to conform to the norms 
suggested by Axioms 0-7. Additionally, while your degrees of belief need not be 
opinionated, and you may not have degrees of belief towards equi-plausible partitions 
like large fair lotteries, your degrees of belief should be supplementable with attitudes 
toward such doxastic objects such that they could be faithfully represented with a 
rudimentary confidence relation that satisfies Axiom (X). 
Since every properly extendable confidence relation is a rudimentary confidence 
relation, it follows that every properly extendable confidence relation has a structure 
induced by any probability function. But, additionally, Hawthorne explains that every 
properly extendable confidence relation is representable with a set of probability 
functions such that for each one of them, 𝑝𝑟, if 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵, then 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) ≥ 𝑝𝑟(𝐵) (2009, p. 
62). Additionally, Hawthorne points out that, if a confidence relation is properly 
extended, then there is a unique probability function 𝑝𝑟 that represents it such that 𝐴 ≽
𝐵 if and only if 𝑝𝑟(𝐴) ≥ 𝑝𝑟(𝐵) (2009, p. 62).  
Thus, Hawthorne’s axioms provide a qualitative characterization of two kinds of 
coherence: a stronger notion associated with representation by properly extended 
confidence relations equivalent to that characterized by standard probabilism, and a 
weaker notion associated with representability by properly extendable confidence 
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relations equivalent to that characterized by the extendability form of the probabilist 
norm discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 5, I will discuss which of these notions of 
coherence is most appropriate to the aims of probabilism. I will put off that discussion 
until then.  
Now that I’ve presented the axioms in CCF’s formal system, I want to present some 
of the benefits of qualitative axiomatizations in general and Hawthorne’s axiomatization 
in particular.  The first main advantage is that the qualitative approach is compatible 
with a fundamentally qualitative representation of degrees of belief. As I explain above, 
a fundamentally qualitative representation scheme avoids issues associated with the 
excessive precision of fundamentally numerical representations of confidence, clarifies 
the significance of numerical representations of confidence, and allows us to model non-
ideal agents whose degrees of belief lack the structure necessary for faithful 
representation with a numerical credence function. 
Similarly, qualitative axiomatizations clarify the comparative structure of the 
coherence requirement imposed by traditional quantitative probabilism. Hawthorne’s 
approach, in particular, makes it clear what kind of comparative structure is necessary 
for faithful representation with a set of numerical probability functions or a unique 
probability function. Relatedly, by characterizing a weaker notion of coherence akin to 
the extendability form of the probabilist norm, Hawthorne’s approach also has the 
advantage that it is compatible with the view that in some cases, like Joyce’s Black/Grey 
Coins case, it is inappropriate to be opinionated or to have precise degrees of belief 
representable with point-valued credences. For, faithful representation with a properly 
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extendable confidence relation is consistent with having incomplete or imprecise 
degrees of belief in the face of incomplete or imprecise evidence. 
Finally, fundamentally qualitative approaches have the advantage that their axioms 
translate more easily into degree of belief norms. As we saw in Chapter 2, it can be 
difficult to specify the normative constraint that, for example, Kolmogorov’s additivity 
axiom for numerical probability imposes. In general, as Capotorti & Vantaggi (2000) put 
it, most qualitative axioms permit “direct reading” unlike many numerical axioms. In 
particular, Hawthorne’s axioms for confidence relations cry out for interpretation as 
confidence norms. Indeed, it was hard not to apply this interpretation to Hawthorne’s 
axioms in glossing their meaning. This advantage is especially important to the 
probabilist aim of formulating clear norms for degrees of belief.  
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provided an account of the nature and aims of formal modeling in 
general and probabilism in particular. I concluded that probabilism has three main aims: 
characterizing certain philosophical concepts (degree of belief, coherence, and 
rationality), formulating norms for degrees of belief, and generating normative verdicts 
about degrees of belief in particular cases. Thus, I argued that probabilism should be 
both local and global. 
I also adopted and presented Titelbaum’s (2013) account of the elements of a well-
articulated modeling framework. And I set out to characterize the elements of a well-
articulated probabilist modeling framework, CCF, beginning with what I call its 
methodological foundations. In particular, I set out a fundamentally qualitative, 
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comparative version of probabilism built on a logical rather than set-theoretic modeling 
language.  
I adopted a fundamentally qualitative, logical approach in CCF for several reasons. 
First, a fundamentally qualitative, logical representation scheme better allows us to 
represent the degrees of belief of real—non-ideal—agents within the modeling 
framework. This approach can model non-omniscience, and it avoids excessive precision 
and unrealistic assumptions. In general, the qualitative approach also helps clarify the 
significance of numerical representations of confidence via its representation theorems 
that specify connections between different properties of confidence relations and their 
numerical representability. From a normative perspective, this helps elucidate when it 
is appropriate to demand sharp degrees of belief based on the evidence. Furthermore, 
Hawthorne’s qualitative approach in particular provides the advantage of flexibility in 
specifying different notions of coherence that make weaker and stronger demands 
appropriate to different circumstances. 
In Chapter 5, I will lay out CCF’s representation scheme, and thereby characterize 
its normative foundations. In particular, I will focus on the precise formulation of degree 
of belief norms based on Hawthorne’s comparative confidence axioms. I will also briefly 
comment on the justification of these norms. 
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5 Normative Foundations 
 In Chapter 4, I began laying out a unified probabilist modeling framework, CCF (the 
Comparative Confidence Framework), which is intended to clarify probabilism’s aims 
and implications, and to rebut or avoid the common objections to probabilism 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3. I provided an account of probabilism’s aims, and I 
identified the key elements of a well-articulated probabilist modeling framework. Then 
I began to articulate CCF’s details according to this account. I provided an account of the 
target phenomena that CCF is intended to model, namely degrees of belief, degree of 
belief coherence, and degree of belief rationality. I presented CCF’s fundamentally 
qualitative (rather than quantitative) formal system consisting of a set of axioms for 
comparative confidence relations defined on a logical (rather than set-theoretic) 
modeling language. I also presented CCF’s scheme for representing degrees of belief 
within CCF’s formal system by means of comparative confidence relations.  Finally, I 
sketched a scheme for translating CCF’s comparative confidence axioms into norms for 
degrees of belief.  
My purpose in this chapter is to continue the project of stating a unified probabilist 
modeling framework by providing an account of its normative foundations. In particular, 
my primary aim in this chapter is to state CCF’s application scheme, its scheme for 
translating the comparative confidence axioms into degree of belief norms that can be 
applied to the degrees of belief of real human agents in particular cases. First, I will 
explain in more detail what a formal modeling framework’s application scheme is, and 
why we need to specify one. Then I will lay out the core of CCF’s application scheme, its 
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scheme for translating the comparative confidence axioms and theorems into degree of 
belief norms. Once I have presented this scheme, I will present the resulting degree of 
belief norms together with the notion of rational degree of belief coherence that they 
encode. Finally, I will comment on the justification of CCF’s norms in connection to the 
standard arguments for probabilism. 
5.1 What Is an Application Scheme and Why Do We Need It? 
As I explained in Chapter 4, a modeling framework’s application scheme is the third 
component of its interpretation of its formal system. The first component is an account 
of the target phenomena to be modeled. The second component is the representation 
scheme, which specifies how to represent the target phenomenon within the formal 
system. The application scheme specifies how to project insights from within the formal 
system back onto the target phenomena. In a traditional probabilist modeling 
framework, the application scheme specifies how to translate the axioms and theorems 
of Kolmogorov’s probability calculus into degree of belief norms. Probabilists then apply 
this scheme to models of particular cases in order to generate normative verdicts about 
agents’ degrees of belief in those cases.  
Why do we need an application scheme? Because, without one, the framework 
does not apply to the target phenomenon. On its own, without an interpretation, the 
formalism doesn’t say anything about the degrees of belief of real agents. So, without 
an application scheme, probabilism doesn’t generate degree of belief norms, and it 
doesn’t provide verdicts about degrees of belief in particular cases.  
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As I noted in Chapter 4, probabilists don’t usually state an application scheme 
explicitly. However, they rely on one implicitly.  This implicit application scheme seems 
to hold that, by applying the representation scheme in reverse, we can translate the 
probability axioms and theorems directly into norms. Likewise we can translate 
derivations within models directly into normative verdicts about particular degrees of 
belief. This implicit application scheme imparts normative force to every axiom and 
theorem of the probability calculus, and it translates each derivation within a model into 
a normative verdict.  
There are two main reasons why this implicit application scheme won’t cut it. First, 
we can’t read norms directly off of the axioms and theorems by substituting talk of 
comparative confidence relations (or about probabilistic credence functions) for talk 
about degrees of belief. This is because the axioms and theorems do not include any 
normative language. To turn the axioms into norms, we need to impart them with 
normative force. Thus, in the translation process, we need to introduce a normative 
operators like “should” or “ought.” For example, a direct translation of the tautological 
certainty axiom yields: 
 If ⊨ 𝐴, then one is certain of 𝐴. 
This is simply a descriptive claim.141 Indeed (as applied to real agents) it is one that will 
very often be false. To turn it into a norm, we need to add a normative operator: 
                                                          
141 That is, assuming “one” refers to a generic human agent. However, we could take 
“one” to refer to ideally rational agent. On this alternate reading, the translation of the 
axiom is normative in the sense that it is a description of an ideal agent, whom real 
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 If ⊨ 𝐴, then one should be certain of 𝐴. 
However, “should” and “ought” are not our only options for normative operators. 
For example, we can also translate the axioms into permissions. 
 If ⊨ 𝐴, then one is permitted to be certain of 𝐴. 
Depending on which normative operator we choose to include in the translations, we 
generate very different norms with very different consequences. As I will show below, 
we also face many other options for generating norms from the comparative confidence 
axioms and theorems. Different choices among these options yield very different 
versions of probabilism, which have different features, and which are subject to 
different criticisms. We must specify CCF’s application scheme explicitly in order to 
make its consequences clear. As Titelbaum (2013, Chs. 4-5) points out, we can avoid 
some of the typical objections to probabilism just by stating our application scheme 
carefully. 
Second, we also need to state CCF’s application scheme explicitly in order to avoid 
imparting normative force to skewed aspects of the formal system. As I explained in 
Chapter 4, formal modeling is fruitful in large part because it allows us to abstract from 
the content of the target phenomena to view their formal features. The process of 
formalization typically includes some simplification and regimentation of the target 
phenomena, which can introduce some bias into the formal representation. No formal 
                                                          
human agents ought to emulate. This kind of blanket approach to normativity doesn’t 
permit the kind of nuance that the following treatment provides. 
184 
 
representation is perfect, after all. Because of this, there may be aspects of our formal 
model that we don’t want to translate back onto degrees of belief with normative force.  
We’ve already modified the typical probabilist modeling framework to avoid 
imparting illicit normative force to its numerical representation of degrees of belief. 
However, even so, there may be features of CCF’s formal system that we don’t want to 
impose onto degrees of belief as norms. For example, for the reasons presented in 
Chapter 3, we might want to avoid imposing the kind of logical omniscience requirement 
suggested by the tautological certainty axiom. So, instead of translating this axiom as 
 if ⊨ 𝐴, then one should be certain of 𝐴 
we might want to translate it as 
 if ⊨ 𝐴, then, if one has any degree of belief in 𝐴, one should be certain of  
𝐴. 
Instead of demanding full logical omniscience, this second translation of the norm 
makes the weaker demand of logical infallibility. 
So, we need to specify CCF’s application scheme in order to make its normative 
consequences clear and to avoid imparting normative force to aspects of the formalism 
that are mere artifacts of that formalism. In the next two sections, I will present the 
array of options we face in formulating probabilist norms from CCF’s axioms and 
theorems, and I will evaluate these options in light of probabilism’s aims.  
5.2 Norm Formulation Options 
Recently, several philosophers have turned their attention to the question of 
precisely how we should formulate coherence norms based on formal systems like 
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deductive logic or the probability calculus.142 The contributors to this literature have 
identified four main parameters that can be varied in norm formulation.143 
1. Normative operator type: What type of normative operator does the norm 
include? Is it a deontic operator: obligation, permission, or interdiction? Or 
does it specify a pro tanto, defeasible recommendation of reason? Is the 
normative operator strict—like obligation—or slack—like the reason 
operator?  
2. Normative operator scope: When the norm is logically complex, what is the 
scope of the normative operator? Are there multiple normative operators 
within the norm? 
3. Normative operator polarity: Is the polarity of the normative operation 
positive or negative? Does the norm tell one to adopt a particular doxastic 
attitude (positive) or to avoid adopting one (negative)? 
4. Knowledge condition: Is the norm conditional on the agent’s knowledge of 
some fact—logical facts, in particular? 
I will make two modifications to this set of parameters. First, I’ll add an additional 
operator to the list of possible normative operators. MacFarlane, Broome, et al., focus 
on the reason operator and the deontic operators. Since many probabilists hold that the 
probabilist norm is an evaluative norm, I’ll add an evaluative operator to the list, namely 
the goodness operator, “it is good that.”144 Second, I’ll add an additional parameter to 
                                                          
142 The roots of this growing literature can be found in, for example, Harman (1986), 
Broome (1999), MacFarlane (MS), and Field (2009). 
143 This list of parameters is due to MacFarlane (MS). MacFarlane’s presentation of the 
formulation options is the most complete and systematic. His paper concerns the 
formulation of norms for categorical belief based on deductive logic. In what follows, I 
will draw heavily on MacFarlane’s work, adapting his approach to the task of generating 
degree of belief norms from the comparative confidence axioms. 
144 I could also add additional evaluative operators, such as a badness operator, an 
indifference operator, or comparative operators – e.g., a better-than and a worse-than 
operator. For the sake of simplicity, I’ll focus on the goodness operator here. 
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the list, which I call the “attitude condition.” This is the condition present in the modified 
version of the tautological certainty norm given above: 
 If ⊨ 𝐴, then, if one has any degree of belief in 𝐴, one should be certain of 
𝐴. 
When this condition is present, the norm applies on the condition that one has an 
attitude (a degree of belief or confidence comparison) toward the claim(s) in question. 
In the case of the modified version of the tautological certainty norm, the addition of 
the attitude condition changes the norm from a requirement of logical omniscience to 
a requirement of logical infallibility with regard to the claims towards which one has an 
attitude. 
By varying these parameters, we can generate a wide array of formulations for any 
given norm—as many as 96 different formulations for some norms. So, before I explain 
the parameters in more detail, and present the different options we can generate by 
varying them, I want to introduce a scheme for naming the formulations. I hope that 
this naming scheme will facilitate and clarify the discussion to follow.145 
According to this scheme for naming the formulations, each formulation is named 
by a string of initials that specify its scope, normative operator, polarity, and whether it 
is conditional on logical knowledge or possession of some attitude. The first initial of 
each name is a capital letter, C, B, or W, to indicate the scope of its normative 
operator(s). I assume here that all logically complex statements of norms employ 
(material) conditionals as their main connectives. So, the statement of a norm can 
                                                          
145 I modify MacFarlane’s scheme (MS, p. 7). 
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include a normative operator in the consequent alone (C), in both antecedent and the 
consequent (B), or the operator can have wide scope over the whole conditional (W). 
The second initial of each name is a lower case letter, o, p, r, or g, to indicate which 
type of normative operator the norm includes, obligation (o), permission (p), reason (r), 
or goodness (g).146   The third initial of each name is either a plus sign (+) or a minus sign 
(-), to indicate that the normative operation has positive or negative polarity.  
Every norm’s name includes at least these first three initials, to indicate its 
operator(s), scope, and polarity. When a norm is not logically complex, its name will 
always indicate that its operator has widest scope (W). In addition to the first three 
initials, a formulation’s name may also include one or two suffixes: a k to indicate that 
the norm is conditional on knowledge of some logical fact, or an a to indicate that the 
norm includes an attitude condition. With this naming scheme in hand, I will now 
present the parameters and the norms that they allow us to generate in more detail.  
5.2.1 Operator Type 
The first parameter I’ll consider is the type of normative operator the norm includes. 
We have a choice among four main options: obligation, permission, reason, and 
goodness. I don’t include interdiction as an option in its own right since we can 
conveniently state interdictions in terms of obligation or permission. There are a few 
main differences that distinguish the operators. First, some of them are strict, while 
                                                          
146 I assume here that a single norm will not include multiple normative operators of 
different types. So, for example, I will ignore formulations like the following: if it is good 
for one to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵, and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, 
then one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶.  
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others are slack. A normative operation is strict if one is subject to legitimate criticism 
when the norm says to φ, but one fails to φ. A normative operation is slack if one is not 
necessarily subject to criticism when the norm says to φ, but one fails to φ. 
The deontic operators, obligation and permission, are strict. Recommendations of 
reason, on the other hand, are slack. For example, consider the Co+, Cp+, and Cr+ 
forms of the tautological certainty norm. 
Co+ If ⊨ 𝐴, then one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
Cp+ If ⊨ 𝐴, then one is permitted to be certain of 𝐴. 
Cr+ If ⊨ 𝐴, then one has  reason to be certain of 𝐴. 
If one is uncertain of a particular tautology, 𝐴, one violates the Co+ form of the norm, 
but not necessarily the Cr+ formulation. This is because recommendations of reason 
are defeasible and pro tanto.147 So, one’s uncertainty in a tautology may be consistent 
with satisfaction of the Cr+ formulation if there are other reasons that defeat or over-
ride one’s reason to be certain. For example, the tautology in question might be too 
complex for one to recognize it as such, or one might possess misleading evidence that 
leads one to think the tautology is false. As I noted above, permissions are also strict. 
The Cp+ form of the norm permits certainty in any tautology regardless of one’s 
evidence or the complexity of the tautology. 
                                                          
147 When I say that reasons are pro tanto, I mean that a given reason might not be 
conclusive. When I say that reasons are defeasible, I mean that additional considerations 
may remove or mitigate the force of the reason. 
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It’s not as clear whether the goodness operator is strict or slack. Consider the Cg+ 
form of the tautological certainty norm. 
Cg+ If ⊨ 𝐴, then it is good for one to be certain of 𝐴. 
There’s a sense in which it is strict: if one is uncertain of a tautology, then one’s degree 
of belief could have been better. So, if one violates the norm, then one merits a negative 
evaluation. However, there’s also a sense in which the goodness operator is slack. For, 
there seem to be cases where one’s uncertain degree of belief in a tautology could be 
good. I have in mind again cases in which the tautology is extremely complex and the 
agent possesses misleading evidence that suggests that the tautology is false. One might 
argue that, in such a case, it is not only good, but best for the agent to be uncertain of 
the tautology. 
I think that the goodness operator is strict, but that it gives the appearance of being 
slack in some cases. This is because we can make evaluations of goodness from different 
perspectives. We can make evaluations from an all-things-considered perspective, or we 
can evaluate based on subsets of our values. Evaluations of goodness, I contend, are 
strict relative to the set of values they are based on. Thus, it is important to keep in mind 
the set of values on the basis of which one is conducting an evaluation. From the 
perspective of coherence, it is perhaps good for one to be certain of all tautologies. But 
from a perspective that also takes evidential considerations into account, it might not 
always be good for one to be certain of a tautology, depending on one’s evidence. 
In addition to strictness, another feature that distinguishes the operators is how they 
are constrained by our limitations—to what extent they are subject to “ought”-implies-
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“can” constraints. It is widely accepted that obligations are constrained by our abilities: 
one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do. It is also widely accepted that 
evaluative norms are not subject to “ought”-implies-“can” constraints. There’s a sense 
in which it would be good for me to be logically omniscient, though I cannot be. If there 
were a logical omniscience pill (with no major side effects), I would be a fool not to take 
it. Recommendations of reason are not directly constrained by our abilities either. 
Rather, our limitations provide competing reasons. So, in the scenario in which I am 
considering an extremely complex tautology, I have reason to be certain of the tautology 
per the Cr+ form of the tautological certainty norm, but my cognitive limitations also 
provide a countervailing reason to be uncertain. 
How do the different operations relate to each other? Holding the other parameters 
fixed, obligation formulations entail permission and reason formulations. If one is 
obligated to 𝜑, it must also be permissible for one to 𝜑. Likewise one must also have 
some reason to 𝜑. Plausibly, obligation formulations also entail goodness formulations. 
If one is obligated to 𝜑, there is at least some perspective—perhaps the all-things-
considered perspective—from which it is good for one to 𝜑. 
Other things equal, permissions do not seem to entail or be entailed by 
recommendations of reason. A permission to 𝜑 doesn’t necessarily give one any reason 
to 𝜑, or indicate that it is good for one to 𝜑. Likewise, if one has reason to 𝜑, it’s not 
necessarily permissible for one to 𝜑. There might be countervailing reasons that make 
it impermissible for one to 𝜑. 
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The relations between recommendations of reason and goodness norms are not as 
clear. If one has reason to 𝜑, there is at least some sense in which it is good for one to 
𝜑. But it doesn’t follow that, if one has reason to 𝜑, then it is good for one to 𝜑, all things 
considered. Similarly, if there’s a sense in which it’s good for one to 𝜑, then there must 
be at least some reason for one to 𝜑, pro tanto and defeasible though it may be. Despite 
these apparent entailment relations, it’s not clear that reasons formulations and 
goodness formulations are equivalent. After all, the reasons operator is slack, but the 
goodness operator is strict relative to a set of values. 
5.2.2 Scope  
When our norms are logically complex, we have three choices with regard to the 
scope of their normative operators: the normative operator can be embedded in the 
consequent of the conditional, as in the Co+ form of the transitivity norm; there can be 
normative operators in the antecedent and the consequent, as in the Bo+ form; or the 
normative operator can have wide scope over the whole conditional as in the Wo+ form.  
Co+ If one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as 
in 𝐶, then one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶. 
 
Bo+ If one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as 
confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is obligated to be at least as confident in 
𝐴 as in 𝐶. 
 
Wo+ One is obligated to see to it that if one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 
and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is at least as confident in 𝐴 
as in 𝐶.148 
                                                          
148 Following MacFarlane (MS), I use the phrase “see to it that” in the wide scope 
formulations to clarify the scope of the normative operator. Compare “one is obligated 
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The scope of the normative operator makes a huge difference to the implications of 
a norm. In the Co+ form of the norm, the normative operator has narrow scope over 
the consequent of the conditional. So, when the antecedent is satisfied, the normative 
conclusion in the consequent “detaches” (Broome, 1999, p. 401).  Thus, when one is at 
least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, one becomes 
obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as one is in 𝐶, regardless of whether one’s 
confidence comparisons of 𝐴 and 𝐵 and 𝐵 an 𝐶 are well-founded. 
Wide scope norms like the Wo+ form of the transitivity norm, on the other hand, 
don’t generate determinate normative conclusions like narrow scope norms. According 
to the Wo+ form of the transitivity norm, if one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and 
at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is obligated either to be at least as confident 
in 𝐴 as in 𝐶, or one is obligated to revise one’s comparisons of 𝐴 and 𝐵 and 𝐵 and 𝐶. 
Wide scope norms don’t tell one whether to embrace the consequences of one’s 
degrees of belief or revise one’s degrees of belief. 
Narrow scope norms with normative operators in both the antecedent and the 
consequent, like the Bo+ transitivity norm, make still a different kind of demand. They 
extend normative pressure one is already under (MacFarlane MS, p. 10).  
Bo+ If one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as 
confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as 
in 𝐶. 
                                                          
to see to it that, if 𝐴, then 𝐵” with the more awkward formulation, “one is obligated 
that, if A, then B.” By using “see to it that” in this way, I do not mean to suggest that we 
have direct voluntary control over our doxastic states. 
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The Bo+ transitivity norm says that, if one is already obligated to be at least as confident 
in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is also obligated to be at least 
as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶. The norm doesn’t apply any normative pressure to one, if one 
not obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 
𝐶. 
5.2.3 Polarity 
The polarity of the normative operation in a norm determines whether the norm 
requires (or recommends) us to adopt some attitude or avoid adopting one. Compare 
the Wr+ and Wr- forms of the entailment norm.149 
Wr+ If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then one has reason to be at least as confident in 𝐵 as one is in 𝐴. 
Wr- If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then one has reason not to be more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵. 
The Wr+ form has positive polarity. If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, it recommends that one has reason to be 
at least as confident in 𝐵 as one is in 𝐴, regardless of whether or not one currently has 
attitudes toward 𝐴 and 𝐵. The negative polarity form, Wr-, on the other hand, 
recommends that, if 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, one has reason not to be more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵. This 
is perfectly consistent with one having no attitudes toward 𝐴 and 𝐵 whatsoever. Thus, 
the Wr- form of the norm does not recommend that one adopt new attitudes; it merely 
                                                          
149 Note that even though the Wr+ and Wr- forms of the entailment norm take the form 
of conditionals, and the normative operators appear only in the consequent, I still call 
them wide scope formulations. This is because even though the norms take the form of 
conditionals, I think of them as norms conditional on logical facts. In each case, the norm 
in the consequent of the conditional is not logically complex, so the normative operator 
trivially has widest scope in each case. For an example of a C norm conditional on a 
logical fact, consider the Cr+ formulation of the entailment norm for categorical belief: 
If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then if one believes 𝐴, then one has reason to believe 𝐵. 
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recommends coherence among the attitudes one already has.  In this sense, the 
negative polarity form is less demanding than the positive polarity form.  
In many cases, adopting the negative polarity form of a norm is a good way to make 
the norm less demanding. In this way, it captures part of the idea behind the 
extendability form of the probabilist norm discussed in Chapter 3. However, in some 
cases, the positive and negative polarity forms of a norm are equivalent. Compare the 
Wr+ and Wr- forms of the tautological uncertainty norm. 
Wr+ If ⊨ 𝐴, then one has reason to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wr- If ⊨ 𝐴, then one has reason not to be uncertain of 𝐴. 
A recommendation to be certain of all tautologies is equivalent to a recommendation 
not to be uncertain of any tautology. In cases such as this, we must adopt some other 
formulation in order to weaken the demands of the norm. 
Holding other parameters fixed, positive polarity forms entail their negative polarity 
counterparts. For example, compare the Wo+ and Wo- forms of the entailment norm. 
Wo+ If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐵 as one is in 
𝐴. 
 
Wo- If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then one is obligated not to be more confident in 𝐴 than one is 
in 𝐵. 
If one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐵 as one is in 𝐴, then one is obligated 
not to be more confident in 𝐴 than one is in 𝐵.  
In general, the negative polarity forms do not entail their positive polarity 
counterparts. For example, comparing the Wo+ and Wo- forms of the entailment norm 
again, an obligation not to be more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵 doesn’t necessarily mean that 
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one should be at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐴. It could also mean that one is permitted 
to have no confidence comparison between 𝐴 and 𝐵. However, as we saw above, in 
some cases, like the tautological certainty norm, the positive and negative polarity forms 
are equivalent.  
Wr+ If ⊨ 𝐴, then one has reason to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wr- If ⊨ 𝐴, then one has reason not to be uncertain of 𝐴. 
Any positive polarity norm to be certain in a claim will be equivalent to the negative 
polarity norm not to be uncertain in that claim. 
5.2.4 Knowledge Conditions 
So far I’ve presented options for manipulating the normative operators in our 
norms—their type, scope, and polarity. However, in some cases we can manipulate 
additional aspects of the norm. Some norms, for example the tautological certainty 
norm and the entailment norm, are conditional on logical facts. Consider the Wo+ forms 
of these norms. 
Tautological Certainty 
(Wo+) 
If ⊨ 𝐴, then one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
Entailment (Wo+) If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then one is obligated to be at least as confident 
in 𝐵 as one is in 𝐴. 
These norms say, respectively, that one is obligated to be certain of all tautologies, and 
one is obligated to be at least as confident in any claim as one is in the claims that entail 
it. 
These norms are very demanding. They fall far afoul of “ought”-implies-“can” 
constraints. To make them less demanding, rather than making them conditional upon   
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bare logical facts, we can make them conditional upon knowledge of these facts, as in 
the Wo+k forms. 
Wo+k If one knows that ⊨ 𝐴, then one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wo+k If one knows that 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then one is obligated to be at least as confident in 
𝐵 as one is in 𝐴. 
These norms make much weaker demands. The Wo+k form of the tautological certainty 
norm demands certainty in the tautologies one knows as such. And the Wo+k form of 
the entailment norm demands that one is at least as confident in entailed claims as one 
is in the claims that one knows entail them. Adding knowledge conditions to norms of 
this kind can bring them more nearly within reach of the abilities of real agents. 
Since knowledge is factive, when we hold other parameters fixed, formulations 
without knowledge conditions entail their counterparts with knowledge conditions, but 
not vice versa. For example: 
Wg+ If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then it is good for one to be at least as confident in 𝐵 as one is in 𝐴. 
Wg+k If one knows that 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then it is good for one to be at least as confident in 
𝐵 as one is in 𝐴. 
Given the Wg+ for of the entailment norm, it follows that Wg+k form must hold, but not 
vice versa.  
5.2.5 Attitude Conditions 
An alternative way to make norms less demanding—even when they aren’t 
conditional upon logical facts—is to include an attitude condition. Compare, for 
example, the Wo+ and Wo+a forms of the tautological certainty norm. 
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Wo+ If ⊨ 𝐴, then one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wo+a If ⊨ 𝐴, then, if one has a degree of belief in 𝐴, one is obligated to be certain 
of it. 
Rather than requiring logical omniscience, like the Wo+ form, the Wo+a form requires 
mere logical infallibility: one might not be certain of all tautologies, but one is certain of 
all tautologies one invests confidence in.  
Thus, attitude conditional formulations of the norms capture the spirit of the 
extendability form of the probabilist norm mentioned in Chapter 3. Namely, probabilism 
doesn’t require one to be opinionated, but it does require one’s degrees of belief to be 
coherently augmentable with additional degrees of belief. Thus, attitude conditional 
formulations are similar to negative polarity formulations except that in the case of 
certainty norms, as we saw above, negative polarity formulations are equivalent to their 
positive polarity cousins. In these cases, attitude conditions can be added to achieve the 
desired diminution of demandingness. However, as I will explain in the next sub-section, 
there are also cases where negative polarity formulations are more natural than attitude 
conditional formulations for this purpose. 
When we hold other parameters fixed, formulations that do not include attitude 
conditions entail their counterparts that do, but not vice versa. For example, consider 
the Wo+ and Wo+a forms of the tautological certainty norm. 
Wo+ If ⊨ 𝐴, one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wo+a If ⊨ 𝐴, one is obligated to see to it that, if one has a degree of belief in 𝐴, then 
one is certain of it. 
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In most cases, when other parameters are held fixed, the negative polarity form of 
a norm is equivalent to the positive polarity form with an attitude condition. So, in these 
cases, the negative polarity form and the attitude condition make each other redundant. 
Certainty norms are the exception. In those cases, as we have seen, the negative and 
positive polarity forms of the norm are equivalent, other things equal. In these cases, 
the addition of an attitude condition makes the norm less demanding, as we have seen. 
In formulations that include knowledge conditions, these conditions seem to make 
the inclusion of attitude conditions redundant. For example:  
Wo+k If one knows that ⊨ 𝐴, one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wo+ka If one knows that ⊨ 𝐴, one is obligated to see to it that, if one has a degree 
of belief in 𝐴, then one is certain of it. 
It is widely—if not universally—accepted that knowledge in a claim entails belief in that 
claim. So, if one knows that 𝐴 is a tautology, it seems to follow that one believes 𝐴 is a 
tautology. Setting aside the precise connection between categorical belief and degree 
of belief, this suggests that, if one knows that 𝐴 is a tautology, then one has some degree 
of belief in 𝐴. Thus, the inclusion of the knowledge condition in the norm seems to make 
the attitude condition redundant.  
However, the connections between knowledge and other mental states are 
controversial. Consider the Wo+k form of the tautological certainty norm on its own.  
Wo+k If one knows that ⊨ 𝐴, one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
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On some understandings of the connection between degree of belief, categorical belief 
and knowledge, this form of the norm is trivial.150 For, some epistemologists hold that 
knowledge of a claim entails certainty in that claim.151 If this is the case, then, if one 
knows 𝐴 is a tautology, then one is certain that it is. It would be strange for one, then, 
to be certain that 𝐴 is a tautology, but uncertain in 𝐴. As I will argue below, because of 
difficulties associated with the analysis of knowledge, it may be best to avoid knowledge 
conditional formulations altogether.  
5.3 Evaluation of the Formulation Options 
Given the options, how should we formulate our probabilist norms? In this section, 
I will weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each option. In the end, I will argue for 
a hierarchy of wide-scope, evaluative, formulations. First, I’ll argue that the formulations 
should be wide(st) scope. Then I will argue for formulations with the evaluative 
goodness operator. Finally, I will argue that probabilists should want to characterize 
higher standards of coherence as well as lower standards. For this reason, I propose a 
hierarchy of evaluative formulations.  
5.3.1 Scope Issues 
Following MacFarlane (MS, pp. 9-10), I’ll start by ruling out the narrow scope 
formulations. We can rule out these formulations on the basis that, with the exception 
                                                          
150 Thanks to Martin Montminy for pointing this out to me. 
151 Indeed, some epistemologists have suggested that the connection between 
categorical belief and degree of belief is that categorical belief in a claim is certainty 
(maximal degree of belief) that the claim is true. See Christensen (2004, Ch. 2) for 
discussion. 
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of attitudes toward logical truths and falsehoods, logic alone doesn’t recommend or 
require adopting or avoiding particular attitudes. Rather, it tells you to maintain 
coherence among your attitudes. Consider the Co+ formulation of the transitivity norm. 
Co+ If one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, 
then one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶.  
 
If one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then the 
Co+ form says that one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as one is in 𝐶, 
regardless of whether or not one’s comparisons of 𝐴 and 𝐵 and 𝐵 and 𝐶 are well-
founded. In some cases, as I explain above, one should revise these comparisons rather 
than be at least as confident in 𝐴 as one is in 𝐶.  
What about norms with multiple normative operators—the B formulations? 
Consider the Bo+ form of the transitivity norm. 
Bo+ If one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as 
confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as 
in 𝐶. 
As I explain above, principles like this merely extend normative pressure that one is 
already under. One is obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as one is in 𝐶, if one is 
also obligated to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as one is in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 
𝐵 as one is in 𝐶. However, if one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as 
confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, but one is not obligated to be, then the norm is silent. As 
MacFarlane (MS, p. 12) points out, we want norms that allow us to make negative 
appraisals of agents who have attitudes they shouldn’t; we don’t just want to be able to 
extend normative pressure agents are already under. 
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The wide scope formulation, Wo+, doesn’t suffer from these flaws.  
Wo+ One is obligated to see to it that if one is least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at 
least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as one is in 
𝐶. 
If one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then the 
norm applies whether or not one ought to hold those comparisons. It tells one to revise 
one’s comparisons or embrace the consequence that one is obligated to be at least as 
confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶. The main short-coming of wide scope formulations is that they 
don’t give us determinate guidance about which attitudes to hold. However, we 
shouldn’t expect coherence norms to provide such guidance on their own in most cases. 
So, hereafter, I will focus on the wide scope formulations. 
5.3.2 Which Operator? 
Now that I’ve ruled out the narrow scope C and B formulations in favor of wide scope 
W formulations, I’ll argue that we should favor evaluative g formulations rather than 
deontic o and p formulations and reasons r formulations. First I’ll consider the deontic 
norms, beginning with permissions. 
I find two main problems with permission formulations. First, as MacFarlane (2004, 
p. 10) points out, permission formulations do not constrain our degrees of belief. We 
want probabilist norms that tell us what our degrees of belief should be like. So, 
permissions alone are not suitable for the formulation of our probabilist norms. 
Second, coherence considerations alone cannot grant permissions about how to 
invest our confidence. We must also consult our evidence and, perhaps, other mitigating 
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factors, like our limited cognitive abilities. Consider the Wp+ form of the tautological 
certainty norm. 
Wp+ If ⊨ 𝐴, then one is permitted to be certain of 𝐴. 
As I explain above, permissions like this are strict. This norm tells us that certainty in a 
tautology is always permissible regardless of whatever else may be the case. However, 
as I note above, there may be cases in which one’s evidence, including perhaps 
knowledge of one’s own cognitive limitations, might make it impermissible for one to 
be certain of some tautologies. If the tautology in question is extremely complex, it’s 
hard to imagine a scenario in which complete certainty in it is permissible. 
Whereas permission formulations don’t constrain our degrees of belief enough on 
their own, obligation formulations are often—if not always—too demanding. Consider 
again the Wo+ formulation of the tautological certainty norm. 
Wo+ If ⊨ 𝐴, one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
This norm requires logical omniscience, which is far beyond the abilities of humans. 
Thus, it fails to satisfy the “ought”-implies-“can” constraint on obligations. To make it 
less demanding, we could add a knowledge condition as in the Wo+k formulation, or an 
attitude condition as in the Wo+a formulation.  
Wo+k If one knows that ⊨ 𝐴, one is obligated to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wo+a If ⊨ 𝐴, then one is obligated to see to it that, if one has a degree of belief in  
𝐴, one is certain of it. 
Both formulations are considerably less demanding than the original Wo+ formulation. 
The Wo+k form imposes an obligation for certainty conditional on one’s logical 
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knowledge. However, depending on the connections between knowledge, belief, and 
degree of belief, the Wo+k form could be trivial, as I noted above. The Wo+a formulation 
requires logical infallibility rather than logical omniscience. It weakens the requirement 
significantly without invoking the difficult concept of knowledge. However, even this 
weaker demand is perhaps still too strong for humans. We couldn’t reasonably expect 
to be certain of all of the logical truths we have attitudes towards. In another sense, 
however, the addition of knowledge and attitude conditions may weaken the demands 
of the norm too much. Such formulations permit what MacFarlane calls “logical 
obtuseness” (MS, p. 12). For there may be simple tautologies that one is obligated to be 
certain of regardless of whether one knows them as such or whether one has degrees 
of belief towards them. 
Even if these formulations are sufficiently weak to pass the “ought”-implies-“can” 
test without swinging too far in the other direction to permit logical obtuseness, my 
second objection to permission formulations applies equally to obligation formulations. 
Namely, coherence considerations alone cannot impose obligations about how we 
should invest our confidence. Considerations of evidence and our practical and cognitive 
limitations must also be taken into account.152 Once again, I have in mind cases in which 
an agent is uncertain in a complex tautology. Just as these cases seem to show that it is 
                                                          
152 I assume here that there cannot be conflicting epistemic obligations—tragic 
scenarios in which, say, separate evidential and coherence obligations make 
incompatible demands. MacFarlane questions this assumption (MS, p. 14).  
204 
 
not always permissible to be certain of some tautologies, they also show that we are not 
always obligated to be certain of tautologies.  
What about reasons formulations? Because they are slack, reasons formulations do 
not fall afoul of demandingness concerns like obligation formulations. Consider the Wr+ 
form of the tautological certainty norm. 
Wr+ If ⊨ 𝐴, one has reason to be certain of 𝐴. 
One can satisfy this norm even if one is uncertain of some tautologies, provided that 
one has overriding reasons to be uncertain. This norm doesn’t demand logical 
omniscience; it merely recommends it. 
As Broome (1999, p. 404) and MacFarlane (MS, p. 12) point out, however, this 
advantage of reasons formulations is also their main flaw.  For we cannot appeal to slack 
reasons norms in order to account for the appearance that in some cases, agents’ 
degrees of belief violate strict constraints. For example, imagine that I know that 𝐴 is a 
tautology, but I am certain that it is false. In this scenario, something has gone very 
wrong with my degree of belief in 𝐴. However, on its own, the Wr+ formulation of the 
tautological certainty norm cannot indict my certainty that 𝐴 is false. 
Perhaps this is how it should be. I criticized the deontic formulations on the basis 
that obligations and permissions do not depend on coherence considerations alone, but 
also on our evidence and limitations. So, perhaps it is an advantage of reasons 
formulations that they do not overstate the normative contribution of coherence 
concerns by stating strict constraints. Ultimately, I think that reasons formulations 
provide a useful language in which to describe how different epistemic considerations—
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coherence, evidence, limitations, etc.—interact in all-things-considered normative 
appraisals of our doxastic attitudes. However, for the purposes of probabilism, we want 
to be able to provide strict appraisals of the coherence of agents’ degrees of belief. Since 
the reasons operator is slack, reasons formulations are not best suited toward this 
purpose. 
5.3.3 Which Evaluative Formulation? 
This leaves us with the wide scope evaluative formulations, the Wg formulations. 
Ultimately, I think we want a hierarchy of higher and lower standards that allow us to 
make fine-grained evaluations of the coherence of agents’ degrees of belief. Within this 
evaluative hierarchy, the Wg+ norms provide the stricter standard, whereas the Wg+a 
norms provide a standard closer to the abilities of real agents like us. Both standards 
play important roles, as we will now see. 
All of the Wg formulations avoid the problems of the obligation, permission, and 
reason formulations. As I explain above, the evaluative norms are not constrained by 
our abilities in the same way obligations are. So, they are not subject to the same kinds 
of demandingness concerns as the obligation formulations. Furthermore, evaluative 
norms characterize what is good relative to some perspective or set of values. So, we 
can use evaluative norms to characterize what is good in the way of degree of belief 
from the perspective of coherence without reference to considerations of evidence and 
cognitive limitations. So, while coherence considerations do not impose obligations and 
permissions on their own, they do support univocal evaluations. Additionally, the 
goodness operator is strict (relative to some set of values). So, unlike the reasons 
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formulations, evaluative norms allow us to make strict appraisals of agents’ degrees of 
belief from the perspective of coherence. 
Which of the wide scope evaluative formulations is best? As I explain above, the 
negative polarity formulations are equivalent to the attitude conditional formulations 
except in the case of certainty norms, like the tautological certainty norm. In these cases, 
the positive and negative polarity formulations are equivalent, whereas the attitude 
conditional norms succeed in weakening the demands of the norm. Compare the Wg+, 
Wg-, and Wg+a forms of the tautological certainty norm.  
Wg+ If ⊨ 𝐴, it is good for one to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wg- If ⊨ 𝐴, it is good for one not to be uncertain of 𝐴. 
Wg+a If ⊨ 𝐴, it is good for one to see to it that, if one has a degree of belief in 𝐴, 
one is certain of it. 
Hereafter, I will set aside the negative polarity formulations in favor of the attitude 
conditional formulations, which better capture the spirit of the notion of coherent 
extendability. 
Adding knowledge conditions to our norms lowers the standards these norms set 
when they are conditional on particular logical facts, like the tautological certainty and 
entailment norms.  
Wg+ If ⊨ 𝐴, it is good for one to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wg+k If one knows that ⊨ 𝐴, it is good for one to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wg+ If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, it is good for one to be at least as confident in 𝐵 as one is in 𝐴. 
Wg+k If one knows that 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, it is good for one to be at least as confident in 𝐵 as 
one is in 𝐴. 
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While evaluative norms are not subject to “ought”-implies-“can” constraints like 
obligations, it still may be useful to have probabilist norms that specify lower standards. 
After all, the Wg+ forms of the tautological certainty and entailment norms set very high 
standards.  
However, the Wg+k formulations are not suitable as the sole probabilist norm 
formulations for two main reasons. First, adding knowledge conditions to our norms 
restricts their applicability too much. Probabilism is intended to characterize a general 
notion of coherence for degrees of belief—not a notion of coherence-given-logical-
knowledge. Furthermore, the knowledge conditional formulations permit a kind of 
logical obtuseness, as I explain above. If 𝐴 is a tautology, but one doesn’t know it as 
such, the Wg+k form of the tautological certainty norm doesn’t provide any constraints 
on one’s degree of belief in 𝐴. Second, the analysis of knowledge is notoriously 
controversial, and the connections between knowledge, categorical belief, and degree 
of belief are unclear. So, it would likely be counterproductive to attempt to characterize 
degree of belief coherence in terms of logical knowledge. For these reasons, I will also 
set aside the knowledge conditional formulations.  
That leaves us with either the Wg+ or the Wg+a formulations. The main difference 
between these formulations is the demandingness of the evaluative standards they set. 
The Wg+ forms set a very high evaluative standard of what I’ll call “full-blown” 
coherence. Together, they recommend that one should have an extremely richly 
structured, opinionated, logically omniscient degree of belief set. Thus, they 
characterize a coherence ideal that is beyond the reach of real human agents. The Wg+a 
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norms, on the other hand, set a less-demanding standard of what I call “coherent 
extendability.” They don’t require one to adopt any particular additional degrees of 
belief. Rather, they merely impose coherence on the degrees of belief one already has. 
If it were psychologically possible, one could satisfy these norms by having no degrees 
of belief at all. Together, the Wg+a norms make more precise the notion of extendability 
to probabilistic coherence mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3.153 
Compare, for example, the Wg+ and Wg+a formulations of the tautological certainty 
and transitivity norms. 
Wg+ If ⊨ 𝐴, it is good for one to be certain of 𝐴. 
Wg+a If ⊨ 𝐴, it is good for one to see to it that, if one has a degree of belief 
in 𝐴, one is certain of it. 
Wg+ It is good for one to see to it that if one is at least as confident in 𝐴 
as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is at least as 
confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶. 
Wg+a It is good for one to see to it that if one is at least as confident in 𝐴 
as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then, if one compares 
𝐴 and 𝐶, one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶. 
Notice, as I mention above, that the Wg+ formulations entail the Wg+a formulations. 
The Wg+ tautological certainty norm sets the high standard of logical omniscience. It 
tells one to adopt the attitude of certainty in every logical truth. The Wg+a form, on the 
other hand, sets the lower—but still quite high—standard of logical infallibility. It tells 
                                                          
153 Note that the extendability form of the probabilist norm mentioned in Chs. 2 & 3 is 
not quite the same as Hawthorne’s (2009) notion of proper extendability described in 
Ch. 4. I’ll say more about this connection below in §5.4. 
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one to be certain of every tautology toward which one has an attitude: never be 
uncertain in any tautology that you consider—no mistakes!  
The Wg+ transitivity norm recommends that if one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 
𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one should be at least as confident in 𝐴 as 
in 𝐶 or one should revise one’s comparisons of 𝐴 and 𝐵 or 𝐵 and 𝐶. It requires one to 
extend one’s degree of belief set to full-blown coherence (or revise one’s current 
attitudes). The Wg+a form, on the other hand, doesn’t recommend that one should be 
at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶 (or revise) unless one compares 𝐴 and 𝐶. Admittedly, it 
would be a bit strange to compare 𝐴 and 𝐵 and 𝐵 and 𝐶 but not 𝐴 and 𝐶, but it is in 
principle possible. So, again, the attitude conditional form of the norm doesn’t tell one 
to adopt new attitudes; it simply imposes coherence on the attitudes one already has. 
Ultimately the choice between these formulations comes down to the question of 
whether we want to set the high standard of full-blown coherence, or the somewhat 
lower standard of coherent extendability. There are a couple of reasons to be wary of 
setting the higher standard. First, while the Wg+ norms aren’t constrained by “ought”-
implies-“can” considerations, there’s another sense in which the standard of full-blown 
coherence is too demanding. If we adopt the Wg+ norms as our lone set of probabilist 
norms, they won’t allow us to make very fine-grained, informative assessments of 
limited agents like ourselves. For, as I’ve noted above, humans cannot achieve full-
blown coherence. So, for example, if you managed to achieve logical infallibility, the 
Wg+ tautological certainty norm would be silent on your remarkable achievement. It 
would simply indicate that your degree of belief set falls short of ideal coherence. So, 
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we might be wary of adopting the Wg+ norms in favor of less demanding standards that 
apply better to limited agents like ourselves. 
Second, we might be wary of adopting the Wg+ formulations because we might 
doubt the value of full-blown coherence over and above the standard of coherent 
extendability. In particular, we might doubt that being logically omniscient is more 
valuable than being logically infallible. And we might doubt the value of the extremely 
rich form of opinionation that the Wg+ norms require: one should compare every claim 
in the logical closure of one’s ken, and one’s comparisons should be extremely fine-
grained. So, in general, we might doubt the value of having the extremely rich degree of 
belief set required by full-blown coherence. Why should one have such a rich doxastic 
state unless one is prompted to do so by one’s practical circumstances? Why should one 
be certain of extremely complex tautologies unless they impinge on one’s practical life 
somehow? These worries are versions of the cognitive clutter objections described in 
Chapter 3. 
I think that if we recall the purposes of probabilism I identified in Chapter 4, we can 
assuage these concerns. I identified three main purposes of probabilism: to characterize 
a notion of coherence for degrees of belief, to formulate coherence norms for degrees 
of belief, and to apply these norms to generate verdicts about the degrees of belief of 
real agents in particular cases. I think the aims of characterizing a notion of coherence 
for degrees of belief and formulating norms that codify this notion have priority. We can 
then apply these norms to generate verdicts about particular cases. We can also then 
attempt to reconcile coherence considerations with other relevant considerations like 
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evidential norms and facts about our practical and cognitive limitations. I contend that 
the first step in in this project is to characterize a coherence ideal. 
I grant that we want to characterize a notion of coherence that applies to limited 
agents like us. Thus, I think that we should not throw out the Wg+a norms. After all, 
since the Wg+ norms entail them, we get them for free. And I do think that we should 
attempt to formulate additional less demanding evaluative standards that are within 
closer reach of real agents, which the Wg+a norms provide. But even the lower standard 
of coherent extendability is likely beyond the reach of real humans. Ultimately, I think 
we want a hierarchy of higher and lower standards that allow us to make fine-grained 
evaluations of the coherence of agents’ degrees of belief. I think the first step in 
characterizing this hierarchy, however, is the specification of the highest coherence 
ideal, the Wg+ norms (without attitude conditions). Even if specifying this ideal doesn’t 
pave the way for the formulation of lower coherence standards, the ideal still has an 
important normative role to play, as Hawthorne (2009, p. 57-58) points out. For even if 
we succeed in characterizing lower coherence standards without reference to the ideal, 
we will still want to know how far from the ideal these standards are. So, henceforth I’ll 
focus on this highest standard, the simple Wg+ norms. 
I also grant that probabilists want to characterize other kinds of degree of belief 
norms—deontic norms, hypological norms,154 and prescriptions that allow us to make 
                                                          
154 Hypological norms characterize which doxastic states are praiseworthy and 
blameworthy. The term “hypological” is due to Zimmerman (2002). See also Zimmerman 
(2006). 
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other kinds of normative appraisals of agents’ degrees of belief in addition to 
evaluations of goodness and badness. And I think that probabilists want to characterize 
degree of belief norms from a wider perspective, encompassing additional 
considerations like evidential norms and facts about our practical and cognitive 
limitations. That is, I grant that probabilists want to characterize a wider notion of 
degree of belief rationality. I see this wider project as the project of subjective 
Bayesianism in general. However, I think that before we can tackle this more ambitious 
project, we need to engage in the more narrowly circumscribed project of spelling out 
probabilism’s details, characterizing the notion of ideal coherence for degrees of belief, 
and then specifying lower standards more applicable to real agents. Then we can try to 
reconcile this ideal with other considerations, and incorporate probabilism into a wider 
theory of degree of belief rationality and epistemology generally. 
Thus, I think we should take the cognitive clutter concerns mentioned above 
seriously. But I think these concerns arise from viewing probabilism as a complete 
(synchronic) theory of degree of belief rationality in and of itself. I, on the other hand, 
think that probabilism is better viewed as an account of the evaluative coherence ideal 
for degrees of belief. When we attempt to incorporate probabilism into a wider theory 
of degree of belief rationality, we will need to reconcile this ideal with considerations 
about evidence, and cognitive and practical limitations, including clutter concerns. 
5.4 The Wg+ Norms & the Ideal of Full-blown Coherence 
Now that I’ve argued for the importance of the strong (non-attitude-conditional) 
Wg+ norm formulations, I want to present in more detail the notion of full-blown 
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coherence that they codify. So, in this section, I will present the Wg+ translations of 
CCF’s axioms into norms. I will also present a couple of normative translations of more 
intuitive theorems. Finally, I will comment on the overall coherence standard that these 
norms set, and place it in contrast to other coherence standards and the wider theory 
of degree of belief rationality.  
5.4.1 The Wg+ Norms 
Without further ado, here are the Wg+ translations of CCF’s axioms into norms.  
Certainty-
Confidence-
Connection 
It is good for one to see to it that one is certain that 𝐴 if and only 
if one is at least as confident that 𝐴 as that (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴).   
Non-triviality It’s good for one to be more confident in (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) than ¬(𝐴 ∨
¬𝐴). 
Minimality It’s good for one to be at least as confident in any claim 𝐵 as one 
is in ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). 
Completeness It’s good for one to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 or at least 
as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐴. 
Transitivity It’s good for one to see to it that if one is least as confident in 𝐴 
as in 𝐵 and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is at least 
as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶. 
Right Equivalence It’s good for one to see to it that if one is certain that 𝐶 and 𝐷 
are materially equivalent and one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as 
in 𝐶, then one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐷. 
Left Equivalence It’s good for one to see to it that if one is certain that 𝐶 and 𝐷 
are materially equivalent and one is at least as confident in 𝐶 as 
in 𝐵, then one is at least as in 𝐷 as in 𝐵. 
Subtractivity It’s good for one to see to it that if one is certain that some claim 
𝐸 is incompatible with 𝐴 and 𝐵 respectively and one is at least 
as confident in 𝐴-or-𝐸 as in 𝐵-or-𝐸, then one is at least as 
confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵.  
Additivity It’s good for one to see to it that if one is at least as confident in 
𝐴 as in 𝐵, then if one is certain that 𝐺 is incompatible with 𝐴 and 
𝐵 respectively, then one is at least as confident that 𝐴-or-𝐺 as 
that 𝐵-or-𝐺. 
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Tautological 
Certainty 
If ⊨ 𝐴, it’s good for one to be certain of 𝐴. 
Separating  
Equi-plausible 
Partitions 
It’s good for one to see to it that if one is more confident in 𝐴 
than 𝐵, then there is an equiplausible partition {𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛} such 
that for each claim, 𝑆𝑘, in this partition, one is more confident in 
𝐴 than in the disjunction 𝐵-or-𝑆𝑘. 
At the risk of being tedious, I will walk through the norms and some of their intuitive 
consequences, to explain the kind of coherence constraint each norm imposes. Then I 
will call attention to some of the features of the general standard of full-blown 
coherence that they jointly impose, and compare it to other coherence standards we 
might also be interested in characterizing. 
5.4.1.0 Certainty-Confidence-Connection 
As its name indicates, the certainty-confidence-connection norm establishes a 
normative connection between certainty and confidence comparisons. 
Certainty- 
Confidence-
Connection 
It is good for one to see to it that one is certain that 𝐴 if and 
only if one is at least as confident that 𝐴 as that (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴).   
In particular, it says that it is good for one to see to it that, if one is certain of a claim 𝐴, 
then one is at least as confident that 𝐴 as that the tautology (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) is true, and if one 
is at least as confident that 𝐴 as that (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴), then one is certain that 𝐴. While the 
tautological certainty norm is most clearly a logical omniscience requirement among 
CCF’s norms, the certainty-confidence-connection norm is also a kind of logical 
omniscience requirement. For it ties certainty to the notion of tautology. On its own, 
the certainty-confidence-connection norm ties certainty to the simple tautologous form 
(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). The tautological certainty norm and the other norms extend this connection 
to apply to all tautologies. 
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5.4.1.1 Non-triviality 
When you compare CCF’s axioms with the norms listed in the preceding section, 
you’ll notice that the formulation of the non-triviality norm is not a direct Wg+ 
translation of the non-triviality axiom.  
Non-triviality Axiom ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) ⋡ (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) 
Non-triviality Norm 
(Wg+) 
It’s good for one to see to it that one is more confident in 
(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) than ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). 
This is because the non-triviality axiom is stated with negative polarity: it says that 
sentences of the simple contradictory form, ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴), are never ranked as high or 
higher than sentences of the simple tautologous form (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). This axiom is stated 
with negative polarity because CCF’s axioms are all stated in terms of the weak 
comparative confidence relation, ≽. However, in conjunction with the minimality axiom  
and the definition of ≻ in terms of ≽, the non-triviality axiom entails what I’ll call the 
“strict non-triviality theorem.” 
 Strict Non-triviality Theorem (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) ≻ ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) 
The non-triviality norm above is a Wg+ translation of this theorem. In conjunction with 
the other norms, this non-triviality norm tells one to be strictly more confident of each 
tautology than each contradiction.   
Like the certainty-confidence-connection norm, the non-triviality norm is also a kind 
of logical omniscience requirement. It tells one to be strictly more confident in all 
tautologies of the simple form, (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴), than all contradictions of the simple form, 
 ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). Thus, all on its own, it requires one to have attitudes towards a huge set of 
tautologies. As we will see, the other norms add to the demandingness of probabilism’s 
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logical omniscience requirement, but, on its own, the non-triviality axiom already sets a 
standard that may be beyond the reach of real agents. After all, even though the 
tautologous form, (𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴), and the contradictory form, ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴), have a simple 
basic logical forms, claims of these forms could be extremely complex—too complex for 
real agents to decipher given our practical and cognitive limitations. So, while the Wg+ 
non-triviality norm sets a plausible evaluative coherence ideal, we would want a less 
demanding norm to apply to real agents. However, the non-triviality axiom can be 
weakened without loss to CCF. One can replace it with an axiom that simply says this, 
for some specific simple atomic sentence 𝐸: ¬(𝐸 ∨ ¬𝐸) ⋡ (𝐸 ∨ ¬𝐸). From this axiom, 
together with the other axioms, one can prove the more general version. Thus, the 
relevant norm can be stated as follows, using some specific atomic sentence 𝐸: 
It’s good for one to be more confident in (𝐸 ∨ ¬𝐸) than ¬(𝐸 ∨ ¬𝐸). 
Such a norm would be more appropriate for the purposes of developing a more real-
agent-friendly evaluative standard.  
5.4.1.2 Minimality 
The minimality norm says exactly what it seems to. 
Minimality It’s good for one to be at least as confident in any claim 𝐵 as one is in 
¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). 
It’s good for one to be at least as confident of each claim 𝐵 as one is in every claim of 
the simple contradictory form ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). It’s worth pointing out that some of the 
claims that take the simple contradictory form ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴) are extremely complex. So, 
this norm is more demanding than it may seem at first glance. Furthermore, in 
conjunction with the other norms, it entails the more general and even more demanding 
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norm that one should be at least as confident in every claim as one is in each 
contradiction. Thus, the minimality norm also contributes to probabilism’s logical 
omniscience requirement. Similarly, it also contributes to the probabilist opinionation 
requirement, for it requires comparisons between every claim and claims that take the 
simple contradictory form, ¬(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). And, like the non-triviality norm, while the 
minimality norm sets a plausible ideal coherence standard, it may be beyond the reach 
of real agents. 
5.4.1.3 Completeness 
The completeness norm says that it’s good for one to have some confidence 
comparison for each pair of claims. 
Completeness It’s good for one to be at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 or at least as 
confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐴. 
Thus, it recommends a very strong form of opinionation. It doesn’t merely recommend 
that one have some attitude toward each claim—that is, that each claim shows up 
somewhere in one’s confidence ordering. Rather, it recommends that one be able to 
compare each claim with every other. For example, it’s good for you (after reading this 
sentence, perhaps) to have a determinate confidence comparison between the claim 
that the OU Women’s Gymnastics team will win the 2016 NCAA National Championship 
and the claim that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true. Like each of the other norms 
considered so far, the completeness norm sets a standard that real agents can’t live up 
to due to both practical and cognitive limitations, and due to the sometimes incomplete, 
imprecise, or equivocal nature of our evidence.  
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While CCF’s high normative standard of full-blown coherence demands 
completeness, the weaker standard of coherent extendability demands mere reflexivity 
and completability. So, again, for the purpose of characterizing a more real-agent-
friendly coherence standard, full-blown coherence may be too demanding, and the 
standard of coherent extendability may be more appropriate. 
5.4.1.4 Transitivity 
Since I have used the transitivity norm as an example throughout §§5.2-5.3, I hope 
that its meaning is pretty clear by now.  
Transitivity It’s good for one to see to it that if one is least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 
and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, then one is at least as confident in 
𝐴 as in 𝐶. 
However, I’ll repeat that the Wg+ formulation of the norm tells us that if one is at least 
as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵, and at least as confident in 𝐵 as in 𝐶, it’s good for one to be at 
least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶 or to revise one’s comparisons of 𝐴 and 𝐵, and 𝐵 and 𝐶. 
This norm seems eminently plausible as a coherence ideal. There may be cases155 in 
which our evidence or our practical or cognitive limitations seem to permit us to violate 
the transitivity norm, but from a perspective of coherence alone, it seems hard to deny. 
5.4.1.5 Equivalence 
The equivalence norms say that it’s good for one to see to it that if one is certain 
that two claims are materially equivalent, then all of one’s confidence comparisons that 
include them agree. 
                                                          
155 For some putative examples, see Fishburn (1986, p. 6). 
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Right 
Equivalence 
It’s good for one to see to it that if one is certain that 𝐶 and 𝐷 are 
materially equivalent and one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐶, then 
one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐷. 
Left 
Equivalence 
It’s good for one to see to it that if one is certain that 𝐶 and 𝐷 are 
materially equivalent and one is at least as confident in 𝐶 as in 𝐵, then 
one is at least as in 𝐷 as in 𝐵. 
 So, for example, the equivalence norms say together that it’s good for you to see to it 
that if you are certain that 𝐶 and 𝐷 are materially equivalent, then you are equally 
confident in them. The equivalence norms make good sense as coherence ideals, though 
they may be hard for real agents to satisfy in combination with the strong opinionation 
requirements imposed by the other norms. 
5.1.4.6 Additivity & Subtractivity 
Like the equivalence norms, the subtractivity and additivity norms are somewhat 
complicated, but they mean just what they say. 
Subtractivity It’s good for one to see to it that if one is certain that some claim 𝐸 is 
incompatible with 𝐴 and with 𝐵, respectively, and one is at least as 
confident in 𝐴-or-𝐸 as one is in 𝐵-or-𝐸, then one is at least as confident 
in 𝐴 as in 𝐵.  
Additivity It’s good for one to see to it that if one is at least as confident in 𝐴 as 
in 𝐵, then if one is certain that 𝐺 is incompatible with 𝐴 and 𝐵 
respectively, then one is at least as confident that 𝐴-or-𝐺 as that 𝐵-or-
𝐺. 
Together, they say that the addition or subtraction of (subjectively) incompatible 
disjuncts should not make a difference in confidence comparisons from a perspective of 
coherence. So, if you’re certain that 𝐸 is incompatible with 𝐴 and 𝐵 respectively, then 
it’s good for you to see to it that you revise these certainties or you are at least as 
confident in 𝐴 as in 𝐵 if and only if you are at least as confident in 𝐴-or-𝐸 as in 𝐵-or-𝐸. 
While these norms seem plausible as characterizations of the coherence ideal, there is 
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evidence that real agents systematically violate them in the face of incomplete evidence 
in the Ellsberg paradox.156  
5.4.1.7 Tautological Certainty 
The Wg+ form of the tautological certainty norm should be quite familiar now.  
Tautological Certainty If ⊨ 𝐴, it’s good for one to be certain of 𝐴. 
It makes one of the most significant contributions to probabilism’s logical omniscience 
requirement. As we’ve seen, real agents can’t satisfy the logical omniscience 
requirement, but nonetheless, the tautological certainty norm and the other 
contributors to the requirement play an important role in providing the coherence 
scaffolding of the full-blown coherence ideal.  
5.4.1.8 Separating Equi-plausible Partitions 
The separating equi-plausible partitions norm imposes a fineness of grain on one’s 
confidence comparisons. 
Separating  
Equi-plausible 
Partitions 
It’s good for one to see to it that if one is more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵, 
then there is an equi-plausible partition {𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛} such that for each 
claim, 𝑆𝑘, in this partition, one is more confident in 𝐴 than in the 
disjunction 𝐵-or-𝑆𝑘. 
It says that it’s good for one to see to it that whenever one is strictly more confident in 
one claim 𝐴 than another claim 𝐵, there is some equiplausible partition {𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛}—a 
(large) set of mutually incompatible, jointly exhaustive claims in all of which one is 
equally confident—such that one is more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵 or 𝑆𝑘. Thus, if you’re 
                                                          
156 See Ellsberg (1961) for the Ellsberg Paradox and see Fishburn (1986) for an 
interpretation of the results as a counterexample to the additivity and subtractivity 
norms. 
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strictly more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵, the norm tells you to revise this comparison, or it 
tells you that your confidence structure should have two features. First, your confidence 
structure should include equi-plausible partitions. Second, the claims within these 
partitions should separate 𝐴 and 𝐵 in the sense that you should be more confident in 𝐴 
than 𝐵-or-𝑆𝑘 and more confident in 𝐵-or-𝑆𝑘 than 𝐵. If you satisfy this norm, in effect, 
whenever you’re strictly more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵, there’s a degree—a degree as 
precise as the equi-plausible partition is large, and as small as your confidence in each 
claim in the partition—to which you are more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵.  
Real agents may not satisfy this norm both because of their practical and cognitive 
limitations, and because their evidence may preclude the precision it requires. They may 
not have equi-plausible partitions that give their degree of belief set enough structure 
to make fine-grained comparisons. Or, even if they do have equi-plausible partitions, 
they may find it difficult to satisfy the condition for all claims in combination with the 
completeness norm. While real agents won’t satisfy the norm, it nonetheless 
characterizes a coherence ideal. An ideally coherent degree of belief set has a fine-
grained structure. 
For the purposes of characterizing the more real-agent-friendly coherence standard 
of coherent extendability, we could replace the separating equi-plausible partitions 
norm with what we might call the “proper extendability norm.” 
Proper 
Extendability 
It’s good for one to see to it that, in principle, one’s confidence 
comparisons can be extended so as to: (i) definitely compare each 
pair of claims (i.e., leave no pair of claims confidence-incomparable); 
and (ii) (to see to it that) if one is more confident in 𝐴 than 𝐵, then 
(it’s possible, in principle, that) one can incorporate into one’s 
comparisons an equi-plausible partition (e.g. a fair lottery of size n) 
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consisting of claims {𝑆1, … , 𝑆𝑛} such that for each claim, 𝑆𝑘, in this 
partition, one is more confident in 𝐴 than in the disjunction 𝐵 or 𝑆𝑘. 
Rather than recommending that agents actually have complete confidence comparisons 
and separating equi-plausible partitions, the proper extendability norm merely 
recommends that agents’ degrees of belief should be coherently augmentable with 
additional attitudes. 
5.4.1.9 The Entailment Norm & Other Intuitive Norms 
In addition to the norms generated by translating the axioms, there are infinitely 
many additional norms generated by translating the theorems that follow from the 
axioms. I’ve mentioned some of them informally above, but I want to call attention once 
more to the entailment norm in particular. 
Entailment 
Norm 
If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then it’s good for one to be at least as confident in 𝐵 as 
in 𝐴.  
The entailment norm is very straightforward and intuitive. It extends the logical 
omniscience requirement imposed by the non-triviality, minimality, and tautological 
certainty norms and it is often very intuitive to apply to real cases.  
I should note that it is well-documented that humans regularly violate this norm. 
Kahneman & Tversky’s (1983) conjunction fallacy is one such common example. 
However, the fact that humans systematically violate the entailment norm doesn’t 
undermine its status as a coherence ideal. 
5.4.2 Full-blown Coherence 
Together, the Wg+ norms set a very high standard of coherence. According to this 
ideal, a fully coherent degree of belief set is very richly structured, opinionated, and 
logically omniscient. As we’ve seen, the logical omniscience requirement extends far 
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beyond mere certainty in all tautologies. It also consists of being strictly more confident 
in all tautologies than all contradictions, equally confident in logically equivalent claims, 
at least as confident in all claims as in the claims that entail them, and so on. Attitudes 
toward logical truths and claims that bear entailment relations thus provide the 
scaffolding of ideally coherent degree of belief sets.  The extent of the opinionation of 
an ideally coherent degree of belief set is not just that the ideally coherent agent has 
some degree of belief in each claim.  Additionally, this opinionation also consists in 
having a determinate confidence comparison for every pair of claims, including claims 
that concern vastly disparate matters. Indeed, not only does the ideally coherent agent 
have such comparisons, but they are extremely fine-grained. So, not only can the ideally 
coherent agent compare all claims, but they can compare them with an arbitrarily fine 
degree of precision.  
Above, I have pointed out various ways that real agents can’t live up to this 
coherence ideal. Due to our practical and cognitive limitations, we can’t have so many 
attitudes, we can’t be expected to recognize all tautologies and entailment relations as 
such, etc. I have also pointed out various ways that it may be inappropriate for us to 
attempt to satisfy this ideal given our evidential, practical, and cognitive limitations. For 
all of these reasons, the Wg+ norms and the standard of full-blown coherence that they 
codify may not be especially useful in the appraisal and instruction of real human agents. 
However, as I explained in §5.3, this should not be seen as a mark against the Wg+ norms 
or the value of full-blown coherence ideal. Instead, it should be viewed as reason to 
additionally articulate lower coherence standards, which are less demanding and which 
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may be more easily reconciled with considerations about our evidential, practical, and 
cognitive limitations. The Wg+a norms, along with the proper extendability norm, are 
good places to start articulating such lower, real-agent-friendly standards. 
5.5 Justifying the Norms 
In the previous section, my primary aim was to present the Wg+ norms and to 
characterize the ideal of full-blown coherence that they encode. However, I also tried to 
show how each norm provides a reasonable coherence constraint on degrees of belief, 
and I explained how apparent counterexamples to these norms weigh coherence 
considerations against considerations of evidence and limitations. Thus, these apparent 
counterexamples do not undermine the norms as statements of what is good in the way 
of confidence from a perspective of coherence alone. In this sense, I’ve provided some 
justification for the Wg+ norms and CCF, generally.   
However, as we saw in Chapter 2, there is a long tradition among probabilists of 
providing “Arguments for Probabilism” of a few well-known kinds—the Dutch book 
arguments, representation theorem arguments, and epistemic utility arguments. I 
haven’t yet committed to one of these arguments to justify probabilism. So, you might 
be wondering, which kind of argument I will endorse. Will I opt for a version of one of 
the standard arguments, or will I provide some new kind of justification? The answer is 
that I’m not going to provide a traditional justification of probabilism, and I’m also not 
going to venture to provide some completely new kind of argument either. In this 
section, I’ll explain why I don’t endorse any of the standard justifications for probabilist 
norms, but why I also think it is nonetheless reasonable to be committed to probabilism 
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given the intuitiveness of its norms and consequences, and its successes in illuminating 
problems in epistemology, confirmation theory, and decision theory. 
Before I explain why I don’t endorse any of the traditional justifications for 
probabilism, I want to make a few comments about the phenomenon of Arguments for 
Probabilism. For there’s something odd about these arguments. Epistemologists don’t 
usually justify their analyses and norms with arguments quite like the traditional 
arguments for probabilism. Usually, I think, epistemologists try to do what I’ve done 
above, motivate the norm, analysis, or principle in question and defend it against 
counterexamples.  
So, why do probabilists feel compelled to offer these grand arguments for their 
norms? I think there are a few reasons. First, probabilism grew out of the degree of 
belief analysis of probability. So, early probabilists like Ramsey and de Finetti gave a lot 
of attention to the question of why degrees of belief should conform to the probability 
axioms. The traditional arguments for probabilism are intended to demonstrate the 
close connection between probability and degree of belief. Second, as I’ve noted many 
times, probabilism’s details are usually left unstated, so the normative connections 
between the probability axioms and degrees of belief can be a little unclear. So, as I 
explained in Chapter 2, the arguments for probabilism serve as much to fill in 
probabilism’s details as they do to justify it. They serve to characterize degrees of belief, 
and they help flesh out what it means for degrees of belief to conform to the probability 
axioms. 
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Before I explain the particular reasons why I reject each of the major arguments as 
justifications for probabilism, I want to explain generally why I won’t undertake the 
project of giving a capital “A” Argument for Probabilism in this dissertation. First, as I 
explained in Chapter 2 and again in Chapter 4, I think that we can get a firm handle on 
the notion degree of belief without providing an operational definition, analysis, or 
explication of it. So, I’ve assumed primitivism about degree of belief as a working 
assumption. I welcome a successful analysis or explication, but, following Eriksson & 
Hájek (2007), I don’t think that any of the current options is completely successful. So, I 
don’t think the traditional arguments for probabilism are called for in order to analyze 
and legitimatize degree of belief. Likewise, I think we can characterize a notion of degree 
of belief coherence without providing a Dutch book argument, representation theorem 
argument, or epistemic utility argument. Second, as I just explained, I think that the 
traditional arguments for probabilism serve as much (or more) to characterize 
probabilism than they serve to justify it, and I think we can undertake this project of 
characterization without engaging in the project of justification. Finally, as I will explain 
below, there are aspects of each of the traditional arguments that make me leery of 
whole-heartedly endorsing any one of them as a successful justification for probabilism. 
Instead, I think that each of the traditional arguments contributes to the project of 
characterizing degrees of belief and degree of belief coherence, but none of them fully 
justifies the probabilist coherence norm. To use Hájek’s term, I think the traditional 
arguments help us to “triangulate” to probabilism (2008, p. 816). 
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So, why in particular do I reject the traditional arguments as justification of 
probabilism? I won’t consider each argument in detail, but I will present the main 
reasons I don’t endorse any one of them as the justification for probabilism. The main 
reason I don’t endorse a Dutch book argument for probabilism is that I reject the betting 
quotient analysis of degrees of belief. I think that betting quotients are often a good 
indication of degrees of belief, but they do not constitute degrees of belief, and they 
indicate or measure degrees of belief only imperfectly. So, I reject versions of the 
argument that draw a tight connection between degrees of belief and betting quotients. 
I am sympathetic to versions of the argument that draw looser connections between 
degrees of belief and betting quotients. I have in mind here Christensen’s (1996, 2004) 
depragmatized versions of the argument. However, I also think that these versions 
provide, as Titelbaum (2013, p. 286) puts it, at best an “indirect” justification for 
probabilistic degree of belief coherence. Thus, I see these arguments more as 
illustrations or dramatizations of the importance of degree of belief coherence than I 
see them as conclusive arguments for probabilism. 
I don’t fully endorse representation theorem arguments for similar reasons.157 Just 
as I deny the tight connection between degrees of belief and betting quotients, I also 
deny the tight connection between degrees of belief and preferences. Setting aside the 
                                                          
157 I wish to distinguish, once again, the traditional Representation Theorem Arguments 
for probabilism, which tie degrees of belief to preferences, from appeals to 
representation theorems that demonstrate the representability of comparative 
confidence functions with quantitative probability functions. 
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problems with the representation theorem argument itself,158 I reject the analysis or 
explication of degree of belief in terms of preference.  
My reasons for avoiding commitment to an epistemic utility argument for 
probabilism are a little different. My primary reasons for avoiding the Dutch book and 
representation theorem arguments have to do with what I see as inaccurate 
characterizations of degrees of belief. Since the epistemic utility arguments don’t seek 
so much to analyze degree of belief, I have different reasons for being leery of them. 
First, I avoid calibration arguments because I am not sure that calibration—matching 
relative frequencies—is a genuine epistemic good, or that the goodness of coherence 
stems from the goodness of calibration, if indeed it is good. My reasons for avoiding the 
gradational accuracy arguments are different still. I acknowledge that accuracy is a 
genuine epistemic good, and I am sympathetic to the idea that coherence is good 
because of its connection to accuracy across possible worlds. However, I don’t provide 
a gradational accuracy argument for probabilism in this dissertation because I think that 
the accuracy measures that these arguments rely on are every bit as controversial as 
probabilism itself.159 So, while I think that accuracy arguments provide a useful tool to 
help explore the connections between coherence and accuracy, and to suss out the 
normative assumptions that underlie probabilism, I don’t think that these arguments 
provide genuine justification for probabilism at present. 
                                                          
158 See Zynda (2000), Hájek (2008), and Meacham & Weisberg (2011) for discussion. 
159 Thanks to Jim Hawthorne on this point. 
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So, how do I think probabilism is justified? First, I want to note again that I would 
welcome a decisive Argument for Probabilism, if there were one. But since I think each 
of the major candidates has significant problems, I think we can find at least some 
alternative justification for probabilism in three main ways. First, I think we can justify 
probabilism by giving the kind of intuitive justification and defense of its norms that I 
attempt to provide in the previous section. Second, I think, following Hájek (2008), that 
we may be able to appeal to revised—weakened—versions of the traditional arguments 
for probabilism to triangulate to a characterization and justification of probabilism. 
Finally, following Eriksson & Hájek (2007) and Hájek (2008), I think that we can lend 
some justification to probabilism via a “proof in the pudding” strategy. That is, we can 
justify probabilism by appealing to its many successes in illuminating problems in 
epistemology, confirmation theory, and decision theory. Since probabilism provides 
such intuitive, helpful analyses of problem cases in these areas, it stands to reason that 
there is at least a kernel of truth in it. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to continue the project of stating a unified, complete 
probabilist modeling framework by generating a set of norms from CCF’s confidence 
axioms. Above, I explained that we need to carefully formulate these norms in order to 
make probabilism’s content and consequences clear. I presented the options for 
formulating norms from CCF’s axioms, and I argued for the Wg+ formulations as a 
characterization of the evaluative ideal of coherence for degrees of belief. I also 
mentioned some possibilities for lowering this standard of coherence to reconcile 
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coherence considerations with considerations about evidence, and our practical and 
cognitive limitations. Finally, I explained why I don’t endorse any of the typical 
arguments for probabilism to justify the notion of full-blown coherence I have 
characterized. 
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6 Conclusion 
I’ve had three main aims in this dissertation. First, I wanted to show why probabilists 
need to better articulate the foundations of their view. Second, I wanted to characterize 
what exactly it means to provide well-articulated foundations for probabilism. Finally, I 
wanted to provide an account of the core aspects of probabilism’s foundations. I set out 
to accomplish the first task in Chapters 2 and 3, and I set out to accomplish the latter 
two tasks in Chapters 4 and 5. 
In Chapter 2, I presented a typical statement of probabilism’s core tenets as well as 
the most prominent (and widely discussed) options for filling in the details. I presented 
probabilists’ characterizations of degrees of belief, and their justifications for positing 
degrees of belief. I also presented the probability calculus, its interpretation as a source 
of degree of belief norms, and the standard arguments probabilists use to justify the 
probabilist norm that degrees of belief should satisfy the axioms of probability theory. I 
presented this material primarily in order to acquaint the reader with probabilism, but 
also in order to begin to demonstrate the need for probabilists to fill in the details of 
their view. 
In Chapter 3, I developed in earnest the argument that probabilists must articulate 
unified foundations for their view. I presented the central issues in the dialectic between 
probabilists and their critics, and I drew out some of the major themes from this 
exchange. I presented three main sources of objections to probabilism, and I presented 
several of the major responses to these objections. I showed how the objections I 
surveyed fall into three main kinds: descriptive adequacy objections, demandingness 
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objections, and value objections. I also showed how the probabilist responses to these 
objections tend to be concessive or dogmatic in the face of these concerns. I showed 
how this dialectic raises various questions about probabilism’s methodological and 
normative foundations, and how probabilist responses to objections begin to reveal 
different answers to these foundational questions. I concluded with an argument that 
probabilists must articulate unified foundations for their view. I argued that while 
probabilists have a variety of responses to the main objections to their view (both 
concessive and dogmatic), several of these responses are in tension. They are not clearly 
compatible. So, I concluded that probabilists must articulate the foundations of their 
view in a unified, systematic way in order to clarify their view’s content and aims, and 
in order to provide a fully developed rebuttal of the common objections to their view. 
In the remainder of the dissertation, I set out to begin the project of spelling out 
unified foundations for probabilism. I started with probabilism’s methodological 
foundations in Chapter 4, where I provided an account of probabilism’s aims, its 
formalism, and its modeling methodology. I provided an account of the nature and aims 
of formal modeling in general and probabilism in particular. I concluded that probabilism 
has three main aims: characterizing certain philosophical concepts (degree of belief, 
coherence, and rationality), formulating norms for degrees of belief, and generating 
normative verdicts about degrees of belief in particular cases. I also adopted and 
presented Titelbaum’s (2013) account of the elements of a well-articulated modeling 
framework. Finally, I set out to characterize the elements of a well-articulated 
probabilist modeling framework, CCF (the Comparative Confidence Framework), 
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beginning with what I call its methodological foundations. In particular, I set out CCF in 
terms of a logical (rather than set-theoretic) formal system, and in terms of a 
fundamentally qualitative, comparative (rather than quantitative) representation of 
degrees of belief.  
In Chapter 5, I provided an account of probabilism’s normative foundations. In 
particular, I defended an account of the translation of CCF’s axioms and theorems into 
degree of belief norms. I explained that we need to carefully formulate these norms in 
order to make probabilism’s content and consequences clear. I presented many options 
for formulating norms from CCF’s axioms, and I argued for what I called the Wg+ 
formulations, which characterize degree of belief coherence as an evaluative ideal, 
which I called “full-blown coherence.” Finally, I explained why I don’t endorse any of the 
typical arguments to justify probabilism. 
The result of my efforts is CCF. CCF is a logical, fundamentally qualitative and 
comparative probabilist modeling framework. It is intended primarily to characterize a 
notion of ideal degree of belief coherence, which I call “full-blown coherence.” And it 
provides norms associated with this coherence standard, which can be applied to 
evaluate the coherence of the degrees of belief of real agents in particular cases.  
CCF avoids concerns about the excessively precise numerical representation of 
degrees of belief that plague traditional probabilism. Indeed, it clarifies when the 
numerical representation of degrees of belief is truly appropriate. Furthermore, it is well 
suited to the representation of the degrees of belief of non-ideal agents, and agents 
whose evidence is incomplete, imprecise, or equivocal.  
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CCF is also sensitive to concerns about the demandingness of its normative 
standard of full-blown coherence. As I explained in Chapter 5, full-blown coherence is 
an extremely high normative standard—well beyond the reach of real human agents, 
with all of our cognitive and practical limitations. Though CCF characterizes a coherence 
ideal that is beyond the reach of real agents, it is just one part of the wider subjective 
Bayesian theory of doxastic and pragmatic rationality. Many of the apparent tensions 
that emerge in probabilist responses to objections are due to the fact that probabilism’s 
purposes are not clear. Is probabilism supposed to characterize mere coherence norms 
for degrees of belief? Or is it supposed to codify all of the synchronic degree of belief 
norms, encompassing both coherence considerations and evidential considerations? Is 
probabilism an epistemic ideal or is it supposed to provide norms that guide real agents, 
with all of our practical, computational, and mnemonic limitations? CCF characterizes 
probabilism as a coherence ideal. A complete statement of this wider theory will include 
an account of how to reconcile coherence considerations with evidential norms and 
considerations about human limitations. CCF is a first step in a more careful articulation 
of the wider subjectivist Bayesian account of doxastic and practical rationality.  
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Appendix: Alternative Comparative Confidence Axioms 
In this appendix, I’ll present two alternative sets of axioms for CCF’s rudimentary 
confidence relations. Both alternative sets of axioms are equivalent to CCF’s 
rudimentary confidence axioms. I present these alternative axioms here not because 
they have different consequences from CCF’s axioms (they don’t), but for three main 
reasons. First, the alternative axioms are similar to other extant approaches in the 
literature on qualitative probability and comparative confidence. Second, the 
alternative axioms have some features that make them more suitable for some 
purposes than CCF’s axioms. Third, the alternative axioms are somewhat simpler than 
CCF’s axioms. 
CCF’s rudimentary confidence axioms are stated so as to avoid appealing to the 
notions of entailment and generic tautology, except in the tautological certainty axiom. 
This makes CCF’s other axioms a little more real agent friendly; for, some tautologies 
are extremely complex and some entailment relations are extremely difficult to 
compute. Thus, axioms that demand knowledge of any tautology whatsoever, or any 
entailment relation whatsoever, may be too demanding for real agents to follow in 
many cases. Ultimately, both CCF’s axioms and the alternative sets of axioms below have 
the same consequences, since they are equivalent. So, in the grand scheme, they all 
make the same strong demands. However, CCF’s axioms themselves, taken individually, 
are a little easier for real agents to follow when translated into norms.160   
                                                          
160 Excepting the tautological certainty axiom. 
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For the purposes of crafting a general theory of doxastic and practical rationality, 
real-agent-friendliness is a desirable feature of a set of comparative confidence axioms. 
However, for some more specific purposes, like the purpose of characterizing the 
highest ideal of degree of belief coherence without respect to the abilities of real agents, 
we might not be so squeamish about real-agent-unfriendliness. The main differences 
between CCF’s axioms and the alternative sets of axioms below are that the alternative 
axioms appeal to the notions of entailment and tautology more freely, and neither set 
of axioms appeals to a certainty predicate. For these reasons, the alternative axioms are 
a little simpler than CCF’s axioms. Thus, for the purposes of characterizing the highest 
ideal of degree of belief coherence, the alternative sets of axioms below may be 
preferable. 
The first set of alternative axioms is due to James Hawthorne.161 As before, a 
relation, ≽, defined on a standard language for predicate logic ℒ is a rudimentary 
confidence relation if and only if it satisfies the following axioms. For all 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷 ∈ ℒ: 
A1 there are some sentences 𝐹 and 𝐺 such that 𝐹 ⋡ 𝐺  (non-triviality); 
A2 if ⊨ 𝐴, then 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 (for every sentence 𝐵) (maximality); 
A3 𝐴 ≽ 𝐴 (reflexivity); 
A4 if 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ≽ 𝐶, then 𝐴 ≽ 𝐶 (transitivity); 
A5 if for some 𝐸, ⊨ ¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐸), ⊨ ¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐸), and  
(𝐴 ∨ 𝐸) ≽ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐸), then 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 
(subtractivity); 
                                                          
161 In private communication. 
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A6 if 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵, then for all 𝐺 such that ⊨ ¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐺) and ⊨ ¬(𝐵 ∧
𝐺), (𝐴 ∨ 𝐺) ≽ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐺) 
(additivity). 
In Chapter 4, I noted that CCF’s comparative confidence are based on the 
comparative confidence axioms of Hawthorne (2009), which are in turn based on the 
axioms of Savage (1972). The second set of alternative axioms is a logical analogue of 
Capotorti & Vantaggi’s (2000, pp. 210) set-theoretic comparative confidence axioms, 
which are similar to some early attempts at axiomatizing qualitative probability.162 Once 
again, a relation, ≽, defined on a standard language for predicate logic ℒ is a 
rudimentary confidence relation if and only if it satisfies the following axioms (where ⊥ 
is an arbitrary contradiction and T is an arbitrary tautology). For all 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷 ∈ ℒ: 
B1 ⊥ ⋡ T  (non-triviality); 
B2 if 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then 𝐵 ≽ 𝐴  (entailment); 
B3 𝐴 ≽ 𝐴 (reflexivity); 
B4 if 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ≽ 𝐶, then 𝐴 ≽ 𝐶 (transitivity); 
B5 if for some 𝐸, ⊨ ¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐸), ⊨ ¬(𝐵 ∧ 𝐸), and  
(𝐴 ∨ 𝐸) ≽ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐸), then 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵 
(subtractivity); 
B6 if 𝐴 ≽ 𝐵, then for all 𝐺 such that ⊨ ¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐺) and ⊨ ¬(𝐵 ∧
𝐺), (𝐴 ∨ 𝐺) ≽ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐺) 
(additivity). 
It’s obvious that the A axioms follow from the B axioms. The converse may not be 
so clear. In particular, one might want a proof that axiom B2 follows from the A axioms. 
(It’s obvious that Axiom A2 follows from Axiom B2.) 
                                                          
162 For example de Finetti (1931) as cited in Capotorti & Vantaggi (2000) and Fishburn 
(1986). 
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Theorem.  From the A axioms we have the following:  If 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵, then 𝐵 ≽ 𝐴. 
Proof.  Suppose 𝐴 ⊨ 𝐵. Then, ⊨ ((𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∨ ¬𝐴), so from A2, ((𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∨ ¬𝐴) ≽
(𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴). Notice also that ⊨ ¬((𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∧ ¬𝐴) and ⊨ ¬(𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐴), so (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ≽ 𝐴 
(from A5). Similarly, ⊨ (𝐵 ∨ ¬𝐵), so from A2, (𝐵 ∨ ¬𝐵) ≽ ((𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∨ ¬𝐴). Notice 
also that ⊨ ¬(𝐵 ∧ ¬𝐵) and ⊨ ¬((𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∧ ¬𝐵), so 𝐵 ≽ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) (from A5). Then 
𝐵 ≽ 𝐴 (A4). ∎ 
 
It’s also worth noting that, like CCF’s rudimentary confidence axioms, neither of 
these axiomatizations is sufficient for unique representability with numerical probability 
functions on its own. However, both sets are sufficient for unique probabilistic 
representation when they are supplemented with CCF’s Axiom X, as is the case with 
CCF’s rudimentary confidence relations. 
 
 
